Argued
November 7, 2018
ON
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) generally
immunizes foreign states from suit in this country unless
one of several enumerated exceptions to immunity applies.
28 U.S.C. §§1604, 1605-1607. If an exception
applies, the FSIA provides subject-matter jurisdiction in
federal district court, §1330(a), and personal
jurisdiction "where service has been made under
section 1608," §1330(b). Section 1608(a) provides
four methods of serving civil process, including, as
relevant here, service "by any form of mail requiring
a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched ... to the
head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign
state concerned," §1608(a)(3).
Respondents,
victims of the bombing of the USS Cole and their
family members, sued the Republic of Sudan under the FSIA,
alleging that Sudan provided material support to al Qaeda
for the bombing. The court clerk, at respondents'
request, addressed the service packet to Sudan's
Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Sudanese Embassy in the
United States and later certified that a signed receipt had
been returned. After Sudan failed to appear in the
litigation, the District Court entered a default judgment
for respondents and subsequently issued three orders
requiring banks to turn over Sudanese assets to pay the
judgment. Sudan challenged those orders, arguing that the
judgment was invalid for lack of personal jurisdiction,
because § 1608(a)(3) required that the service packet
be sent to its foreign minister at his principal office in
Sudan, not to the Sudanese Embassy in the United States.
The Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the statute was
silent on where the mailing must be sent and that the
method chosen was consistent with the statute's
language and could be reasonably expected to result in
delivery to the foreign minister.
Held:
Most naturally read, § 1608(a)(3) requires a mailing to
be sent directly to the foreign minister's office in the
foreign state. Pp. 5-17.
(a)A
letter or package is "addressed" to an intended
recipient when his or her name and address are placed on
the outside. The noun "address" means "a
residence or place of business." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 25. A foreign nation's
embassy in the United States is neither the residence nor
the usual place of business of that nation's foreign
minister. Similarly, to "dispatch" a letter to an
addressee connotes sending it directly. It is also
significant that service under § 1608(a)(3) requires a
signed returned receipt to ensure delivery to the
addressee. Pp. 5-9.
(b)
Several related provisions in §1608 support this
reading. Section 1608(b)(3)(B) contains similar
"addressed and dispatched" language, but also
says that service by its method is permissible "if
reasonably calculated to give actual notice."
Respondents' suggestion that § 1608(a)(3) embodies
a similar standard runs up against well-settled principles
of statutory interpretation. See Department of Homeland
Security v. MacLean, 574 U.S. ___, ___, and Mackey
v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486
U.S. 825, 837. Section 1608(b)(2) expressly allows service
on an agent, specifies the particular individuals who are
permitted to be served as agents of the recipient, and
makes clear that service on the agent may occur in the
United States. Congress could have included similar terms
in § 1608(a)(3) had it intended the provision to
operate in this manner. Section 1608(c) deems service to
have occurred under all methods only when there is a strong
basis for concluding that the service packet will very
shortly thereafter come into the hands of a foreign
official who will know what needs to be done. Under §
1608(a)(3), that occurs when the person who receives it
from the carrier signs for it. Interpreting
§1608(a)(3) to require that a service packet be sent
to a foreign minister's own office rather than to a
mailroom employee in a foreign embassy better harmonizes
the rules for determining when service occurs. Pp. 9-13.
(c)This
reading of § 1608(a)(3) avoids potential tension with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. If mailing a service
packet to a foreign state's embassy in the United
States were sufficient, then it would appear to be easier
to serve the foreign state than to serve a person in that
foreign state under Rule 4. The natural reading of
§1608(a)(3) also avoids the potential international
implications arising from the State Department's
position that the Convention's principle of
inviolability precludes serving a foreign state by mailing
process to the foreign state's embassy in the United
States. Pp. 13-15.
(d)
Respondents' remaining arguments are unavailing. First,
their suggestion that §1608(a)(3) demands that service
be sent "to a location that is likely to have a direct
line of communication to the foreign minister" creates
difficult line-drawing problems that counsel in favor of
maintaining a clear, administrable rule. Second, their
claim that §1608(a)(4)-which requires that process be
sent to the Secretary of State in "Washington,
District of Columbia"-shows that Congress did not
intend § 1608(a)(3) to have a similar locational
requirement is outweighed by the countervailing arguments
already noted. Finally, they contend that it would be
unfair to throw out their judgment based on
petitioner's highly technical and belatedly raised
argument. But in cases with sensitive diplomatic
implications, the rule of law demands adherence to strict
rules, even when the equities seem to point in the opposite
direction. Pp. 15-17.
