United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ORDER SCREENING AND DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE
Jonathan Psi Young, an Indiana Department of Correction
(IDOC) inmate presently incarcerated in the Plainfield
Correctional Facility, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action on February 2, 2019. Mr. Young was granted in
forma pauperis status and has paid the initial partial
filing fee. An amended complaint was filed March 12, 2019,
and is ready for screening.
Mr. Young is a “prisoner” as that term is defined
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), this Court has an obligation
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) to screen his complaint
before service on defendants. Pursuant to § 1915A(b),
the Court must dismiss the amended complaint if it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. In determining whether the amended complaint
states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when
addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d
714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). To survive dismissal,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se
complaints such as that filed by plaintiff are construed
liberally and held to “a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Cesal, 851 F.3d
Mr. Young's Amended Complaint
Young names as defendants Wexford Medical, Dr. M. Links, Dr.
Thayer, Warden Stanley Knight, IDOC Commissioner Robert
Carter, the Plainfield Correctional Facility, the IDOC, and
the State of Indiana. He seeks relief in the form of (1) a
correction to his IDOC security classification; (2) a
“Statement of Competency”; (3) previous
disciplinary conduct reports against him to be voided as
frivolous; (4) compensatory damages of two million dollars;
and (5) injunctive relief to deter retaliation against him.
Dkt. 6, ¶¶ 28-32.
Young pleads that he is “an errant sovereign”
sentenced to five years imprisonment in the IDOC. He alleges
that upon arrival in IDOC, he was erroneously given the
mental health code “c” which has resulted in his
being denied “level 1” housing. He has
unsuccessfully sought a “Statement of Competency”
from Dr. Thayer. Mr. Young alleges that Dr. Thayer, Dr.
Links, Wexford Medical Company, the Plainfield Correctional
Facility, the IDOC, and the State of Indiana have conspired
to produce and enforce policies that deter the “errant
sovereign” from asserting constitutional claims of
immunity. Dkt. 6, ¶¶ 13, 17-18, 21, 25, 28.
Thayer and Dr. Links are also alleged to have violated Mr.
Young's constitutional rights by invading his privacy,
making unspecified threats to deter him from making requests.
Wexford Medical Company is alleged to have policies to
“gaslight, exploit, and railroad” prisoners to
harm their health out of carelessness to their needs.
Id., ¶¶ 22-24.
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” L.P. v. Marian Catholic High Sch., 852
F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). A
defendant in a § 1983 action can be liable only for the
actions or omissions in which she personally participated.
Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th
Cir. 2017); Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724,
734 (7th Cir. 2001).
Young's only discernable allegation of being deprived of
something is that he cannot obtain a “Certificate of
Competency” or have his mental health code of
“c” changed. Because of this, the only
articulable damage he asserts is that he has been denied
“level 1 housing” within the IDOC. Mr.
Young's entire amended complaint is based on this
is no constitutional right to be assigned a specific security
level within a prison system. See Wilkinson v.
Austin,545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (“[T]he
Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest
in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of