United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
ROBERT P. BASTON, Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT E. CARTER, JR., et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
JON E.
DEGUILIO JUDGE
Robert
P. Baston, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint.
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . .”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this court
must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. “In order to state a claim under [42 U.S.C.]
§ 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants
deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that
the defendants acted under color of state law.”
Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
In the
complaint, Baston alleges that he has been diagnosed with
hepatitis C and has requested medication that would cure the
disease. However, physicians have informed him that, even if
they recommended this medication, Wexford Medical Sources and
Corizon would deny the requests because the Indiana
Department of Correction cannot afford to purchase medication
for all inmates with hepatitis C. For his claims, he seeks
money damages and injunctive relief.
Baston
asserts an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs against Robert E. Carter, Wexford
Medical Services, and Corizon for the policy or practice of
refusing to provide medication that would cure hepatitis C to
afflicted inmates. Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are
entitled to adequate medical care. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability,
a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and subjective
component by showing: (1) his medical need was objectively
serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate
indifference to that medical need. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Neither
corporate entities nor individuals “[may] be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.” Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379
(7th Cir. 2005). Rather corporate liability exists only
“when execution of a [corporation's] policy or
custom . . . inflicts the injury.” Id. A
corporation can be held liable for “an express policy
that, when enforced, causes a constitutional
deprivation.” Id. Absent an unconstitutional
policy, corporate liability may be established with a showing
of “a widespread practice that, although not authorized
by written law or express [corporate] policy, is so permanent
and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the
force of law.” McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60
F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995). The policy or custom must be
the “moving force behind the deprivation of his
constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Cook Cty.,
526 Fed.Appx. 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2013). “[Section] 1983
lawsuits against individuals require personal involvement in
the alleged constitutional deprivation to support a viable
claim.” Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588,
594 (7th Cir. 2003). Because Baston does not explain how
Robert E. Carter, Jr., was personally involved with his
claims, Baston cannot proceed on a claim of money damages
against him. However, Baston states a plausible Eighth
Amendment claim against Wexford Medical Services, and
Corizon.
Baston
also seeks injunctive relief in connection with his medical
treatment. For prisoner cases, the court has limited
authority to order injunctive relief. Westefer v.
Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012). Specifically,
“the remedial injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn,
extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right, and use the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right.” Id. Therefore, injunctive relief, if
granted will be limited to requiring the defendants to
provide medical treatment as required by the Eighth
Amendment. Carter as the Commissioner of the Indiana
Department of Correction has both the authority and the
responsibility to ensure that Baston receives the medical
treatment to which he is entitled under the Eighth Amendment.
See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th
Cir. 2011). Therefore, Baston may proceed on an injunctive
relief claim against Commissioner Carter in his official
capacity.
For
these reasons, the court:
(1)
GRANTS Robert P. Baston leave to proceed on an Eighth
Amendment claim against Wexford Medical Services and Corizon
for the policy or practice of refusing to provide medication
that would cure hepatitis C to afflicted inmates;
(2)
GRANTS Robert P. Baston leave to proceed on an injunctive
relief claim against Robert E. Carter, Jr., in his official
capacity to obtain medical treatment for hepatitis C as
required by the Eighth Amendment;
(3)
DISMISSES all other claims;
(4)
DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to
issue and serve process on Robert E. Carter, Jr., Wexford
Medical Services, and Corizon at the Indiana Department of
Correction with a copy of this order and the complaint (ECF
10) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(5)
ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Robert E.
Carter, Jr., Wexford Medical Services, and Corizon to
respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for
which ...