802 F.3d 399, reversed and remanded.
ROBERTS, C. J., and Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan,
Gorsuch, and Kav-ANAUGH, JJ., joined.
OPINION
ALITO
JUSTICE.
This
case concerns the requirements applicable to a particular
method of serving civil process on a foreign state. Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), a foreign
state may be served by means of a mailing that is
"addressed and dispatched ... to the head of the
ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state
concerned." 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3). The question
now before us is whether this provision is satisfied when a
service packet that names the foreign minister is mailed to
the foreign state's embassy in the United States. We hold
that it is not. Most naturally read, § 1608(a)(3)
requires that a mailing be sent directly to the foreign
minister's office in the minister's home country.
I
A
Under
the FSIA, a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of
courts in this country unless one of several enumerated
exceptions to immunity applies. 28 U.S.C. §§1604,
1605-1607. If a suit falls within one of these exceptions,
the FSIA provides subject-matter jurisdiction in federal
district courts. § 1330(a). The FSIA also provides for
personal jurisdiction "where service has been made under
section 1608." § 1330(b).
Section
1608(a) governs service of process on "a foreign state
or political subdivision of a foreign state." §
1608(a); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(j)(1). In particular, it sets
out in hierarchical order the following four methods by which
"[s]ervice . . . shall be made." 28 U.S.C. §
1608(a). The first method is by delivery of a copy of the
summons and complaint "in accordance with any special
arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign
state or political subdivision." § 1608(a)(1).
"[I]f no special arrangement exists," service may
be made by the second method, namely, delivery of a copy of
the summons and complaint "in accordance with an
applicable international convention on service of judicial
documents." §1608(a)(2). If service is not possible
under either of the first two methods, the third method,
which is the one at issue in this case, may be used. This
method calls for
"sending a copy of the summons and complaint and a
notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the
official language of the foreign state, by any form of
mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of
the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state
concerned." §1608(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Finally,
if service cannot be made within 30 days under §
1608(a)(3), service may be effected by sending the service
packet "by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt,
to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to
the Secretary of State in Washington, District of
Columbia," for transmittal "through diplomatic
channels to the foreign state." § 1608(a)(4).
Once
served, a foreign state or political subdivision has 60 days
to file a responsive pleading. § 1608(d). If the foreign
state or political subdivision does not do this, it runs the
risk of incurring a default judgment. See § 1608(e). A
copy of any such default judgment must be "sent to the
foreign state or political subdivision in the [same] manner
prescribed for service." Ibid.
B
On
October 12, 2000, the USS Cole, a United States Navy
guided-missile destroyer, entered the harbor of Aden, Yemen,
for what was intended to be a brief refueling stop. While
refueling was underway, a small boat drew along the side of
the Cole, and the occupants of the boat detonated
explosives that tore a hole in the side of the Cole.
Seventeen crewmembers were killed, and dozens more were
injured. Al Qaeda later claimed responsibility for the
attack.
Respondents
in this case are victims of the USS Cole bombing and
their family members. In 2010, respondents sued petitioner,
the Republic of Sudan, alleging that Sudan had provided
material support to al Qaeda for the bombing. See 28 U.S.C.
§§1605A(a)(1), (c). Because respondents brought
suit under the FSIA, they were required to serve Sudan with
process under § 1608(a). It is undisputed that service
could not be made under § 1608(a)(1) or §
1608(a)(2), and respondents therefore turned to §
1608(a)(3). At respondents' request, the clerk of the
court sent the service packet, return receipt requested, to:
"Republic of Sudan, Deng Alor Koul, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, 2210 Massachusetts
Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008." App. 172. The clerk
certified that the service packet had been sent and, a few
days later, certified that a signed receipt had been
returned.[1] After Sudan failed to appear in the
litigation, the District Court for the District of Columbia
held an evidentiary hearing and entered a $314 million
default judgment against Sudan. Again at respondents'
request, the clerk of the court mailed a copy of the default
judgment in the same manner that the clerk had previously
used. See § 1608(e).
