United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY
DEFENDANTS FELDKAMP, KEMP, COFFEY, AND PRULHIERE
Tyrone Denny, an inmate at Pendleton Correctional Facility
(“Pendleton”), brought this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 alleging violations of his
Eighth Amendment rights. Defendants Feldkamp, Kemp, Coffey,
and Prulhiere moved for summary judgment. Mr. Denny
responded to the motion for summary judgment, and the
defendants filed a reply. Because the defendants designated
additional evidence in their reply, Mr. Denny filed a
sur-reply. See S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1(d). The
motion is now ripe for review. For the reasons explained in
this Order, there exists a genuine issue of material fact,
and the defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter
Summary Judgment Standard
motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a
trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). As the current version of Rule 56 makes clear, whether
a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely
disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing
to particular parts of the record, including depositions,
documents, or affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party
can also support a fact by showing that the materials cited
do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute
or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or
declarations must be made on personal knowledge, set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the
affiant is competent to testify on matters stated.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly support a fact in
opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in
the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and
potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P.
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only
consider disputed facts that are material to the decision. A
disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Williams v.
Brooks, 809 F.3d 936, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2016). “A
genuine dispute as to any material fact exists ‘if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Daugherty v.
Page, 906 F.3d 606, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence
it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its
version of the events. Gekas v. Vasilades, 814 F.3d
890, 896 (7th Cir. 2016). The moving party is entitled to
summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a
verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller,
570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court views the record
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws
all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.
Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717
(7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility
determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are
left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761
F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need only consider
the cited materials, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly assured the district
courts that they are not required to “scour every inch
of the record” for evidence that is potentially
relevant to the summary judgment motion before them.
Grant v. Trustees of Indiana University, 870 F.3d
562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017). Any doubt as to the existence of
a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving
party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Denny alleges that on December 17, 2015, he was attacked in
his housing dormitory by four other inmates incarcerated at
Pendleton. The complaint states that the defendants knew of
the threat to Mr. Denny and failed to prevent the attack,
demonstrating deliberate indifference to a known risk of
serious harm. The following facts are taken from Mr.
Denny's deposition, which was designated by the
defendants in support of their motion,  and are presented
in the light most favorable to Mr. Denny as the non-movant.
Denny was placed in administrative segregation at PCF on July
13, 2015. Shortly after, another inmate who was serving as a
wheelchair pusher informed Mr. Denny that “they was
going to do stuff to [him] or certain stuff was supposed to
happen to [him].” Dkt. 56-2 at 17:13-16, 21:20.
Specifically, the inmate told Mr. Denny that other inmates
were going to “get” him when he got out of
segregation because the other inmates believed Mr. Denny had
“checked into” segregation, meaning that he had
provided information to prison officials about other inmates.
August 20, 2015, Mr. Denny met with Investigator Prulhiere
and Investigator Feldkamp and told them “what [he]
heard in terms of the threats.” Id. at
26:2-10. He explained that other inmates thought he provided
information on them and that was why they “got their
stuff caught up.” Id. at 28:11-13. Mr. Denny
told Investigator Prulhiere and Investigator Feldkamp that he
had heard that “people wanted to attack [him] and hurt
[him].” Id. at 27:23-25; see also Id.
at 29:11-17. Investigator Prulhiere told Mr. Denny that he
would put in a transfer request and that prison officials
were not going to “take the chance” and put Mr.
Denny “back out there.” Id. at 27:18-22.
being told that he was being transferred to another facility,
on August 30, 2015, Investigator Feldkamp visited Mr. Denny
and informed him that he was being removed from
administrative segregation and placed in the F South
dormitory. Investigator Feldkamp said he did not want to
remove from Mr. Denny from administrative segregation, but
they needed the bed space. When Mr. Denny reminded
Investigator Feldkamp of the threats against him,
Investigator Feldkamp said Mr. Denny would not be there long.
When Mr. Denny suggested that he be returned to N Central-the
housing unit he was assigned to before being placed in
administrative segregation-Investigator Feldkamp promised to
look into a transfer and said Mr. Denny would go to F South
“for right now.” Id. at 33:20-34:11.
After Mr. Denny again expressed discomfort with going to F
South, Investigator Feldkamp said he had no choice.
Denny spoke with Investigator Feldkamp again within the first
week of being placed in F South and throughout the time he
was housed there. He also spoke with Lieutenant Kemp and
Captain Coffey. On an almost daily basis, Mr. Denny expressed
his concerns. Anytime he saw one of them, he would try to
talk to them. He had conversations with the defendants, sent
requests for interviews, and filed grievances. During the
conversations, he would tell the defendants that he did not
feel comfortable in F South because people were still talking
about “doing stuff to [him]” and threatening him.
Id. at 44:8-44:5. He also told the defendants that
“people tried to steal [his] stuff and start with
[him].” Id. at 44:15-16; see also Id.
Mr. Denny asked Investigator Feldkamp, Lieutenant Kemp, or
Captain Coffey about being transferred, they all said that it
was “out of [their] hands” and they could not do
anything to help him. These individuals also did not respond
to the grievances and requests for interview submitted by Mr.
Mr. Denny did not speak with Investigator Prulhiere about the
threats against him after the interview on August 20, 2015,
he sent several requests for interview to Investigator
Prulhiere. Investigator Prulhiere did not respond to these