United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON EXHAUSTION AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL
WILLIAM T. LAWRENCE, SENIOR JUDGE
Mark Jacob Jones, Sr. is a prisoner who at all relevant times
has been confined within the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) at the
Federal Correctional Center in Terre Haute, Indiana (FCC-TH).
Mr. Jones filed his complaint on September 17, 2018. Dkt. 1.
His claims are brought pursuant to the theory recognized in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA). More
specifically, the claims proceeding in this action are an
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Dr.
Elizabeth Trueblood and a negligence claim against the United
States. Dkt. 7.
defendants moved for summary judgment seeking resolution of
all claims on the basis that Mr. Jones failed to exhaust his
available administrative remedies. Dkt. 19. Mr. Jones has not
opposed the motion for summary judgment and the time for
doing so has passed. The action is ripe for resolution.
reasons explained in this Entry, the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, filed on March 27, 2019, must be
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Material facts are those that
might affect the outcome of the suit under applicable
substantive law.” Dawson v. Brown, 803 F.3d
829, 833 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
“A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists
‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'”
Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 609-10 (7th Cir.
2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The Court views the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in the non-movant's favor. See
Barbera v. Pearson Education, Inc., 906 F.3d 621, 628
(7th Cir. 2018).
defendants' motion for summary judgment, brief in
support, and Rule 56 notice were served on Mr. Jones on or
about March 27, 2019. The consequence of Mr. Jones'
failure to respond is that he has conceded the
defendants' version of the facts. Smith v. Lamz,
321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to
respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the local rules
results in an admission.”); see S.D. Ind.
Local Rule 56-1(b) (“A party opposing a summary
judgment motion must . . . file and serve a response brief
and any evidence . . . that the party relies on to oppose the
motion. The response must . . . identif[y] the potentially
determinative facts and factual disputes that the party
contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding summary
judgment.”). This does not alter the standard for
assessing a Rule 56(a) motion, but does “reduc[e] the
pool” from which the facts and inferences relative to
such a motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129
F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
Prison Litigation Reform Act Exhaustion
substantive law applicable to a portion of the motion for
summary judgment is the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA'”), which requires that a prisoner
exhaust his available administrative remedies before bringing
a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25
(2002). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement
applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.” Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines
and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly
structure on the course of its proceedings.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote
omitted); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804,
809 (7th Cir. 2006) (“‘To exhaust remedies, a
prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and
at the time, the prison's administrative rules
require.'”) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry,
286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). Because exhaustion of
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, the burden
of proof is on the defendants to demonstrate that Mr. Jones
failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies
before he filed this suit. See Thomas v. Reese, 787
F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Because exhaustion is
an affirmative defense, the defendants must establish that an
administrative remedy was available and that [the plaintiff]
failed to pursue it.”).