United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, CHIEF JUDGE
2011, Defendant Lorenzo Lipscomb pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to defraud the U.S. Treasury and filing false claims with the
IRS after he and his co-defendant sister summitted a series
of tax returns to the IRS seeking approximately $609, 000 in
fraudulent refunds. [Cause No. 1:10-cr-0221-JMS-MJD-01,
Filing No. 67.] Mr. Lipscomb and his sister were
successful in causing the IRS to pay them approximately $95,
036 as a result of the false returns. [Cause No.
1:10-cr-0221-JMS-MJD-01, Filing No. 66 at 5-6.] Mr.
Lipscomb also pleaded guilty to two additional charges as
part of this scheme, including one count of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft.
[Cause No. 1:10-cr-0221-JMS-MJD-01, Filing No. 67.]
different scheme, Mr. Lipscomb caused the Indiana Department
of Workforce Development to pay him approximately $17, 700 in
unemployment benefits to which he was not entitled.
[Cause No. 1:11-cr-0140-JMS-KPF, Filing No. 18 at
6.] Mr. Lipscomb pleaded guilty to one count of wire
fraud. [Cause No. 1:11-cr-0140-JMS-KPF, Filing No.
11.] On October 31, 2011, Mr. Lipscomb was sentenced to
84 months' incarceration to be followed by a period of
three years' supervised release for the IRS tax return
scheme, [Cause No. 1:10-cr-0221-JMS-MJD-01, Filing No. 69
at 3-4], running concurrently with another 18
months' incarceration to be followed by a period of three
years' supervisory release for the unemployment benefit
scheme. [Cause No. 1:11-cr-0140-JMS-KPF, Filing No. 20 at
3.] Mr. Lipscomb has a history of similar convictions,
including two prior adult convictions for fraud offenses for
which he served sentences of incarceration. [Cause No.
1:10-0221-JMS-MJD-01, Filing No. 111 at 3.] On July 29,
2019, after completing 28 months of his assigned 36 months of
supervised release, Mr. Lipscomb filed a Motion for Early
Termination of Supervised Release, [Cause No.
1:11-cr-0140-JMS-KPF, Filing No. 27], and that motion is
now ripe for the Court's decision.
Lipscomb argues that, since beginning his supervised release
on March 16, 2017, he has maintained housing and full-time
employment, and has never been late nor missed any of his
restitution payments. [Cause No. 1:11-cr-0140-JMS-KPF,
Filing No. 27 at 1.] He states that he has complied with
all the requirements of his supervised release, and that his
life has changed for the better. [Cause No.
1:11-cr-0140-JMS-KPF, Filing No. 27 at 2.]
United States Probation Office (“USPO”)
has no specific objection to Mr. Lipscomb being released from
supervision, but suggests the Court consider his lengthy
criminal history, which includes multiple prior offenses for
fraud-related activities. [Cause No.
1:11-cr-0140-JMS-KPF, Filing No. 29.]
Government opposes Mr. Lipscomb's motion, arguing that he
has not articulated any new or unforeseen circumstances nor
information regarding exceptionally good behavior. [Cause
No. 1:10-0221-JMS-MJD-01, Filing No. 111 at 4-5.] The
Government claims that Mr. Lipscomb's motion is
insufficient to justify early termination of supervised
release because simply abiding by the terms of the supervised
release, refraining from criminal activity, and maintaining
employment is the bare minimum required under a Court-ordered
release. [Cause No. 1:10-0221-JMS-MJD-01, Filing No. 111
may, after considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), “terminate a term of supervised release and
discharge the defendant released at any time after the
expiration of one year of supervised release . . . if it is
satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the
defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Because Mr. Lipscomb has served
more than one year, he is eligible for early termination. The
issue, therefore, is whether termination is warranted by the
conduct of the defendant and is in the interest of justice.
have broad discretion when deciding motions for early
termination, provided that the court has shown its
consideration of the factors under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). See U.S. v. Temple, 464
Fed.Appx. 541, 544, 2012 WL 688260, at *3 (7th Cir. 2012).
However, courts also caution that “the conduct of the
defendant necessary to justify early termination should
include more than simply following the rules of supervision;
otherwise, every defendant who avoided revocation would be
eligible for early termination.” U.S. v.
O'Hara, 2011 WL 4356322, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Sep. 16,
2011). Courts expect compliance with rules as the default,
and early termination is only granted in cases involving new
or unforeseen circumstances, or where the defendant's
behavior has been exceptionally good. See, e.g.,
id.; U.S. v. Hicks, No. 05-cr-40023, 2009
WL 1515203 (S.D. Ill. June 1, 2009); U.S. v.
Washington, 2009 WL 482779 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 25, 2009).
Court agrees with the Government that immediate termination
of Mr. Lipscomb's release is not warranted at this time.
While Mr. Lipscomb's stability and adherence to the terms
of the supervised release are laudable, the Court cannot
grant an early termination for mere compliance with the
probationary terms. Mr. Lipscomb has failed to allege
exceptionally good behavior or unforeseen circumstances that
would make serving out the remainder of his sentence
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C § 3553(a), the Court
finds that Mr. Lipscomb's supervised release should not
be terminated prior to its original termination date.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Mr.
Lipscomb's Motion for Early Termination of Supervised
Release.   The clerk is directed to docket this
Order in cause numbers 1:10-cr-00221-JMS-MJD-01 and
 In many instances, the parties filed
documents under both cause numbers. However, for ease of
reference, the Court will refer to the filing number of only
one of the cause numbers.
 The factors include: (1) the nature
and circumstances of the offense and characteristics of the
defendant; (2) deterrence, protection of the public, and the
need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other rehabilitation; (3) the
sentence and applicable sentencing range; (4) any pertinent
policy statement by the Sentencing Commission; (5) the need
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; ...