United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
PHILIP
P. SIMON JUDGE
Archie
Lee Looney was granted leave to proceed against Correction
Officer Vanhorn in his individual capacity for compensatory
damages for denying necessary medical care to Looney on April
3, 2017, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Officer
Vanhorn now seeks summary judgment (ECF 70) contending that
the undisputed material facts entitle him to judgment as a
matter of law because: (1) Looney was not suffering from an
objectively serious medical condition when he encountered
Officer Vanhorn on April 3, 2017; (2) Vanhorn did not know of
and disregard a serious risk to Looney's health; and (3)
Vanhorn is entitled to qualified immunity. Looney has filed a
response and Officer Vanhorn has filed a reply.[1] (ECF 86; ECF 91.)
I will focus my attention on his second argument - whether
Vanhorn knew of and disregarded Looney's serious medical
condition.
Pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” The party seeking summary
judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion and
identifying” the evidence which “demonstrate[s]
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is,
which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A party asserting that a fact
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion
by … citing to particular parts of materials in the
record” or “showing that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute,
or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). In ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, I must view all facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. I will not “make
credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide
which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a
factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,
770 (7th Cir. 2003).
Here
are the facts recited in the light most favorable to Looney.
On April 3, 2017, Looney was an inmate incarcerated at Miami
Correctional Facility and Officer Vanhorn was a Correctional
Officer in the area where Looney was housed. (ECF 1; ECF 71-2
at ¶¶ 2, 4-5.) The unit had been on lockdown since
the preceding day. (ECF 71-1 at 10.) While on lockdown,
offender movement is limited - inmates are at the mercy of
guards to let them out of their cells so they can use the
restroom or get water. (Id.; ECF 71-2 at ¶ 6.)
Early
on the morning of April 3, 2017, around 2:30 a.m., the
inmates on Looney's block were permitted an opportunity
to use the restroom and get a drink. (ECF 71-1 at 13.) When
Looney went to the restroom, he started hurting.
(Id.) According to Looney, it felt like he was
getting electric shocks down his back and side, and he was
barely able to walk. (Id. at 13, 15.) He was
suffering from spasms, and he had never experienced pain like
this before. (Id. at 14-15, 22-23.) Looney
approached Officer Vanhorn and asked him to call for medical
help. (Id. at 10, 13.) Officer Vanhorn asked what
was wrong, and Looney indicated that his back was
“killing [him] around [his] kidney area.”
(Id. at 13.) Officer Vanhorn responded by telling
Looney to fill out a medical request. (Id. at 11,
13; ECF 71-2 at ¶ 12.) Looney replied by stating,
”[m]an, a medical request would take seven days before
I get seen. I need, you know, medical help now.” (ECF
71-1 at 13-14.) Officer Vanhorn responded by stating “I
don't' give a fuck” and telling Looney to
“[l]ock back down.” (Id. at 14; see
also ECF 86 at 3; ECF 86-1 at 1-5.) Officer Vanhorn does
not concede that he used this language, but I will assume he
did for present purposes. In either event, he does concede
that Looney was told to return to his cell because the
facility was on lock-down. (ECF 71-2 at ¶ 13.) Looney
estimates his conversation with Officer Vanhorn lasted two
and a half to three minutes. (ECF 71-1 at 15.) Following this
brief conversation, Looney went to lay down. (Id. at
14-15.)
Looney
believed that, based on the information he provided to
Officer Vanhorn, a “signal 3000” for a medical
emergency should have been called. (Id. at 23.)
Officer Vanhorn, however, reports that he observed that
Looney was conscious, breathing regularly, had no excessive
bleeding, no severe burns and was ambulating without
assistance. (ECF 71-2 at ¶ 10.) Officer Vanhorn did not
believe that Looney was suffering from a medical emergency.
(Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11.) Nevertheless, he
reported Looney's complaints to his unit sergeant. (ECF
71-2 at ¶ 14.) Shortly thereafter, the unit sergeant
told Officer Vanhorn that medical did not need to see Looney.
