United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
R. SWEENEY II JUDGE
Campbell, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in
Terre Haute, Indiana, brings this petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the
following reasons, the petition must be dismissed.
Campbell was convicted in the District of South Dakota of sex
trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1), and 18 U.S.C. §§
2(a) and 2(b); interstate transportation for prostitution in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422; two counts of sex
trafficking of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1591(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)
and 2(b); and obstruction of sex trafficking enforcement
under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d). United States v.
Campbell, 4:12-cr-40039-KES (“Crim. Dkt.”)
Dkt. 39 (D. S.D. Nov. 6, 2012). He was convicted on those
counts on June 3, 2013. Crim. Dkt. 115.
Campbell filed a motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, which was denied. Campbell v. United
States, 4:16-cv-04030-KES (D. S.D. Aug. 22, 2017). His
petition to file a successive habeas petition was also
denied. Campbell v. United States, 18-1897 (8th Cir.
June 8, 2018).
Campbell then filed the present petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. He contends that, under the Supreme Court ruling in
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018), his
convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 and § 2422 do
not qualify as crimes of violence and that he has been
sentenced above the guideline range.
Campbell's habeas petition is subject to preliminary
review to determine whether “it plainly appears from
the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254
Cases (applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to
Rule 1(b)); see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the
petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4.
federal court may issue the writ of habeas corpus only if it
finds the applicant “is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Rose v.
Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975) (“A necessary
predicate for the granting of federal habeas relief [to a
petitioner] is a determination by the federal court that [his
or her] custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.”). As discussed below, Mr.
Campbell cannot show his entitlement to relief pursuant to
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the presumptive
means by which a federal prisoner can challenge his
conviction or sentence. See Shepherd v. Krueger, 911
F.3d 861, 862 (7th Cir. 2018); Webster v. Daniels,
784 F.3d 1123, 1124 (7th Cir. 2015). Under very limited
circumstances, however, a prisoner may employ Section 2241 to
challenge his federal conviction or sentence.
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1124. This is because
“[§] 2241 authorizes federal courts to issue writs
of habeas corpus, but § 2255(e) makes § 2241
unavailable to a federal prisoner unless it ‘appears
that the remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of [the]
detention.'” Roundtree v. Krueger, 910
F.3d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 2018). Section 2255(e) is known as
the “savings clause.” The Seventh Circuit has
held that § 2255 is “‘inadequate or
ineffective' when it cannot be used to address novel
developments in either statutory or constitutional law,
whether those developments concern the conviction or the
sentence.” Roundtree, 910 F.3d at 313
(citing e.g., In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th
Cir. 1998); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir.
2013); Webster, 784 F.3d at 1123). Whether §
2255 is inadequate or ineffective “focus[es] on
procedures rather than outcomes.” Taylor v.
Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002).
Seventh Circuit construed the savings clause in In re
A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed
inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted
defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so
fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been
imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611. “[S]omething
more than a lack of success with a section 2255 motion must
exist before the savings clause is satisfied.”
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1136. Specifically, to fit
within the savings clause following Davenport, a
petitioner must meet three conditions: “(1) the
petitioner must rely on a case of statutory interpretation
(because invoking such a case cannot secure authorization for
a second § 2255 motion); (2) the new rule must be
previously unavailable and apply retroactively; and (3) the
error asserted must be grave enough to be deemed a
miscarriage of justice, such as the conviction of an innocent
defendant.” Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d 962, 964
(7th Cir. 2017); Brown, 719 F.3d at 586.
as noted, Mr. Campbell relies on Sessions v. Dimaya,
138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). In Dimaya, the United States
Supreme Court held that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C.
§ 16, defining a crime of violence, is void for
vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 1216. In other words,
Dimaya is a case of constitutional, not statutory,
interpretation. It therefore fails the first requirement for
obtaining relief under § 2241. The mere fact that the
claim would be a second ...