United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
JON E.
DEGUILIO JUDGE
Kevin
Martin, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint.
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner
complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. “In order to state a claim
under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1)
that defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional
right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state
law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th
Cir. 2006).
In the
complaint, Martin has named nine separate defendants and
alleged that they have opened his legal mail and denied him
access to the courts by refusing to send his outgoing legal
mail. He alleges that the defendants have violated his First
Amendment free speech rights, Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. For his
claims, he seeks money damages and injunctive relief.
Prisoners
are entitled to meaningful access to the courts. Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977). The right of access
to the courts is the right of an individual, whether free or
incarcerated, to obtain access to the courts without undue
interference. Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 291
(7th Cir. 2004). The right of individuals to pursue legal
redress for claims that have a reasonable basis in law or
fact is protected by the First Amendment right to petition
and the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due
process. Id. (citations omitted). Denial of access
to the courts must be intentional; “simple negligence
will not support a claim that an official has denied an
individual of access to the courts.” Id. at
291 n.11 (citing Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 602
(7th Cir. 1992)). To establish a violation of the right to
access the courts, an inmate must show that unjustified acts
or conditions (by defendants acting under color of law)
hindered the inmate's efforts to pursue a non-frivolous
legal claim, Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 591, 590
(7th Cir. 1998), and that actual injury (or harm) resulted.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (holding
that Bounds did not eliminate the actual injury
requirement as a constitutional prerequisite to a prisoner
asserting lack of access to the courts); see also
Pattern Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, 8.02
(rev. 2017). In other words, “the mere denial of access
to a prison law library or to other legal materials is not
itself a violation of a prisoner's rights; his right is
to access the courts, ” and only if the
defendants' conduct prejudices a potentially meritorious
legal claim has the right been infringed. Marshall v.
Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006).
Martin's
complaint contains many broad statements about his rights
being violated but few facts. In the complaint, Martin does
not identify any specific legal proceeding, describe his
nature of his legal claim that has been harmed, or explain
how that claim has been harmed. And, he alleges that his
legal mail has been opened, but he does not describe the
legal mail at issue. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419
F.3d 678, 685- 86 (7th Cir. 2005)(defining legal mail
narrowly as letters “marked with an attorney's name
and a warning that the letter is legal mail.”). He does
not describe in detail how each defendant was involved in
violating his rights. And, while he provides many dates, he
does not link those dates to specific facts.
Martin
also alleges that his right to access the prison's
grievance process was impinged. But, Martin has no
constitutional right to access the grievance process. See
Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2008)
(noting that there is not a Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due-process right to an inmate grievance procedure). Martin
further alleges that prison staff did not follow the
prison's own policies, but a violation of the
prison's policy does not rise to the level of a
Constitutional violation. Scott v. Edinburg, 346
F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003)(“However, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional
violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case,
departmental regulations and police practices.”). In
sum, the complaint does not state a valid claim, and Martin
may not proceed on the complaint.
Lastly,
Martin has filed a motion (ECF 4) seeking a temporary
restraining order. “[A] preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be
granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the
burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). To obtain a preliminary injunction,
the moving party must show (1) he will suffer irreparable
harm before the final resolution of his claims; (2) available
remedies at law are inadequate; and (3) he has a likelihood
of success on the merits. See BBL, Inc. v. City of
Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 323-24 (7th Cir. 2015). Because
Martin's complaint does not state a claim, at this
juncture the court cannot find that Martin has a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits, and the motion for a
temporary restraining order must be denied.
While
Martin's complaint does not state a claim, if Martin
believes he can address the deficiencies set forth in this
order, he may file an amended complaint. See Luevano v.
Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013). If he chooses
to file an amended complaint, he should obtain the
court's approved form from the jail law library, and he
must put the case number of this case on it, which is on the
first page of this order. In the amended complaint, he should
explain in his own words what happened, when it happened,
where it happened, who was involved, and how he was
personally injured by the events that transpired, providing
as much detail as possible.
For
these reasons, the court:
(1)
DENIES Kevin Martin's Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order (ECF 4);
(2)
GRANTS Kevin Martin until January 30,
2020, to file an amended complaint; and
(3)
CAUTIONS Kevin Martin, that, if he does not respond by that
deadline, this case will ...