United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
JON E.
DEGUILIO JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
William
Rose, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas corpus
petition challenging the disciplinary decision (ISP 17-6-171)
at the Indiana State Prison in which a disciplinary hearing
officer (DHO) found him guilty of possession of a weapon in
violation of Indiana Department of Correction Offense A-106.
Following a disciplinary hearing, Rose was sanctioned with a
demotion in credit class.
Rose
argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the
hearing officer lacked sufficient evidence of his guilt. He
states that no weapon was taken from his person or his cell,
that Sergeant A. Lee provided false testimony, and that the
internal affairs unit did not interview him.
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only]
have the support of some evidence in the record. This is a
lenient standard, requiring no more than a modicum of
evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the
record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the
disciplinary board were without support or otherwise
arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still must
point to the accused's guilt. It is not our province to
assess the comparative weight of the evidence underlying the
disciplinary board's decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
The
administrative record included reports from two correctional
officers, Sergeant A. Lee and Officer Brown, stating that
they saw Rose give a sharp metal object to another inmate and
then ran into a cell that was not assigned to him to hide
from pursuing correctional staff. Correctional staff was able
to recover the sharp metal object and took photographs, which
were also included in the administrative record. As a result,
despite the deficiencies noted by Rose and even assuming that
Sergeant A. Lee's account was false, the administrative
record included some evidence that Rose was guilty of
possessing a deadly weapon. Therefore, the claim that the
hearing officer lacked sufficient evidence for a finding of
guilty is not a basis for habeas relief.
Rose
also argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because
correctional staff did not allow him to personally observe
the evidence of his guilt, including photographs and the
evidence given to the internal affairs unit. However, while
the right to procedural due process entitles prisoners to
present relevant evidence to the hearing officer, it does not
entitle them to personally observe the evidence. Outlaw
v. Anderson, 29 Fed.Appx. 372, 374 (7th Cir. 2002).
Moreover, based on the court's review, none of the
allegedly undisclosed evidence, including the photographs, is
exculpatory. See Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678
(7th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n inmate is entitled to disclosure
of material, exculpatory evidence in prison disciplinary
hearings unless such disclosure would unduly threaten
institutional concerns.”). Additionally, Rose concedes
that the hearing officer showed him photographs of the sharp
metal object at the disciplinary hearing (ECF 8 at 3), and
the court has already determined that disclosing the internal
incident reports would pose a threat to institutional
security (ECF 20). Therefore, the claim that correctional
staff did not allow him to personally observe the evidence of
his guilt is not a basis for habeas relief
Finally,
Rose argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the
hearing officer was not an impartial decisionmaker. He states
that the hearing officer was not impartial because he
considered false evidence. In the prison disciplinary
context, adjudicators are “entitled to a presumption of
honesty and integrity, ” and “the constitutional
standard for improper bias is high.” Piggie v.
Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Due process
prohibits a prison official who was personally and
substantially involved in the underlying incident from acting
as a decision-maker in the case. Id. However, due
process is not violated simply because the hearing officer
knew the inmate, presided over a prior disciplinary case, or
had some limited involvement in the event underlying the
charge. Id. Even assuming that the hearing officer
considered false evidence, it would not raise concerns with
the hearing officer's impartiality, particularly where
there is no suggestion that the hearing officer was aware
that the evidence was false. Moreover, there is no indication
that the hearing officer was involved with the underlying
charge, that he had a personal interest in the result of the
hearing, or that he based his decision on anything other than
the administrative record. As a result, the claim that the
hearing officer was not an impartial decisionmaker is not a
basis for habeas relief.
Because
it is clear from the petition and attached exhibits that Rose
is not entitled to habeas relief, the petition is denied. If
Rose wants to appeal this decision, he does not need a
certificate of appealability because he is challenging a
prison disciplinary proceeding. See Evans v. Circuit
Court, 569 F.3d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). However, he
may not proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because the court
finds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal
in this case could not be taken in good faith.
For
these reasons, the court:
(1) DENIES the petition pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas
Corpus Rule 4;
(2) DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment and to close this
case; and
(3) DENIES William Rose leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
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