United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ROBERT E. SPIKER, Petitioner,
T.J. WATSON, Respondent.
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL
Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge.
Spiker seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
January 2014, in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, Mr. Spiker pleaded guilty to two
counts of solicitation to commit a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373, and one count of attempted
murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1113. United
States v. Spiker, 3:13-cr-00127-MEW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. 2014)
(“Crim. Dkt.”), dkt. 35, 37. He received an
aggregate sentence of 720 months' imprisonment. Crim.
Dkt. 42. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Mr. Spiker's
conviction and sentence after his appointed counsel moved to
withdraw and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). United States v.
Spiker, No. 14-11679 (11th Cir. 2014).
March 2016, Mr. Spiker filed an amended motion to vacate
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied.
Crim. Dkt. 61, 63. He has now filed a § 2241 petition
alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
during his criminal proceeding.
Spiker's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is
subject to preliminary review to determine whether “it
plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254
Cases (applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to
Rule 1(b)); see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the
petition must be summarily dismissed.
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the presumptive
means by which a federal prisoner can challenge his
conviction or sentence. See Shepherd v. Krueger, 911
F.3d 861, 862 (7th Cir. 2018); Webster v. Daniels,
784 F.3d 1123, 1124 (7th Cir. 2015). Under very limited
circumstances, however, a prisoner may employ § 2241 to
challenge his federal conviction or sentence.
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1124. This is because
“[§] 2241 authorizes federal courts to issue writs
of habeas corpus, but § 2255(e) makes § 2241
unavailable to a federal prisoner unless it ‘appears
that the remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of [the]
detention.'” Roundtree v. Krueger, 910
F.3d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 2018). Section 2255(e) is known as
the “savings clause.”
Seventh Circuit has held that § 2255 is
“‘inadequate or ineffective' when it cannot
be used to address novel developments in either statutory or
constitutional law, whether those developments concern the
conviction or the sentence.” Id. Whether
§ 2255 is inadequate or ineffective “focus[es] on
procedures rather than outcomes.” Taylor v.
Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002).
Seventh Circuit construed the savings clause in In re
A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed
inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted
defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so
fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been
imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998).
“[S]omething more than a lack of success with a section
2255 motion must exist before the savings clause is
satisfied.” Webster, 784 F.3d at 1136.
to fit within the savings clause following
Davenport, a petitioner must meet three conditions:
“(1) the petitioner must rely on a case of statutory
interpretation (because invoking such a case cannot secure
authorization for a second § 2255 motion); (2) the new
rule must be previously unavailable and apply retroactively;
and (3) the error asserted must be grave enough to be deemed
a miscarriage of justice, such as the conviction of an
innocent defendant.” Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d
962, 964 (7th Cir. 2017); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d
583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Roundtree, 910
F.3d at 313 (acknowledging circuit split regarding
Davenport conditions and holding that relitigation
under § 2241 of a contention that was resolved in a
proceeding under § 2255 is prohibited unless the law
changed after the initial collateral review).
Spiker argues ineffective assistance of counsel instead of
relying on cases of statutory interpretation and has not
shown how a motion pursuant to § 2255 is ineffective or
inadequate to address his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Thus, the savings clause of § ...