United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division
OPINION AND ORDER
William C. Lee United States District Court
Plaintiff,
Carl Lee Ledford (“Ledford”), proceeding pro
se, has multiple cases pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983
pending in this Court and assigned to the undersigned.
(See also, Ledford v. Hahn, 1:18 CV 364 and
Ledford v. Escutia, 1:18 CV 365). Each of these
cases before the undersigned derived from an order in
Ledford v. Shefferly et al., No. 1:17-CV-438 TLS
wherein Magistrate Judge Cherry ordered the case be severed
into four separate cases due to misjoinder of the parties in
Ledford's Complaint. [DE 120]. As a result, three of
those four cases were issued new case numbers and were
randomly reassigned to the undersigned.
In each
of these three cases pending before the undersigned, Ledford
has filed identical motions, captioned Motion for Entry of
Default, for Summary Disposition and Request for a Jury
Trial. [DE 130]. These are motions that have previously been
filed in Ledford v. Shefferly et al., No.
1:17-CV-438, incorporated into the record in this case, and
denied. Ledford appears to seek a different outcome by
refiling these same motions in the individually severed
cases. For the following reasons, Ledford's Motion for
Default and for Summary Disposition will be DENIED.
DISCUSSION
As can
be gleaned from the caption of his filing, Ledford has filed
a Motion seeking multiple forms of relief in a single filing.
This type of motion practice is expressly prohibited by this
Court's local rules. N.D.Ind. L.R. 7-1(a) specifically
provides “Motions must be filed separately, but
alternative motions may be filed in a single paper if each is
named in the title following the caption.” Pro
se status does not excuse the obligation of any litigant
to comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's local rules.
See Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758
(7th Cir. 2008) (stating that although “courts are
required to give liberal construction to pro se pleadings[, ]
... it is also well established that pro se litigants are not
excused from compliance with procedural rules”);
Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006)
(stating that “the Supreme Court has made clear that
even pro se litigants must follow rules of civil
procedure”). This said, because Ledford has not
complied with this Court's local rules, on this basis
alone, his Motions are DENIED.
Moreover,
even if the Court entertained the Plaintiff's request for
the entry of default, that request is not supported by the
record, the Defendants not having “failed to plead or
otherwise defend.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Indeed, the
record as well as the recitation in the Defendant's
response to the request for default makes it clear that
Defendant LaMartz complied with his pleading/defense
obligations.[1]
With
respect to the Motion for Summary Disposition, the form and
substance of that request is, at best, confusing and at worst
completely inadequate. Summary judgment is proper where the
evidence of record shows that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party
bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis
for its motion and identifying those portions of the record
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to
the non-movant to “go beyond the pleadings” to
cite evidence of a genuine factual dispute that precludes
summary judgment. Id.
at 324.
“[A] court has one task and one task only: to decide,
based on the evidence of record, whether there is any
material dispute of fact that requires a trial.”
Waldridge v. Am. Heochst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920
(7th Cir. 1994). If the nonmovant does not come forward with
evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to
find in its favor on a material issue, then the Court must
enter summary judgment against it. Id.
Here,
the Plaintiff's Motion appears to be an attempt to file
one Motion in all of his cases without particularizing the
Motion to each case he has pending. The first evidence of
this is the caption of his Motion which lists all the
defendants in all the various cases he has pending and has
the original case number in the original case prior to
severance crossed out and the new case number filled in. The
body of the motion is, in essence, a hodge podge of facts
against all the defendants in all his separate cases
including those not joined in this particular lawsuit and
with broad reference to various filings in the original case
prior to severance, only some of which appear relevant to
Defendant LaMartz. For example, at page 2 of his filing he
directs the court to “see all affidavits and
evidence” from Ledford v. Shefferly without
any particular citation to the record or to what factual
allegations the record supports. However, under the Federal
Rules:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing
that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In this
case, the Plaintiff does not cite to any specific materials
in support of his allegations, and the Court is not obligated
to accept his sweeping allegations at face value. See
Wilson v. Kautex, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-60, 2009 WL 1657463,
at *5 (N.D. Ind. June 10, 2009) (noting that “the Court
cannot accept the facts as asserted by the Plaintiff in her
Motion for Summary Judgment . . . because almost without
exception she failed to support these asserted facts with
admissible evidence in accordance with the local
rules”); see also Welch-Rubin v. Sandals
Corp., 3:03CV481, 2004 WL 2472280, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct.
20, 2004) (“Plaintiffs are required to present
admissible evidence in support of their allegations;
allegations alone, without evidence to back them up, are not
sufficient.”). Therefore, the Court will deny the
Plaintiff's Motion with leave to refile. However, the
Court advises Ledford that any future Motion for Summary
Disposition must comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and N.D.Ind.
L.R. 56.1. Ledford must present a factual basis with
reference to specific evidentiary support for his claims
against the sole remaining Defendant in THIS lawsuit,
Defendant Lamartz. He must separate the allegations of
misconduct by Defendant Lamartz from all of his other
allegations against the other defendants as Defendant Lamartz
is the sole defendant in THIS case.
CONCLUSION
For the
reasons stated above, the Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of
Default, for Summary Disposition and/or Request ...