With
their default judgment in hand, respondents turned to the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, where
they sought to register the judgment and satisfy it through
orders requiring several banks to turn over Sudanese assets.
See 28 U.S.C. §1963 (providing for registration of
judgments for enforcement in other districts). Pursuant to
§1610(c), the District Court entered an order confirming
that a sufficient period of time had elapsed following the
entry and notice of the default judgment, and the court then
issued three turnover orders.
At this
point, Sudan made an appearance for the purpose of contesting
jurisdiction. It filed a notice of appeal from each of the
three turnover orders and contended on appeal that the
default judgment was invalid for lack of personal
jurisdiction. In particular, Sudan maintained that §
1608(a)(3) required that the service packet be sent to its
foreign minister at his principal office in Khartoum, the
capital of Sudan, and not to the Sudanese Embassy in the
United States.
The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this
argument and affirmed the orders of the District Court. 802
F.3d 399 (2015). The Second Circuit reasoned that, although
§ 1608(a)(3) requires that a service packet be mailed
"to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the
foreign state concerned," the statute "is silent as
to a specific location where the mailing is to be
addressed." Id., at 404. In light of this, the
court concluded that "the method chosen by plaintiffs-a
mailing addressed to the minister of foreign affairs at the
embassy-was consistent with the language of the statute and
could reasonably be expected to result in delivery to the
intended person." Ibid.
Sudan
filed a petition for rehearing, and the United States filed
an amicus curiae brief in support of Sudan's
petition. The panel ordered supplemental briefing and heard
additional oral argument, but it once again affirmed,
reiterating its view that § 1608(a)(3) "does not
specify that the mailing be sent to the head of the ministry
of foreign affairs in the foreign country." 838
F.3d 86, 91 (CA2 2016). The court thereafter denied
Sudan's petition for rehearing en banc.
Subsequent
to the Second Circuit's decision, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held in a similar case that §
1608(a)(3) "does not authorize delivery of service to a
foreign state's embassy even if it correctly identifies
the intended recipient as the head of the ministry of foreign
affairs." Kumar v. Republic of Sudan, 880 F.3d
144, 158 (2018), cert, pending, No. 17-1269.
We
granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 585 U.S.
___(2018)
II
A
The
question before us concerns the meaning of § 1608(a)(3),
and in interpreting that provision, "[w]e begin
'where all such inquiries must begin: with the language
of the statute itself.'" Caraco Pharmaceutical
Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399,
412 (2012) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)). As noted,
§ 1608(a)(3) requires that service be sent "by any
form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the
ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state
concerned."
The
most natural reading of this language is that service must be
mailed directly to the foreign minister's office in the
foreign state. Although this is not, we grant, the only
plausible reading of the statutory text, it is the most
natural one. See, e.g., United States v. Hohri, 482
U.S. 64, 69-71 (1987) (choosing the "more natural"
reading of a statute); ICC v. Texas, 479 U.S. 450,
456-457 (1987) (same); see also Florida Dept. of Revenue
v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 41 (2008)
(similar).
A key
term in § 1608(a)(3) is the past participle
"addressed." A letter or package is
"addressed" to an intended recipient when his or
her name and "address" is placed on the outside of
the item to be sent. And the noun "address," in the
sense relevant here, means "the designation of a place
(as a residence or place of business) where a person or
organization may be found or communicated with."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 25 (1971)
(Webster's Third); see also Webster's Second New
International Dictionary 30 (1957) ("the name or
description of a place of residence, business, etc., where a
person may be found or communicated with"); Random House
Dictionary of the English Language 17 (1966) ("the place
or the name of the place where a person, organization, or the
like is located or may be reached"); American Heritage
Dictionary 15 (1969) ("[t]he location at which a
particular organization or person may be found or
reached"); Oxford English Dictionary 106 (1933) (OED)
("the name of the place to which any one's letters
are directed"). Since a foreign nation's embassy in
the United States is neither the residence nor the usual
place of business of that nation's foreign minister and
is ...