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Norma T. v. Berryhill

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

May 9, 2019

NORMA T.,[1] Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

          ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION

          MARK J. DINSMORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         Plaintiff Norma T. applied for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on October 25, 2013, alleging an onset date of September 15, 2013. [Filing No. 6-7 at 2.] On November 4, 2013, she applied for supplemental security income (“SSI”). [Filing No. 6-7 at 4.] Her applications were initially denied on January 31, 2014, [Filing No. 6-5 at 2; Filing No. 6-5 at 6], and upon reconsideration on June 2, 2014, [Filing No. 6-5 at 17; Filing No. 6-5 at 24]. Administrative Law Judge B. Lloyd Blair conducted a hearing on November 12, 2015, [Filing No. 6-2 at 44-61], and issued an unfavorable decision on January 19, 2016, [Filing No. 6-4 at 56]. On January 30, 2017, the Appeals Council vacated the January 19, 2016 decision and remanded Norma T.’s applications to an Administrative Law Judge. [Filing No. 6-4 at 82-83.] Administrative Law Judge Shane McGovern (the “ALJ”) conducted another hearing on July 14, 2017. [Filing No. 6-3 at 5-70.] The ALJ issued a decision on September 21, 2017, concluding that Norma T. was not entitled to receive DIB or SSI. [Filing No. 6-2 at 8.] The Appeals Council denied review on May 12, 2018. [Filing No. 6-2 at 2.] On June 28, 2018, Norma T. timely filed this civil action asking the Court to review the denial of benefits according to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). [Filing No. 1.]

         I.

         Standard of Review

         “The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits … to individuals with disabilities.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002). “The statutory definition of ‘disability’ has two parts. First, it requires a certain kind of inability, namely, an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Second, it requires an impairment, namely, a physical or mental impairment, which provides reason for the inability. The statute adds that the impairment must be one that has lasted or can be expected to last … not less than 12 months.” Id. at 217.

         When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court’s role is limited to ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists for the ALJ’s decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For the purpose of judicial review, “[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). Because the ALJ “is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008), this Court must accord the ALJ’s credibility determination “considerable deference,” overturning it only if it is “patently wrong.” Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).

         The ALJ must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), evaluating the following, in sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy.

Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).[2] “If a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, she will automatically be found disabled. If a claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four. Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy.” Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).

         After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) by evaluating “all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe.” Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ “may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling.” Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four to determine whether the claimant can perform her own past relevant work and if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(iv), (v). The burden of proof is on the claimant for Steps One through Four; only at Step Five does the burden shift to the Commissioner. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.

         If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When an ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An award of benefits “is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the record can yield but one supportable conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).

         II.

         Background

          Norma T. was 50 years of age at the time she alleged her disability began. [Filing No. 6-7 at 2.] She has completed four years of college, earned a real estate license, and previously worked in administration and property management. [Filing No. 6-8 at 17-18.][3]

         The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the Social Security Administration in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and ultimately concluded that Norma T. was not disabled. [Filing No. 6-2 at 26.] Specifically, the ALJ found as follows:

• At Step One, Norma T. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity[4] since September 15, 2013, the alleged onset date. [Filing No. 6-2 at 14.]
• At Step Two, she had “the following severe impairments: diabetes type II; degenerative changes of the spine, acromegaly and pituitary gigantism; hypothyroidism; plantar fasciitis; major depressive disorder; panic disorder without agoraphobia; mild neurocognitive disorder and cognitive disorder [not otherwise specified].” [Filing No. 6-2 at 14 (internal citations omitted).]
• At Step Three, she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed ...

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