United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, New Albany Division
ENTRY ON GOVERNMENT'S MOTION IN LIMINE
TANYA
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on the United States' (the
“Government”) Motion for Orders in
Limine to exclude the testimonies of three of Defendant
Wayne John Komsi, III's (“Komsi”) proposed
witnesses (Filing No. 65). For the following
reasons, the Government's motion is
granted in part and denied
in part.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant
to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Government has filed a Motion for Orders in Limine
requesting that the Court address certain matters that are
capable of resolution prior to trial. The court excludes
evidence on a motion in limine only if the evidence
clearly is not admissible for any purpose. See Hawthorne
Partners v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. 831 F.Supp.
1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Unless evidence meets this
exacting standard, evidentiary rulings must be deferred until
trial so questions of foundation, relevancy, and prejudice
may be resolved in context. Id. at 1400-01.
Moreover, denial of a motion in limine does not
necessarily mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion
is admissible (or inadmissible); rather, it only means that,
at the pretrial stage, the court is unable to determine
whether the evidence should be excluded. Id. at
1401.
II.
DISCUSSION
At the
final pretrial conference held on June 7, 2019, Komsi
indicated that witness Laura Raiman (“Raiman”),
the attorney who represented him in the Veterans Treatment
Court, would testify about Komsi's plea agreement and the
general operation of the Veterans Treatment Court. Komsi
further indicated Marty Pentz, Ph.D. (“Dr.
Pentz”) and Lonnie Sutterfield, M.Div. (“ Rev.
Sutterfield”) would testify as to his state of mind
during the period in which he allegedly purchased the
firearms. The Government seeks to exclude the testimonies of
these three witnesses arguing the proffered testimony of each
witness is either irrelevant, hearsay or opinion testimony
that is barred by the rules of evidence.
A.
Testimony of Laura Raiman
Komsi
indicates that Raiman will testify regarding her
interpretation of the plea agreement Komsi signed in Jennings
County (Indiana), which required him to appear in the
Veterans Treatment Court in Bartholomew County (Indiana), and
that she would testify about his participation in the
Veterans Treatment Court. The Government argues both lines of
evidence are inadmissible. (Filing No. 65 at 1.)
1.
Interpretation of the Plea Agreement
At the
final pretrial conference, Komsi's counsel proffered:
“[a]lthough Raiman had nothing to do with the plea
agreement, she is a lawyer, obviously, and she can interpret
for the jury the provisions of the plea agreement as well as
the process of the Veteran's Treatment Court.”
Raiman's interpretation of the plea agreement is
inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403,
according to the Government, because it is irrelevant and
prejudicial. The Government also asserts that her
interpretation of the Jennings County plea agreement would be
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(b)(1)(C) and FRE 702 because, since she was not
Komsi's counsel of record in Jennings County, her
interpretation of a legal document from that proceeding would
be expert testimony.
Komsi
responds that Raiman's responsibilities as his attorney
in Bartholomew County require that she be familiar with the
plea agreement. (Filing No. 69 at 1.) He contends
that if Officer Harry, the witness through whom he expects
the Government to introduce the plea agreement, “fairly
and accurately explains the plea agreement, with the
diversion component, ” he may not call Raiman to
testify about it. “[I]n the event that does not occur,
fairness dictates that Mr. Komsi would be entitled to call
his present state-court counsel to explain to the jury the
plea agreement with the diversion component.”
Id. at 2.
The
plea agreement itself is admissible evidence, and the
Government may lay the foundation for that evidence through a
witness familiar with the document. However, the rules of
evidence prevent any witness, whether called by the
Government or by Komsi, from interpreting the meaning of the
plea agreement. A plea agreement is a contract. U.S. v.
Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962, 971 (7th Cir. 2014).
“Courts have historically refused to admit expert
testimony explaining matters of domestic law, including the
interpretation of contracts.” Landmark Builders,
Inc. v. Cottages of Anderson, LP, 2003 WL 21508118 at *2
(S.D. Ind., May 20, 2003). Although courts will in some cases
allow expert testimony to address ambiguous terms, neither
party alleges that any part of the plea agreement is
ambiguous. See WH Smith Hotel Services, Inc. v.
Wendy's Intern., Inc., 25 F.3d 422 (7th Cir. 1994)
(admitting expert testimony on industry custom and usage to
assist in interpretation of ambiguous terms). Permitting
testimony, whether lay testimony or expert testimony, on how
to interpret the plea agreement could potentially invade the
province of both the jury and the court. Therefore, the
Government's Motion regarding this testimony is
granted, and Raiman will not be allowed to
offer her interpretation of the plea agreement.
2.
Participation and Operation of the Treatment
Court
The
Government next requests that Raiman be prohibited from
offering testimony regarding Komsi's participation in
Veterans Treatment Court because that testimony is irrelevant
and inadmissible character evidence. At the final pretrial
conference, counsel asserted that Raiman would testify about
how the treatment court operates and argued “this is
competent and relevant evidence to determine whether or not
the defendant was aware that he was under felony indictment
at the time that he made application for the firearm
acquisitions.” The Government contends this testimony
is irrelevant because “[h]is continued participation
does not go to whether or not he knew he had a pending
felony, ...