United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
JON E.
DEGUILIO JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
Stephen
McDaniel, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas corpus
petition challenging the disciplinary decision (ISP 19-2-5)
at the Indiana State Prison in which a disciplinary hearing
officer (DHO) found him guilty of committing theft in
violation of Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2, which is, in turn,
in violation of Indiana Department of Correction Offense
A-100. Following a disciplinary hearing, he was sanctioned
with a loss of one hundred twenty days of earned credit time
and a demotion in credit class from Class 1 to Class 2.
Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4, the court must
dismiss the petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court.”
McDaniel
argues that he did not receive adequate notice of the charges
or an adequate explanation of the findings because he was not
given a copy of the Indiana theft statute, Ind. Code §
35-43-4-2. For disciplinary proceedings, a prisoner is
entitled “to written notice of the charges . . . in
order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to
marshal the facts and prepare a defense.” Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974); Northern v.
Hanks, 326 F.3d 909, 910 (7th Cir. 2003). Additionally,
“there must be a written statement by the factfinders
as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary
action.” Id.
McDaniel
was provided with a conduct report at screening, which read:
On 1/23/2019 Case 19-ISP-0019 was opened for the theft of 29
unopened syringes from the Medical Services door that is
connected to the Offender Waiting room. After review of the
camera Offender McDaniel #911534 was recorded as one of three
Offenders involved in the theft of the syringes. Offender
McDaniel can be seen using a stick to knock the syringes to
the floor and then using the stick to get them out of the
crack of the door on the floor.
The
State of Indiana defines theft as the knowing or intentional
exertion of “unauthorized control over property of
another person, with intent to deprive the other person of
any part of its value or use.” Ind. Code §
35-43-4-2. Notably, the statutory definition of theft is
entirely consistent with the common understanding of the
word, and the conduct report included the factual basis of
the charge and was sufficient to enable McDaniel to prepare a
defense. Moreover, in the hearing report, the hearing officer
explained that McDaniel was found guilty based on the conduct
report and the surveillance video recording; the hearing
officer thus satisfied his obligation to provide a written
explanation of the decision. Therefore, the claim that
McDaniel did not receive a copy of the text of the Indiana
theft statute is not a basis for habeas relief.
McDaniel
further argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because
the hearing officer was not an impartial decisionmaker. He
states that the hearing officer demonstrated improper bias by
allowing the hearing to proceed despite McDaniel's
complaints about correctional staff's failure to follow
departmental policy, which pertained to mistakes with the
dates on the conduct report and the assigned case number as
well as a disagreement about the severity of the charged
offense. In the prison disciplinary context, adjudicators are
“entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity,
” and “the constitutional standard for improper
bias is high.” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660,
666 (7th Cir. 2003). Due process prohibits a prison official
who was personally and substantially involved in the
underlying incident from acting as a decisionmaker in the
case. Id. Moreover, the failure to follow
departmental policy does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. See Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (“state-law violations provide
no basis for federal habeas relief”); Keller v.
Donahue, 271 Fed.Appx. 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008)
(inmate's claim that prison failed to follow internal
policies had “no bearing on his right to due
process”). Notably, McDaniel's policy-related
complaints were either insubstantial or meritless, and the
fact that the hearing officer allowed the hearing to proceed
despite these complaints does not suggest improper bias, nor
does it suggest that the hearing officer had a personal
interest in the outcome of the hearing. Therefore, the claim
that the hearing officer was not impartial is not a basis for
habeas relief.
Because
it is clear from the petition and attached exhibits that
McDaniel is not entitled to habeas relief, the petition is
denied. If McDaniel wants to appeal this decision, he does
not need a certificate of appealability because he is
challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. See Evans
v. Circuit Court, 569 F.3d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 2009).
However, he may not proceed in forma pauperis on appeal
because the court finds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3) that an appeal in this case could not be taken in
good faith.
For
these reasons, the court:
(1)
DENIES the petition pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus
Rule 4;
(2)
DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment and to close this case;
and
(3)
DENIES Stephen McDaniel leave to proceed in forma ...