United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division
OPINION AND ORDER
P. KOLAR MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the Court sua sponte. The Court
must continuously police its subject matter jurisdiction.
Hay v. Ind. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 312 F.3d
876, 879 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court must dismiss this action
if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(h)(3). Currently, the Court is unable to determine if it
has subject matter jurisdiction over this litigation.
Indiana Farm Bureau Insurance invoked this Court's
subject matter jurisdiction via diversity jurisdiction by
filing its Complaint in federal court. As the party seeking
federal jurisdiction, Plaintiff has the burden of
establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists.
Smart v. Local 702 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
562 F.3d 798, 802-03 (7th Cir. 2009).
Court to have diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff and
Defendants, Gree USA, Inc. and MJC America Ltd. d/b/a Soleus
International, Inc., must be citizens of different states,
and the amount in controversy must be more than $75, 000.
Further, if Plaintiff has not paid the entire loss suffered
by the insured parties, James and Donna Bushong, then the
insured parties and Defendants must also be citizens of
different states. Plaintiff has alleged a sufficient amount
in controversy. Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged the
citizenship of both Defendants. However, the allegations are
insufficient as to the citizenship of Plaintiff. The
allegations are also insufficient as to the citizenship of
the insured parties-if Plaintiff has paid the entire loss,
this is inconsequential; if Plaintiff has paid only part of
the loss, thus making the citizenship of the insured parties
crucial to the determination of diversity, this must be
Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a “‘Domestic
Insurance Corporation' duly authorized to issue insurance
policies in the State of Indiana, domiciled in the State of
Indiana, with its principal place of business in
Indianapolis, Indiana.” (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1).
This allegation is insufficient for the purpose of
“are deemed to be citizens of the state in which they
are incorporated and the state in which they have their
principal place of business.” N. Trust Co. v. Bunge
Corp., 899 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). The Seventh Circuit has further
“held that ‘when one corporation sues another and
the only basis of federal jurisdiction is diversity, the
[party asserting federal jurisdiction] must allege both the
state of incorporation and the state of principal
place of business for each corporation.'” Wojan
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 851 F.2d 969, 974-75 (7th Cir.
1988) (emphasis in original) (citing Casio, Inc. v. S.M.
& R. Co., Inc., 755 F.2d 528, 529-30 (7th Cir.
1985)); see also Karazanos v. Madison Two Assocs.,
147 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1998) (“in cases with
corporate parties, it is necessary to allege both the state
of incorporation and the state of the principal place of
business, even if they are one and the same.” (internal
citation omitted)). It is therefore not enough to allege
Plaintiff's state of principal place of business and the
state of its domicile, rather than its state of
Complaint further alleges that the insured parties
“resided in West Lafayette, Indiana.” (Compl.
¶ 2, ECF No. 1). This allegation is insufficient for the
purpose of determining citizenship. “Determining a
party's citizenship for purposes of a subrogation claim
requires determining whether the subrogation was total or
partial.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Greene, No.
1:10-cv-370, 2012 WL 1802325, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 17, 2012).
If the subrogee has paid an entire loss suffered by the
insured, it is the only real party in interest and must sue
in its own name. If it has paid only part of the loss, both
the insured and insurer (and other insurers, if any, who have
also paid portions of the loss) have substantive rights
against the tortfeasor which qualify them as real parties in
United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S.
366, 380-81 (1949) (citation omitted). “[T]otal
subrogation . . . results in focusing solely on the
subrogee's citizenship for diversity purposes, [while]
partial subrogation forces a look at both subrogee and
subrogor-that is the teaching in Aetna Cas.”
Pepsico Do Brasil, Ltda v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 534
F.Supp.2d 846, 848 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (emphasis omitted)
(citing Aetna Cas., 338 U.S. at 380-81); see
also Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1802325 at *2.
Further, “[t]he citizenship of a natural person for
diversity purposes is determined of course by the
person's domicile . . ., which means the state where the
person is physically present with an intent to remain there
indefinitely.” Lyerla v. Amco Ins. Co., 461
F.Supp.2d 834, 835 (S.D. Ill. 2006). Allegations of residency
in a state are not sufficient. See Id. (Diversity
jurisdiction “is determined by citizenship of a state,
not allegations of residency in a state.” (internal
citations omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiff must first allege
whether it has paid the entire loss suffered by the insured
parties. If Plaintiff has paid the entire loss, then it is
the only real party in interest and the citizenship of the
insured parties is inconsequential to the Court's
determination of subject matter jurisdiction. If Plaintiff
has paid only part of the loss, Plaintiff must then properly
allege the citizenship of the insured parties as described
the importance of determining the Court's jurisdiction to
hear this case, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege its
citizenship and the citizenship of the insured parties, if
necessary, as outlined above. Therefore, the Court
ORDERS Plaintiff to FILE,
on or before July 26, 2019, a