United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED BY DEFENDANTS DAWDY AND NEAL
R. SWEENEY II, JUDGE
James Stewart-Bey, an inmate confined at the Wabash Valley
Correctional Facility (Wabash Valley), filed this civil
rights action on December 4, 2018. Two of the four
defendants, Nurse Dawdy and Officer Neal, have moved for
summary judgment seeking resolution of the claims against
them on the basis that Mr. Stewart-Bey failed to exhaust his
available administrative remedies before filing this action.
Dkt. 23; dkt. 49. Mr. Stewart-Bey has not opposed the motions
for summary judgment and the deadline for doing so has
passed. For the reasons explained in this Entry, the moving
defendants' unopposed motions for summary judgment must
claim against Officer Neal is that he failed to respond to
Mr. Stewart-Bey's emergency medical needs; while the
claim against Nurse Dawdy is that she was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. Dkt. 6.
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Material facts are those that
might affect the outcome of the suit under applicable
substantive law.” Dawson v. Brown, 803 F.3d
829, 833 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
“A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists
‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'”
Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 609-10 (7th Cir.
2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The Court views the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in the non-movant's favor. See
Barbera v. Pearson Education, Inc., 906 F.3d 621, 628
(7th Cir. 2018).
motions for summary judgment, brief in support, and Rule 56
notice were served by Nurse Dawdy and Officer Neal on Mr.
Stewart-Bey on July 18, 2019, dkt. nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, and
on October 18, 2019, dkt. nos. 49, 50, 51, respectively. As
noted, Mr. Stewart-Bey has not opposed the motions. The
consequence of Mr. Stewart-Bey's failure to respond is
that he has conceded the defendants' version of the
facts. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.
2003) (“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as
mandated by the local rules results in an admission.”);
see S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1(b) (“A party
opposing a summary judgment motion must . . . file and serve
a response brief and any evidence . . . that the party relies
on to oppose the motion. The response must . . . identif[y]
the potentially determinative facts and factual disputes that
the party contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding
summary judgment.”). This does not alter the standard
for assessing a Rule 56(a) motion, but does “[r]educ[e]
the pool” from which the facts and inferences relative
to such a motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129
F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
Prison Litigation Reform Act
substantive law applicable to the motions for summary
judgment is the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which
requires that a prisoner exhaust his available administrative
remedies before bringing a suit concerning prison conditions.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular
episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some
other wrong.” Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines
and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly
structure on the course of its proceedings.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote
omitted); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804,
809 (7th Cir. 2006) (“‘To exhaust remedies, a
prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and
at the time, the prison's administrative rules
require.'”) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry,
286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). Because exhaustion of
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, the burden
of proof is on the defendants to demonstrate that Mr.
Stewart-Bey failed to exhaust all available administrative
remedies before he filed this suit. Thomas v. Reese,
787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015).
following facts, unopposed by Mr. Stewart-Bey and supported
by admissible evidence, are accepted as true for purposes ...