United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
TANYA
WALTON PRATT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Morgan F.[1] requests judicial review of the final
decision of the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (the “SSA”), denying her
application for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under the Social Security Act. For the
following reasons, the Court remands the
decision of the Acting Commissioner.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On
August 26, 2014, Morgan F. filed an application for SSI,
alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2007. (Filing
No. 7-2 at 11.) Her application was initially denied on
November 13, 2014, (Filing No. 7-4 at 4), and upon
reconsideration on February 26, 2015, (Filing No. 7-4 at 10).
Administrative Law Judge Roy E. LaRoche, Jr. (the
“ALJ”) conducted a hearing on February 24, 2017,
at which Morgan F., represented by counsel, and a vocational
expert (“VE”) appeared and testified. (Filing No.
7-2 at 38-60.) The ALJ issued a decision on April 19, 2017,
concluding that Morgan F. was not entitled to receive SSI.
(Filing No. 7-2 at 8.) The Appeals Council denied
review on March 9, 2018. (Filing No. 7-2 at 2.) On May 7,
2018, Morgan F. timely filed this civil action, asking the
Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)
to review the final decision of the Acting Commissioner
denying her benefits. (Filing No. 1.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under
the Social Security Act, a claimant may be entitled to
benefits only after she establishes that she is disabled.
Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To be found
disabled, a claimant must demonstrate that her physical or
mental limitations prevent her from doing not only her
previous work but any other kind of gainful employment which
exists in the national economy, considering her age,
education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
The
Acting Commissioner employs a five-step sequential analysis
to determine whether a claimant is disabled. At step one, if
the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, she
is not disabled despite her medical condition and other
factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, if
the claimant does not have a “severe” impairment
that also meets the durational requirement, she is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). A severe
impairment is one that “significantly limits [a
claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). At step
three, the Acting Commissioner determines whether the
claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets
or medically equals any impairment that appears in the
Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1, and whether the impairment meets the twelve-month
duration requirement; if so, the claimant is deemed disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If the
claimant's impairments do not meet or medically equal one
of the impairments on the Listing of Impairments, then her
residual functional capacity will be assessed and used for
the fourth and fifth steps. Residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) is the “maximum that a claimant can
still do despite [her] mental and physical
limitations.” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668,
675-76 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)
96-8p). At step four, if the claimant is able to perform her
past relevant work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(iv). At the fifth and final step, it must be
determined whether the claimant can perform any other work,
given her RFC and considering her age, education, and past
work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). The
claimant is not disabled if she can perform any other work in
the relevant economy.
The
combined effect of all the impairments of the claimant shall
be considered throughout the disability determination
process. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B). The burden of proof
is on the claimant for the first four steps; it then shifts
to the Acting Commissioner for the fifth step. Young v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386,
389 (7th Cir. 1992).
When an
applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this
Court's role is limited to ensuring that the ALJ applied
the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence
exists for the ALJ's decision. Barnett v.
Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). For the purpose of judicial review,
“[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). Because
the ALJ “is in the best position to determine the
credibility of witnesses, ” Craft, 539 F.3d at
678, this Court must accord the ALJ's credibility
determination “considerable deference, ”
overturning it only if it is “patently wrong.”
Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir.
2006) (quotations omitted).
If the
ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists
to support the ALJ's decision, the Court must affirm the
denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When
an ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial
evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the
appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v.
Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An award of
benefits “is appropriate only where all factual issues
have been resolved and the record can yield but one
supportable conclusion.” Id. (citation
omitted).
III.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Morgan
F. was 19 years of age at the time she applied for benefits.
(Filing No. 7-5 at 2.) She alleged that she could no longer
work due to bipolar disorder, personality disorder, attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder, anxiety, and depression.
(Filing No. 7-6 at 12.) She completed the ninth grade and did
not have any work history. (Filing No. 7-6 at
13).[2]
The ALJ
followed the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the
SSA in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) and ultimately
concluded that Morgan F. was not disabled. (Filing No. 7-2 at
21.) At step one, the ALJ found that Morgan F. had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 26,
2014, the application date.[3] (Filing No. 7-2 at 13.) At step
two, the ALJ found that she had the “following severe
impairments: asthma, bipolar disorder with psychotic
features, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),
and generalized anxiety disorder (20 CFR 416.920(c)).”
(Filing No. 7-2 at 13.) At step three, the ALJ found that she
did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments. (Filing No. 7-2 at 14.) After step three but
before step four, the ALJ concluded:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following non-exertional
limitations: no more than occasional exposure to atmospheric
conditions (gas, fumes, dust, and respiratory irritants); is
limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; in a work
environment free of fast-paced production requirements;
involving only simple, work-related decisions; with few, if
any, workplace changes; occasional contact with supervisors;
incidental contact with coworkers; no contact with the
public; and would need supervisor checks twice a day.
(Filing No. 7-2 at 16.) At step four, the ALJ concluded that
Morgan F. did not have any past relevant work to consider.
(Filing No. 7-2 at 20.) At step five, the ALJ found, relying
on the testimony of the VE and considering Morgan F.'s
age, education, work experience, and RFC, that she was
capable of performing other work that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy in representative occupations
such as a sorter, packer, and machine feeder. (Filing No. 7-2
at 20.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
Morgan
F. raises four issues on appeal that the ALJ (1) failed to
consider Morgan F.'s individualized response to stress as
required by SSR 85-15, (2) ignored a line of evidence
concerning her headaches, (3) improperly equated the
performance of activities of daily living- including care for
her children-with the ability to perform full-time work, and
(4) improperly relied on VE testimony that was confusing and
convoluted in response to a hypothetical that included a
vague limitation that was not adequately explained by the
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