April 4, 2019
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No.
1:02-CR-00112-1 - Ruben Castillo, Judge.
Ripple, Hamilton, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
two appeals present straightforward issues of contract law,
but with some procedural complications. Appellant Michael
Segal was convicted in 2004 of racketeering, mail and wire
fraud, making false statements, embezzlement, and conspiring
to interfere with operations of the Internal Revenue Service.
The company he owned, Near North Insurance Brokerage (NNIB),
was convicted of mail fraud, making false statements, and
embezzlement. The history of Mr. Segal's prosecution is
detailed in United States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826
(7th Cir. 2007) (affirming convictions and all aspects of
sentence except forfeiture order); United States v.
Segal, 644 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming in part
and remanding for discretionary re-sentencing); and
United States v. Segal, 811 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 2016)
(addressing several issues under settlement of forfeiture
Mr. Segal served time in prison, see 811 F.3d at 259, and
after further sentencing proceedings, see 644 F.3d at 366-68,
he was ordered to forfeit to the government $15 million and
his entire interest in NNIB. The company itself was ordered
to pay restitution and a fine. 495 F.3d at 830. The
government initially restrained approximately $47 million
worth of assets of both Segal and NNIB. Liquidation
proceedings have continued well into the case's second
Segal's forfeiture obligations have been disputed for
years. See, e.g., 811 F.3d 257. In early 2013, on the eve of
what promised to be a complex and contentious hearing over
which assets should be forfeited and how much they were
worth, Mr. Segal and the government agreed on a
court-approved settlement that fulfilled Mr. Segal's $15
million personal forfeiture obligation. Mr. Segal now seeks
to rescind or modify that agreement. The district court
denied his attempt, and he now appeals. The 2013 settlement,
which Mr. Segal has succeeded in enforcing strictly against
the government, see id. at 261-62, is the first of
the two contracts we address here.
second contract is a related settlement between Mr.
Segal's ex-wife, Joy Segal, and the United States
government. The Segals divorced in June 2005, after Mr.
Segal's conviction. In February 2006, Ms. Segal filed a
third-party claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) to
intervene in Mr. Segal's forfeiture proceedings. In
November 2010, Ms. Segal, too, settled her claims with the
government. Under that deal, the government released to her
about $7.7 million in restrained assets. In
exchange, she relinquished all further claims -save one
contingent future interest, at issue here. She now seeks to
intervene in the ongoing liquidation proceedings that the
district court is administering pursuant to Mr. Segal's
forfeiture settlement. The district court denied her attempt
at intervention because her contingent future interest is not
yet ripe. She also appeals.
jurisdiction over both appeals, and we affirm in all respects
the district court's challenged orders. Because Ms.
Segal's claims depend on Mr.
Segal's-jurisdictionaily, procedurally, and
substantively-we address his first.
Michael Segal's Challenge to his Settlement
begin with appellate jurisdiction, which the government
challenges on the ground that Mr. Segal filed his notice of
appeal too late. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly,
206 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2000) (timely notice of appeal is
prerequisite for appellate jurisdiction). Mr. Segal appeals
from two orders: the district court's denial of his
motion to modify his forfeiture order, entered on July 12,
2017, and its denial of his motion to amend that order,
entered on August 16, 2017. R. 2100, 2107. He filed his
notice of appeal in the district court on September 6, 2017.
notice of appeal was too late if we apply the 14-day deadline
for a defendant's criminal appeal in Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), but it was timely if we apply
the 60-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and Rule
4(a)(1)(B) for civil appeals where the United States is a
party. Counting on the civil appeal deadline for an appeal of
such ancillary orders in a criminal case is risky, but we
find that this appeal is civil in substance and that Mr.
Segal's notice was therefore timely.
speaking, the time limit in a criminal case is not
jurisdictional, in the sense that a failure to comply may not
be overlooked or waived, because the time limit appears in a
Federal Rule rather than in a statute. United States v.
Neff, 598 F.3d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally
Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Svcs. of Chicago, 138
S.Ct. 13, 20 (2017) (distinguishing between jurisdictional
and mandatory claims-processing rules); United States v.
Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). The
60-day civil deadline where the United States is a party is
statutory, however, established by 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b),
so it is jurisdictional. The government has raised the
timeliness issue properly, so we must decide the issue,
whether as a matter of appellate jurisdiction or the
the 2013 settlement agreement, the district court retained
jurisdiction "in order to implement and enforce"
the settlement of the forfeiture issues. 2013 Settlement
Agreement 1 22. Though Mr. Segal himself titled the motion at
issue as one to modify the underlying forfeiture order, the
district court focused on the real substance of the relief
sought, which was rescission or modification of the
settlement agreement. That was the correct focus. The
court's order resolved what was in essence a civil
dispute embedded within a criminal case.
appeals from decisions modifying or refusing to modify
forfeiture orders in criminal cases are ordinarily governed
by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) because criminal
forfeitures are "punishment" and therefore part of
a criminal sentence. Libretti v. United States, 516
U.S. 29, 39 (1995) ("Congress conceived of forfeiture as
punishment for the commission of various drug and
racketeering crimes."); United States v.
Infelise, 159 F.3d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1998) ("There
is no question that, in general, forfeiture is part of the
sentence and is appealable."); United States v.
Apampa, 179 F.3d 555, 556-57 (7th Cir. 1999)
("[T]he core of a 'criminal case' to
which Rule 4(b) applies is the sentence.... A forfeiture that
constitutes part of the punishment in a criminal prosecution
is governed by Rule 4(b).").
in criminal cases do not often attempt to rely on the longer
appeal deadlines for civil cases, but in several such appeals
filed under the umbrella of criminal cases, we have applied a
pragmatic approach that looks to the "substance and
context, and not the label, of the proceeding appealed from
[to] determine its civil or criminal character."
Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir.
1993) (applying civil deadline to appeal from denial of
certificate of innocence). We have taken this approach
because "many appealable orders technically 'in'
criminal cases look more civil than criminal,"
especially when they pertain to "postjudgment remedies
... collateral to criminal punishment." United
States v. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 1992)
(applying civil deadline to appeal of denial of order for
return of seized property); United States v. Lee,
659F.3d 619, 620-21 (7th Cir. 2011)
(applying civil deadline to appeal of order to defendant to
turn over funds in retirement accounts), citing United
States v. Kollintzas,501 F.3d 796, 800-01 (7th Cir.
2007) (allowing government to pursue garnishment and other
civil debt collection techniques under umbrella of criminal
case); United States v. Santiago,826 F.2d 499, 502
(7th Cir. 1987) (applying civil deadline to surety's
appeal of forfeiture of bail bond: "a bail bond is a
civil contractual agreement between the government and the
surety on behalf of the criminal defendant"); cf.
Lilly, 206 F.3d at 760 (applying criminal deadline
where defendant sought declaration that he had satisfied his
forfeiture obligation, which was a ...