United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT
PATRICK HANLON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Victor Keeylen is a prisoner currently incarcerated at
Pendleton Correction Facility. Because he is a
“prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(c), this Court has an obligation under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b) to screen his complaint before service on the
defendants. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must
dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining
whether the amended complaint states a claim, the Court
applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir.
2017). To survive dismissal,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se
complaints like Mr. Keeylen's are construed liberally and
held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768,
776 (7th Cir. 2015).
Keeylen brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Detective Gary Riggs, the City of Indianapolis, the
Marion County Sheriff's Department Metro Drug Taskforce,
and Andre Strong. Dkt. 1.
Keeylen alleges that Detective Riggs (1) failed to follow the
law and protocols in investigating and charging him with
drug-related crimes; (2) submitted photos of money as
evidence even though they were from an unrelated case; (3)
defamed him by saying that he used and sold drugs and used
his business as a drug front; (4) executed a warrant that
“was based on misleading and bone dry facts” and
confiscated $1, 000 that was unrelated to the charged
offense; and (5) arrested him “without factual cause
that would become true beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal trial.” Dkt. 1 at 2-3.
Keeylen alleges that the City of “Indianapolis (1)
hired Detective Riggs despite knowing about “any and
all complaints filed against him, ” (2) allowed
Detective Riggs to execute an invalid search warrant, (3)
allowed Mr. Keeylen to be arrested and charged with charges
it knew could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and
(4) would not return his money and property after he was
acquitted. Dkt. 1 at 4.
Keeylen alleges that the Sheriff Department's Metro Drug
Taskforce confiscated and auctioned off his property before
the charges were resolved. Id.
Mr. Keeylen alleges that Andre Strong conspired with
Detective Riggs and the prosecutor to manufacture charges.
Discussion of Claims
should be dismissed at screening when it is clear on the face
of the complaint that they are barred by statutes of
limitations. See Dickens v. Illinois, 753 Fed.Appx.
390, 392 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 215 (2007)). That appears to be the case here for
all of Mr. Keeylen's federal claims.
Keeylen's § 1983 claims, the statute of limitations
is two years. Johnson v. City of South Bend, 680
Fed.Appx. 475, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Ind. Code §
34-11-2-4; Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City
of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005));
Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir.
2013). Mr. Keeylen says in his complaint that he was
acquitted on August 12, 2015, and all of the alleged
violations happened at or before that point. Dkt. 1. But he
did not file the complaint until July 9, 2019. Id.
The complaint was therefore filed ...