United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
PHILIP
P. SIMON, JUDGE
Acting
without an attorney, Isaiah Roddy Jr. has filed this lawsuit
against defendant, Sharon Lavengood, who Roddy says is the
Coordinator of the “Scept” Program for Goodwill
of Michiana.[1] [DE 1.] Roddy's complaint also refers
to Latasha Dixon, as Coordinator for the Bridge Center for
Abused Women, without clearly identifying her as a defendant
(although the Clerk has docketed the case to reflect Dixon as
a second defendant). Roddy has filed a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, that is, without paying the filing fee
ordinarily required. [DE 2.] Because he asks for that
accommodation, I must review the complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss it if the action: “(i)
is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
Roddy
has used the court's form Employment Discrimination
Complaint, and indicates that he brings the case under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, and for harassment and retaliation.
[DE 1 at ¶4.] Roddy completed the âClaims and Factsâ section
of the complaint, in which he was directed to explain the
when, where, why and how of the defendant's
discrimination, and to include every fact necessary to
explain his case. My most generous interpretation of the
facts Roddy alleges is that when he was already working at
one job site at which he was placed by Goodwill of Michiana,
defendant Lavengood, as coordinator of the jobs program,
insisted that he accept a different position at a different
job site, even after Roddy explained that he was content
where he was and that he would not have convenient
transportation home after work from the new job site. After
Lavengood drove a reluctant Roddy to the new job site for a
meeting with Latasha Dixon, Roddy again explained that the
job's hours didn't mesh with the bus transportation
he would rely on. Lavengood left without giving Roddy a ride
and later made good on her threat to fire him from the jobs
program for his refusal to take the new position. Roddy filed
a company grievance about Lavengood's treatment of him,
but no action was taken on what he describes as
Lavengood's âunprofessional conduct.â [DE 1 at 6.] As
described in Roddy's complaint, Lavengood's behavior
appears unreasonable and inexplicably harsh, but does it
state a legal claim on which Roddy can proceed in this case?
Roddy
clearly names Sharon Lavengood as a defendant, but has also
completed a summons form for service of the complaint on
Latasha Dixon. As to Dixon, the facts alleged indicate only
that she was involved in a meeting concerning a job for
Roddy, which occurred several weeks after an interview and
background check in which Dixon had some involvement
(although it's not clear how). [DE 1 at 4.] These
allegations clearly don't support any claim for relief as
against Dixon. But more significantly, under Title VII and
the ADA there is no personal liability for individual
defendants such as Lavengood and Dixon. See, e.g., Stanek
v. St. Charles Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783
F.3d 634, 644 (7th Cir. 2015); Smith v.
Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 896 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012).
Instead, only an employer can be liable, and it's not
even clear from the complaint that Goodwill of Michiana was
Roddy's employer, as opposed to the entity operating the
job site where he worked (which he does not identify).
Title
VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
race, color, gender, religion and national origin. But Roddy
has not explained which of these protected categories he
claims and how Lavengood's behavior was motivated by it.
He does not tie any of the facts of his firing to his race,
color, religion, sex or national origin, but instead says
that Lavengood “dismiss[ed] him from his job for not
accepting a new job site, regardless of not having
transportation.” [DE 1 at 8.] Roddy's allegations
also fall far short of a claim of hostile work environment,
which requires on-the-job harassment that is
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms
and conditions of employment.” Cole v. Bd. of
Trustees of N. Illinois Univ., 838 F.3d 888, 895-96
(7th Cir. 2016).
As for
the ADA, Roddy has not plainly alleged a disability. Instead
he asserts only that Lavengood knew “that the plaintiff
has a disability” and “has a doctor's
document showing that he cannot stand or walk [for a] long
period of time.” [DE 1 at 8.] “A plaintiff
charging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
must allege that he is disabled within the meaning of the
Act, is nevertheless qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job either with or without reasonable
accommodation, and has suffered an adverse employment action
because of his disability.” Tate v. SCR Med.
Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 345-46 (7th Cir.
2015). In Tate, the Court of Appeals held that a
claim of disability discrimination “must allege a
specific disability” because “a defendant is
entitled to fair notice, in the complaint, of the
plaintiff's claim.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
A
retaliation claim requires that the plaintiff had engaged in
some sort of protected activity, and that it be specifically
identified. Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d
819, 828 (7th Cir. 2014). Roddy explains that he
filed an internal grievance against Lavengood, but he only
alleges that he did so because of her “unprofessional
conduct, ” which he doesn't link to his race, sex
or disability. [DE 1 at 6.]
For all
these reasons, the complaint is subject to dismissal under
§1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted. But because its shortcomings are ones
that could possibly be overcome by changes and improvements
to the manner in which the complaint is pled, I will offer
Roddy a second chance, in the form of leave to file an
amended complaint, keeping in mind what has been explained
here.
ACCORDINGLY:
The
complaint [DE 1] is DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).
Plaintiff
Isaiah Roddy Jr. is GRANTED until July 1,
2019 to file an amended complaint in this case.
Along with a copy of this order, the Clerk is directed to
provide Roddy with a blank Employment Discrimination
Complaint form for his use.
Roddy
is CAUTIONED that if he does not respond by
that deadline, this case will be dismissed without further
notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
SO
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