(ECF 71-2 at ¶ 15.)
In the
hours following his conversation with Officer Vanhorn,
Looney's symptoms would come and go. (ECF 71-1 at 21-22.)
He was able to rest for several hours, and he did not request
medical care from any other correctional officer in the next
twelve hours. (Id. at 15, 21-22.) Later in the day,
Looney began to experience stronger spasms or convulsions,
and he started throwing up. (Id. at 11, 15, 22-23.)
On April 3, 2017, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Looney was
doubled over on his bed, holding his abdomen with one hand
and his lower back with the other. (ECF 71-3.) Looney
reported being unable to use the restroom and unable to
stand. (Id.) The situation was treated as a medical
emergency, and a signal 3000 was called. (Id.) He
was admitted to the infirmary in critical condition and
diagnosed with a urinary tract infection. (ECF 71-1 at 11.)
In
medical cases, the Eighth Amendment test is expressed in
terms of whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent
to the plaintiff's serious medical need. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). A medical need is
“serious” if it is “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Greeno
v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
“[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the
official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless
manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the
plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not
to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even
though he could have easily done so.” Board v.
Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation
marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
At the
point in time that Looney asked Officer Vanhorn to contact
medical for him, a doctor had not diagnosed Looney with a
condition mandating treatment. Thus, I must determine if,
based on the undisputed facts taken in the light most
favorable to Looney, his medical need was “so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the need for a
doctor's attention.” See Greeno, 414 F.3d
at 653. Obviously, Looney did need medical attention - he was
suffering from a urinary tract infection and became gravely
ill within hours of his conversation with Officer Vanhorn.
The issue, however, is what Officer Vanhorn knew when he made
the decision not to call for medical help. At that time,
Officer Vanhorn knew that Looney indicated that his back was
“killing [him] around [his] kidney area.” (ECF
71-1 at 12.) Officer Vanhorn observed that Looney
was conscious, breathing regularly, had no excessive
bleeding, no severe burns and was ambulating without
assistance. (ECF 71-2 at ¶ 10.)
Based
on the limited information that Officer Vanhorn had when he
declined to call for emergency medical assistance for Looney,
no reasonable factfinder could find that a layperson should
have concluded from those facts that Looney needed a
doctor's immediate attention. Perhaps Officer Vanhorn
should have asked more questions. If he did, he might have
learned more details from Looney. Perhaps Looney would have
described the feeling of electrical shocks down his back and
side and explained that he had never had a similar feeling
before. Perhaps he would have described the spasms he was
experiencing. Perhaps he would have explained to Officer
Vanhorn that, while he was walking, it was a struggle because
he was in so much pain. Perhaps a more caring individual
would have checked on Looney before his shift was over to see
how he was doing. Certainly, a more caring individual would
not have indicated that he did not “give a fuck.”
(ECF 71-1 at 14; see also ECF 86 at 3; ECF 86-1 at
1-5.)
One
would hope that jail guards comport themselves with a degree
of compassion. But for better or worse, the Constitution does
not mandate it. Instead, the Constitution requires that
guards summon medical care for an inmate when the need is so
obvious that even a layperson would recognize the need. Here,
no reasonable fact finder could reach that conclusion based
on the limited information that Officer Vanhorn possessed at
the time he refused to seek immediate medical care for
Looney. An additional indication that Vanhorn was not
deliberately indifferent to Looney's medical needs is
that, rather than do nothing at all, Vanhorn reported the
situation to his supervisor, who confirmed Looney's
determination that immediate medical attention was not
warranted at that time.
While
Looney has every reason to be angry and disappointed with how
Officer Vanhorn handled his request for medical care on the
night of April 3, 2017, the facts before the court, even when
taken in the light most favorable to Looney, do not suggest
that Officer Vanhorn violated Looney's Eighth Amendment
rights.
ACCORDINGLY:
Officer
Vanhorn's motion for summary judgment ...