Appeal
from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Travis G.
Sandifur, Magistrate Trial Court Nos. 49D04-1701-OV-4141,
49D04-1703-OV-12165, 49D04-1704-OV-14006,
49D04-1704-OV-14340, 49D04-1704-OV-14994, 49D04-1704-OV-15972
Attorneys for Appellant Deborah L. Law Traci Marie Cosby
Office of Corporation Counsel Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee Jeff Cardella The Law Office of Jeff
Cardella, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
NAJAM,
JUDGE.
Statement
of the Case
[¶1]
The City of Indianapolis ("the City") appeals the
trial court's order to grant relief from judgment to
Ginger Tichy under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). The City raises
three issues for our review, and Tichy raises an additional
issue. We consolidate the issues and restate them as the
following dispositive question: whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it granted relief to Tichy under
Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). We hold that the trial court abused
its discretion. Accordingly, we reverse.
Facts
and Procedural History
[¶2]
On May 10, 2017, following a bench trial in six consolidated
cause numbers, the trial court permanently enjoined Tichy
from acting in a manner that would violate Section 431-702 of
the City's municipal code.[1] As relevant here, Section 431-702
prohibits pedestrians from soliciting or conversing with the
occupant of a vehicle in a roadway if the pedestrian is in
the median of the roadway or within fifty feet of an
intersection. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 193. Tichy did
not appeal the injunction and at no point has she disputed
that she acted in violation of Section 431-702 prior to the
issuance of the injunction. Shortly after the court entered
the injunction, the City moved to have Tichy found in
contempt as she had allegedly continued to solicit or
converse with the occupants of motor vehicles in the roadway
in a manner contrary to Section 431-702.
[¶3]
In response, Tichy moved for relief from the injunction under
Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). In her motion, she argued:
22. Ms. Tichy is entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(7)
because it is no longer equitable that the order permanently
enjoining her from engaging in conduct prohibited by
Municipal Code Section 431-702 [have] prospective
application.
* * *
24. The permanent injunction is overbroad because it fails to
provide for Ms. Tichy's acting within the boundary [of]
the activities specifically declared unlawful by
Indiana's penal statute on panhandling[, ] Ind. Code
§ 35-45-17-1(c).[2] The City has no power to regulate Ms.
Tichy's act . . . [in] an area preempted by our
legislature . . . .
25. The injunction imposes a serious burden on Ms.
Tichy's ability to engage in lawful, passive
panhandling-an activity vital to her survival-by banning such
...