United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
JOHN W. ASHCRAFT, Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT CARTER, SR., et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
JON E.
DEGUILIO JUDGE
John W.
Ashcraft, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint.
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . .”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this court
must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. “In order to state a claim under [42 U.S.C.]
§ 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants
deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that
the defendants acted under color of state law.”
Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
In the
complaint, Ashcraft alleges that the LexisNexis service has
been down in the law library since 2019 and that he has been
unable to conduct legal research by requesting copies from
the library clerk, T. Wall. He either receives no response to
his frequent requests, or he is instructed to conduct
research on his own or to pay for legal materials. He
currently proceeds on a petition for post-conviction relief
in State court as a pro se litigant, and he has an
evidentiary hearing scheduled for August 2019. He has missed
and reset deadlines due to his inability to conduct legal
research. For his claim, Ashcraft seeks money damages.
Ashcraft
asserts that prison officials violated his right of access to
the courts by limiting his ability to conduct legal research.
Prisoners are entitled to meaningful access to the courts.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977). The right
of access to the courts is the right of an individual,
whether free or incarcerated, to obtain access to the courts
without undue interference. Snyder v. Nolen, 380
F.3d 279, 291 (7th Cir. 2004). The right of individuals to
pursue legal redress for claims that have a reasonable basis
in law or fact is protected by the First Amendment right to
petition and the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive
due process. Id. (citations omitted). Denial of
access to the courts must be intentional; “simple
negligence will not support a claim that an official has
denied an individual of access to the courts.”
Id. at 291 n.11 (citing Kincaid v. Vail,
969 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1992)).
To
establish a violation of the right to access the courts, an
inmate must show that unjustified acts or conditions (by
defendants acting under color of law) hindered the
inmate's efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim,
Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 591, 590 (7th Cir.
1998), and that actual injury (or harm) resulted. Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (holding that
Bounds did not eliminate the actual injury
requirement as a constitutional prerequisite to a prisoner
asserting lack of access to the courts); see also
Pattern Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, 8.02
(rev. 2017). In other words, “the mere denial of access
to a prison law library or to other legal materials is not
itself a violation of a prisoner's rights; his right is
to access the courts, ” and only if the
defendants' conduct prejudices a potentially meritorious
legal claim has the right been infringed. Marshall v.
Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). “Thus,
when a plaintiff alleges a denial of the right to
access-to-courts, he must usually plead specific prejudice to
state a claim, such as by alleging that he missed court
deadlines, failed to make timely filings, or that legitimate
claims were dismissed because of the denial of reasonable
access to legal resources.” Ortloff v. United
States, 335 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2003) (overruled on
other grounds). Though the petition for post-conviction
relief remains pending, Ashcraft states that he has missed
court deadlines and thus adequately alleges prejudice to a
potentially meritorious claim.
Ashcraft
asserts this claim against nine defendants. “[Section]
1983 lawsuits against individuals require personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation to
support a viable claim.” Palmer v. Marion
Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003). Ashcraft does
not allege that Robert Carter or Warden Sevier are personally
involved. The allegations suggest that John Salyer, Mr.
Hootnic, John Harvil, Captain Smiley, Lieutenant Eakins, and
Sergeant Johnson had some involvement when Ashcraft told them
about his inability to conduct research and they did nothing.
However, these allegations do not suggest these defendants
intentionally denied him access to the courts, so Ashcraft
may not proceed against them. Nevertheless, Ashcraft states a
plausible denial of access to the courts claim against T.
Wall.
For
these reasons, the court:
(1)
GRANTS John W. Ashcraft leave to proceed on a denial of
access to the courts claim against T. Wall for failing to
assist him with legal research in connection with his pending
petition for post-conviction relief;
(2)
DISMISSES Robert Carter, Warden Sevier, John Salyer, Mr.
Hootnic, John Harvil, Captain Smiley, Lieutenant Eakins, and
Sergeant Johnson;
(3)
DISMISSES all other claims;
(4)
DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to
issue and serve process on T. Wall at the Indiana Department
of Correction with a copy of this order and the complaint
(ECF 2) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(5)
ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), T. Wall to
respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for
which John W. ...