United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
PENNY M. JONES, Plaintiff,
v.
CONSTAR FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS
James
Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge
Penny
Jones believes that Constar Financial Services, LLC engaged
in unlawful collection practices when it sent her a
debt-collection letter informing her, among other things,
that her account was past due and had to be paid in full.
Constar claims that it is entitled to judgment on the
pleadings because the language of the collection letter would
not confuse an objective “unsophisticated
consumer.” Dkt. [22]. Finding that Constar's letter
would not confuse a significant fraction of the population,
the Court now GRANTS Constar's motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
I.
Facts and Background
Because Constar has moved for judgment on the pleadings under
Rule 12(c), the Court accepts and recites “the
well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true.”
See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d
611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
After
Ms. Jones fell behind on loan payments owed to Kia Motors
Finance Company, Constar began collection attempts. Dkt.
1 at 2. About February 5, 2018, Constar sent a letter
saying: “Your account is past due and must be paid in
full. Please remit the entire balance due to our office using
the return envelope provided.” Dkt. 1 at 3;
dkt. 1-1. The letter included a return envelope and
detachable payment coupon. Dkt. 1 at 3; dkt.
1-2.
Ms.
Jones filed a complaint against Constar alleging that the
letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”) and the Indiana Deceptive Consumer
Sales Act (“IDCSA”) by misleadingly or
deceptively demanding the debt's immediate payment.
Dkt. 1 at 4-6. Constar moved for judgment on the
pleadings. Dkt. 22.[1]
II.
Applicable Law
Constar
has moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c). “A motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) . . . is governed by the same
standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6).” Adams v. City of
Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2014). To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially plausible claim is one that
allows “the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.
When
ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will “accept the
well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, ” but will
not defer to “legal conclusions and conclusory
allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim.”
McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616.
III.
Analysis
Congress
passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act “to curb
abusive methods of debt collection.” Wahl v.
Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 556 F.3d 643, 643-44 (7th
Cir. 2009). The statute requires a “written
notice” either sent “[w]ithin five days after the
initial communication with a consumer in connection with the
collection of any debt” or “contained in the
initial communication” itself. 15 U.S.C. §
1692g(a). That written notice must include, among other
things, “the amount of the debt, ” “the
name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, ” and a
notice that the debtor has thirty days to contest the
debt's validity. Id.During that thirty-day
period, “[a]ny collection activities and communication
. . . may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the
disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt or
request the name and address of the original creditor.”
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
“Although
the word ‘confusing' does not appear” in
section 1692g, “[o]vershadowing” means
“obscuring or confusing”-and the Seventh Circuit
has “interpreted the FDCPA to prohibit confusing
presentations.” O'Boyle v. Real Time
Resolutions, Inc., 910 F.3d 338, 343 (7th Cir. 2018)
(citations and quotations omitted). So the question is
whether the letter was confusing-and thus overshadowed the
required disclosure.
Constar
argues that the letter's debt-collection language did not
overshadow its consumer-rights disclosure because it did not
demand immediate payment or set time limits on when Ms. Jones
must pay the debt. Dkt. 22 at 2, 4. Ms. Jones
responds that the letter confusingly gave the impression that
immediate payment was required, which in turn overshadowed
the disclosure. Dkt. 25 at 8.
Whether
the letter's debt-collection language overshadowed its
1692g disclosure is judged by the “unsophisticated
consumer” test. Zemeckis v. Glob. Credit &
Collection Corp., 679 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 2012). The
“unsophisticated consumer, ” however, is not the
“least sophisticated consumer.”
O'Boyle, 910 F.3d at 344. Instead, the test
objectively looks to an “uninformed, naïve, and
trusting” individual with “rudimentary knowledge
about the financial world” and the ability to make
“basic logical deductions and inferences.”
Id.With ...