United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division
OPINION AND ORDER
A. BRADY JUDGE
admittedly failing to protect Plaintiff's rights under a
collective bargaining agreement, Defendant removed a $400
claim from the Allen County, Indiana Superior Court Small
Claims Division to this Court to avoid paying six hours of
overtime pay to one of its members. Now, after filing an
unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9), issuing written
discovery (ECF No. 36), and taking Plaintiff's deposition
(ECF No. 46), Defendant asks this Court for summary judgment
declaring that it can avoid reimbursing its dues-paying
member for amounts that all parties agree he was owed. For
the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 43) will be granted.
is a union with its principal place of business in Fort
Wayne, Indiana. Plaintiff is a member of Defendant, and at
all relevant times was employed by Supervalu as a grocery
selector. Defendant, in turn, had a collective bargaining
agreement with Supervalu.
October 22, 2017, Supervalu had a computer issue that
necessitated the scheduling of a second shift. According to
the collective bargaining agreement, Supervalu was supposed
to call in workers for the second shift based on bargaining
unit seniority. Supervalu failed to do so, resulting in
several of Defendant's members, including Plaintiff,
being denied the opportunity for overtime. Defendant viewed
this as a violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
business agent, Kim Springer, negotiated a verbal agreement
with Supervalu whereby Supervalu would agree to pay affected
workers for six hours of overtime. Defendant was to provide a
list of affected workers to Supervalu and, per the agreement,
no other workers would receive compensation. Plaintiff was
not included on the list, despite qualifying for compensation
as a result of his seniority. He was left off the list
because he had not worked his regular shift that day.
filed a grievance over the lost overtime pay, and his
grievance hearing was set for April 26, 2018. When Plaintiff
arrived for his hearing, Springer informed him that the
grievance would not be heard. Springer decided not to hear
the grievance because of the agreement with Supervalu that no
one other than the listed employees would be paid.
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine
addressing the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must
first dispose of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony Alledgedly [sic] Made by the Plaintiff During Sworn
Deposition. (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff seeks to exclude any
reference to his deposition testimony, essentially because
there was a significant delay between the taking of the
deposition and Plaintiff receiving a copy of the transcript.
Plaintiff apparently believes that this delay deprived him of
the opportunity to review the transcript and complete an
errata sheet, and therefore the whole of the deposition
should be deemed inadmissible.
provides the Court with no legal basis to grant his motion.
Rather, there would have been nothing that would have
prevented Plaintiff from completing and submitting the errata
sheet when he received the deposition. Hawthorne Partners
v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 831 F.Supp. 1398, 1406-07
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (accepting errata sheet even where it was
filed more than thirty days after party received notice of
completion). In addition, as Defendant correctly notes,
Plaintiff could not have made substantive changes to his
testimony via errata sheet, so it is difficult to understand
how submission of an errata sheet could change the
determination on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Treat v. Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 710
F.Supp.2d 777, 790 (N.D. Ind. 2010). The Court finds no
reason to bar the presentation of Plaintiff's deposition
Summary Judgment Standard
judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The non-moving party must marshal and
present the Court with evidence on which a reasonable jury
could rely to find in their favor. Goodman v. Nat'l
Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). A
court must deny a motion for summary judgment when the
nonmoving party presents admissible evidence that creates a
genuine issue of material fact. Luster v. Ill. Dep't
of Corrs., 652 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). A court's role in deciding a motion for summary
judgment “is not to sift through the evidence,
pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to
believe. The court has one task and one task only: to decide,
based on the evidence of record, whether there is any
material dispute of fact that requires a trial.”
Waldridge v. Am. Heochst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920
(7th Cir. 1994).
that are outcome determinative under the applicable law are
material for summary judgment purposes. Smith ex rel.
Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997).
Although a bare contention that an issue of material fact
exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute, a court
must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, view all reasonable inferences in that
party's favor, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200
F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2000), and avoid “the
temptation to decide which party's version of the facts
is more likely true, ” Payne v. Pauley, 337
F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). Additionally, a court is not
“obliged to research and construct legal arguments for
parties.” Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586,
590 (7th Cir. 2011). While pro se litigants ...