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Scott v. Bumpus

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

December 23, 2019

DAVID SCOTT, Plaintiff,
v.
JERRY BUMPUS, et al. Defendants.

          ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

          SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE

         Plaintiff David Scott, an inmate at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he received inadequate medical care for a broken jaw while he was confined at the Marion County Jail. The defendants, who are all Sheriff Deputies at the Jail, move for summary judgment on Mr. Scott's claims. Mr. Scott has responded, and the defendants have replied. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment is granted.

         I. Summary Judgment Standard

         A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

         The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need only consider the cited materials, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to “scour every inch of the record” for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them. Grant v. Trustees of Indiana University, 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

         Mr. Scott has responded to the motion for summary judgment. But he did not submit evidence or identify parts of the record to support his claims. Accordingly, the facts alleged in the defendants' motion are deemed admitted so long as support for them exists in the record. See S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1 (“A party opposing a summary judgment motion must . . . file and serve a response brief and any evidence . . . that the party relies on to oppose the motion.”); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the local rules results in an admission”); Brasic v. Heinemanns, Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 285-286 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming grant of summary judgment where the nonmovant failed to properly offer evidence disputing the movant's version of the facts). This does not alter the summary judgment standard, but it does “[r]educ[e] the pool” from which facts and inferences relative to the motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).

         II. Facts

         When the events giving rise to his claim took place, Mr. Scott was a pre-trial detainee housed at the Jail pending criminal charges. Dkt. 70-2. Mr. Scott claims that he “was assaulted by another inmate at the facility” on February 2, 2016. Dkt. 70-1, p. 8. None of the defendants in this case witnessed the assault and Mr. Scott did not report the assault to any of them. Id., p. 10.

         Following this assault, Mr. Scott had “throbbing pain in [the] left mandible, a headache, and the inside of [his] mouth was … getting dry, like the mucous membrane had been damaged.” Id., p. 12. He could not open or close his mouth without pain. Id. But he did not have any bleeding or lacerations that were visible on the outside of his face. Id., p. 19.

         Within a few hours of the assault, Mr. Scott submitted a written request for medical care directly to one of the nursing staff. Id., p. 18. Mr. Scott's request was classified as a “sick call” request by nursing staff. Id., p. 22. He was seen by Dr. Hill on February 5, 2016. Id. That same day, he was sent to Eskenazi Hospital where he received a CT scan and was diagnosed with a fracture of the left mandibular bone and an abscess. Id., p. 24-25; dkt. 70-5, p. 2. He returned to the Jail later that afternoon and was placed in the infirmary. Dkt. 70-1, p. 26. He was returned to his cell later that night. Id. at 27.

         On February 6, 2016, Mr. Scott presented another written health request. Id., p. 28; dkt. 70-5, p.28. This request states, “The Ibuprofen isn't working. Could I please get something else?” Dkt. 70-5, p. 28. This request was tendered directly to the nurse-not any of the Sheriff Deputies- when the nurse made her regularly scheduled rounds that morning. Dkt. 70-1, p. 28. Medical staff saw Mr. Scott on February 8, 2016. Id., p. 31.

         Mr. Scott submitted a third request for medical care on February 13, 2016. Id. He submitted this handwritten request to a nurse. Id., p. 32. Mr. Scott was seen by Dr. Hill on February 16, 2016. Id., p. 32. Dr. Hill noted, “called HSA office and they are now aware of the fact that the patient needs to get a follow-up appointment with plastic department at Eskenazi.” Id., at 33; dkt. 70-5, p. 32-33.

         After the February 13, 2016 request, Mr. Scott is not “sure of any specific dates” when he requested any additional medical assistance. Dkt. 70-1, p. 35. Mr. Scott was seen daily by nursing staff between February 17, 2016 and February 24, 2016, to receive his medications. Id., p. 35-36. Mr. Scott was then sent to the special care unit. Id., p. 36. He was then transferred to Eskenazi Hospital where he had surgery performed on his jaw on February 25, 2016. Id.

         During this time, Mr. Scott made requests to the defendant Sheriff Deputies for medical assistance. Id., p. 45. However, he does not recall any specific dates or times at which these requests were made. Id. All of these requests were verbal, id., and some occurred in passing. Id., p. 54. Other than a general range of February 2, 2016 to ...


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