United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division
OPINION AND ORDER
S. VAN BOKKELEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Carolyn Raddach seeks judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner's decision denying her disability benefits
and asks this Court to remand the case. For the reasons
below, this Court affirms the ALJ's decision.
Overview of the Case
Plaintiff alleges that she became disabled on November 26,
2012. (R. at 41.) Claimant meets insurance requirements
through December 31, 2017. (R. at 149.) Before filing for
disability, Plaintiff performed work involving data entry and
customer service in 2011 and 2012. (R. at 40.) Ms. Ruddach
claims she became disabled due to a combination of chronic
headaches and back, neck, shoulder, and hip pain. (R. at 44.)
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that
Ms. Ruddach was unable to perform her past relevant work (R.
at 20.), but that a number of jobs existed in the national
and local economy which she could perform. (R. at 21.) As a
result, the ALJ denied her disability benefit request on
April 29, 2015. (R. at 22.)
Standard of Review
Court has authority to review the Commissioner's decision
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court will ensure that the
ALJ built an “accurate and logical bridge” from
evidence to conclusion. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d
802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). This requires the ALJ to
“confront the [plaintiff's] evidence” and
“explain why it was rejected.” Thomas v.
Colvin, 826 F.3d 953, 961 (7th Cir. 2016). The Court
will uphold decisions that apply the correct legal standard
and are supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex
rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir.
2005). Evidence is substantial if “a reasonable mind
might accept [it] as adequate to support [the ALJ's]
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971).
determine eligibility for disability benefits under the
Social Security Act, the ALJ will perform a five-step
“(1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the
claimant's impairment is one that the Commissioner
considers conclusively disabling; (4) if the claimant does
not have a conclusively disabling impairment, whether he can
perform his past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant
is capable of performing any work in the national
Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir.
burden of proof resides with the claimant for the first four
steps, shifting to the Commissioner for determination of
disability at step five. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d
863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).
argues that the ALJ committed three reversible errors: (1)
the ALJ did not appropriately address her limitations of
concentration, persistence, and pace (Pl.'s Br. at 9);
(2) the ALJ failed to consider her impairments collectively
(Pl. Br. at 10); (3) the ALJ did not sufficiently consider
the her self-reported symptoms in evaluating the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms
(Pl.'s Br. at 16).