United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ORDER ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND
MOTION TO DISMISS
Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge
Sarah Rayne, alleges that Correct Care Solutions
(“CCS”), a contract medical services provider for
the Marion County Jail, along with several individual
employees of CCS and the Marion County Sheriff's Office
were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs. Dkt. 50.
Before the Court and ripe for disposition are a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, dkt. 62, and a motion to dismiss,
dkt. 54. For the reasons below, the Court
GRANTS the motion to dismiss and
GRANTS in part the motion for judgment on
Factual Background and Procedural History
deciding the motions, the Court accepts as true
Plaintiff's account of how she was treated while in the
custody of the Marion County Sheriff's Office.
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th
trooper found Plaintiff crying on the side of the road with a
red, swollen arm. Dkt. 50 ¶¶ 25-26. Plaintiff told
the trooper that she was in pain and needed medical
attention. Id. ¶ 27. Discovering an open
warrant for Plaintiff's arrest based on a finding of
probable cause, the trooper arrested Plaintiff and took her
to the Arrest Processing Center (“APC”) in Marion
County. Id. ¶¶ 28, 31.
was held at the Marion County Sheriff's Office jail (the
“jail”) for a few days before being transferred
to the Marion County Community Corrections Work Release
program (the “Work Release Program”).
Id. ¶¶ 32-33. While Plaintiff was at the
jail, CCS-a private company that the Sheriff's Office has
a contract with to provide medical treatment to inmates of
the jail-was responsible for her medical care. Id.
¶¶ 11, 35. During this time, Plaintiff's arm
was red, swollen, and about three times its normal size.
Id. ¶¶ 26, 56, 61. From the start,
Plaintiff informed the staff that she was in extreme pain.
Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
first day in jail, Dr. Buller prescribed Plaintiff Bactrim
for a urinary tract infection. Id. ¶ 38. The
next day, a Medical History and Physical Assessment was
performed on Plaintiff and signed by Nurses Hubbard and
Petty, indicating that Plaintiff continued to complain of
pain in her harm and shoulder. Id. ¶¶ 40,
42. Nurse Gebresilassie saw Plaintiff that day, noted that
she looked anxious and provided her the Bactrim. Id.
¶ 43. Plaintiff also saw Nurse Carter and told him she
needed to go to the hospital, but he did not provide any
treatment. Id. ¶ 44. Later, Nurse Allen was
called to address Plaintiff's ongoing pain, and Nurse
Allen provided her with Ibuprofen and scheduled an x-ray.
Id. ¶ 45. After Plaintiff complained that the
pain was so intense that she struggled to breathe, Nurse
Pierce saw Plaintiff and told her to relax and take deep
breaths. Id. ¶¶ 37, 46. Believing that her
medical condition was being ignored, Plaintiff hit the
medical emergency button in her cell. Id. ¶ 47.
Deputy Edgemon responded and Plaintiff was placed on suicide
watch. Id. ¶¶ 47, 48. Plaintiff began
screaming that her arm was hurting, id. ¶ 49,
so she was placed in suicide segregation, id. ¶
51, where Deputy Cooper was the “sitter, ”
id. ¶ 54.
third day in jail, Plaintiff continued to complain about her
pain. Id. ¶ 57. She intentionally fell and
injured her head in the hopes of getting further medical
attention. Id. ¶¶ 57-58. Deputy Smith
heard Plaintiff crying and called the medical staff.
Id. ¶¶ 59-60. In response, Nurses Jones
and Nurse Petty gave Plaintiff Ibuprofen for her head wound.
Id. ¶ 60. During this time, Plaintiff
“continuously talked about her shoulder being in pain,
” but the nurses were already aware of the problem and
took no further action. Id. ¶ 59.
total, Plaintiff was seen by at least six different nurses
while in the jail, but her condition remained untreated and
the x-ray was never performed. Id. ¶ 66. The
next day, Plaintiff was sent to the Work Release Program.
Id. ¶ 65.
she arrived at the Work Release Program, Plaintiff complained
to the staff about her pain. Id. ¶ 68. They
called 911, and Plaintiff was taken to the hospital where she
was diagnosed with MRSA in her arm, shoulder, elbow, blood,
lungs, and possibly her heart. Id. ¶¶ 68,
69. She spent weeks in the hospital and may have suffered
permanent damage to her arm. Id. ¶¶ 71-72.
Second Amended Complaint sues seventeen different defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for these injuries. Three of
these defendants are law enforcement officers who worked at
the jail (“Deputy Defendants”),  one is CCS, and
ten are medical personnel (“Medical Defendants”)
who worked for CCS. The other three defendants are William
Gannon, John Layton, and Lena Anderson. They have not sought
dismissal of any claims or joined in the pending motions. The
Deputy Defendants have moved to dismiss Count II, dkt. 54;
the Medical Defendants and CCS have moved to dismiss Counts
III and V, dkt. 62. In those counts, Plaintiff alleges that:
(1) the Deputy Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
her medical needs (Count II), (2) the Medical Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to her medical needs (Count III),
and (3) CCS implemented a policy or custom that failed to
protect her constitutional rights (Count V). Dkt. 50.
Medical Defendants and CCS have moved for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is
evaluated under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 646
(7th Cir. 2016), so the Court reviews both pending motions
under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially-plausible claim is one that
allows “the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will
“accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as
true” but will not defer to “legal conclusions
and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of
the claim.” McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616.