United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
JON E.
DEGUILIO JUDGE
Paul
Thompson, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended
habeas corpus petition challenging the disciplinary
proceeding (WCF 18-2-399) at the Westville Correctional
Facility in which a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) found
Thompson guilty of synthetic identity deception in violation
of Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.8, which in turn violates
Indiana Department of Correction Offense A-100. Following a
disciplinary hearing, Thompson was sanctioned with a loss of
ninety days earned credit time and a demotion in credit
class.
Thompson
argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the
hearing officer lacked sufficient evidence to find him
guilty.
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only]
have the support of some evidence in the record. This is a
lenient standard, requiring no more than a modicum of
evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the
record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the
disciplinary board were without support or otherwise
arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still must
point to the accused's guilt. It is not our province to
assess the comparative weight of the evidence underlying the
disciplinary board's decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
Under
departmental policy, Offense 100 is defined as
“violation of any federal, state, or local criminal
law.” Under Indiana law, it is a felony offense to
knowingly use the synthetic identifying information of
another person with the intent to profess to be another
person. Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(a)(3). Indiana law
defines synthetic identifying information as
“identifying information that identifies a person other
than the person who is using the information.” Ind.
Code. § 35-43-5-1. The administrative record includes a
conduct report stating that the inmate phone system prompts
an inmate for his department number and a PIN for his phone
account before the inmate is permitted to make a call.
Officer Throw saw Thompson using the telephone in the
dormitory and recognized his voice from the call but noticed
that the only active phone account belonged to another
inmate. Thompson had a restriction on his account that would
have otherwise prevented him from making this call. This
evidence suggests that Thompson used another person's
identifying information with the intent of presenting himself
as another person to correctional officials via the inmate
phone system and thus constitutes some evidence that Thompson
committed synthetic identity deception.
Thompson
contends that he did not deceive any one and that that the
other inmate agreed to let him use the phone account.
However, despite the name of the offense, actual deception
and lack of consent are not elements of synthetic identity
deception. Rather, the criminal statute expressly provides
that “It is not a defense in a prosecution . . . that
no person was harmed or defrauded.” Ind. Code §
35-43-5-3.5(d). Therefore, the claim that there was
insufficient evidence for a finding of guilt is not a basis
for habeas relief.
Thompson
also argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because
correctional staff would not provide him with the transcript
of the phone call for his defense as required by departmental
policy. He states that these transcripts would have shown
that the other inmate allowed him to use the account and that
the recipient of the call also consented to the call.
“Procedural due process also requires prison
disciplinary officials to disclose material exculpatory
evidence to the charged offenders.” Scruggs v.
Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939-40 (7th Cir. 2007).
“However, prison disciplinary officials need not permit
the presentation of irrelevant or repetitive evidence in
order to afford prisoners due process in disciplinary
proceedings.” Id.
As
discussed above, any evidence regarding consent or actual
deception would have been irrelevant to whether Thompson
committed synthetic identity deception. Moreover, to the
extent Thompson argues that correctional staff failed to
follow the disciplinary policy by not providing the
transcripts, such failures do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Estelle v. McGuire, 502
U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (“state-law violations provide no
basis for federal habeas relief”); Keller v.
Donahue, 271 Fed.Appx. 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding
that inmate's claim that prison failed to follow internal
policies had “no bearing on his right to due
process”). Therefore, the refusal to provide a
transcript is not a basis for habeas relief.
Additionally,
Thompson argues that the hearing officer did not properly
complete the disciplinary hearing report. Procedural due
process requires a “written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the
disciplinary action.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 564 (1974). “A prison disciplinary committee
is required to give a brief statement of the evidentiary
basis for its decision to administer discipline, so that a
reviewing court, parole authorities, etc. can determine
whether the evidence before the committee was adequate to
support its findings concerning the nature and gravity of the
prisoner's misconduct.” Saenz v. Young,
811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987). In the disciplinary
report, the hearing officer explained that he relied on staff
reports and Thompson's statement and that he imposed
sanctions due to the seriousness of the offense. Though the
hearing officer's explanation is not particularly
detailed, it identifies the evidentiary basis for the finding
of guilt and the reasons for the sanctions imposed and thus
satisfies procedural due process. Therefore, the claim that
the hearing officer did not properly complete the
disciplinary hearing report is not a basis for habeas relief.
Thompson
further argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because
the hearing officer was not a judge, reasoning that only a
judge may find him guilty of a criminal offense in a
disciplinary hearing. However, the full panoply of rights
afforded to a criminal defendant do not apply to prison
disciplinary hearings, and the right to procedural due
process does not grant inmates charged with disciplinary
offenses the right to a judicial determination in the first
instance. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 563-66 (listing
procedural requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings);
White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 768 (7th
Cir. 2001) (warning against adding requirements beyond those
provided by Wolff). Therefore, the claim that the
hearing officer was not a judge is not basis for habeas
relief.
Because
Thompson has not asserted a valid claim for habeas relief,
the habeas petition is denied. If Thompson wants to appeal
this decision, he does not need a certificate of
appealability because he is challenging a prison disciplinary
proceeding. See Evans v. Circuit Court, 569 F.3d
665, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). However, he may not proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal because the court finds pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal in this case could
not be taken in good faith.
For
these reasons, the court:
(1)
DENIES the amended habeas ...