United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division, Lafayette
OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES
T. MOODY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
BMO Harris Bank N.A. (“BMO” or
“plaintiff”) brought this action for breach of
contract against defendants J-Lin Trucking, Inc.
(“J-Lin”) and James Jones (“Jones”).
(DE # 1.) Now, plaintiff moves for summary judgment on all
claims. (DE # 19.) For the reasons stated below, the motion
will be granted.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary
judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A
genuine issue of material fact exists when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Not every
dispute between the parties makes summary judgment
inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Id. To determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists, the court must construe all facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Ogden v.
Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). If the
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an
essential element on which he or she bears the burden of
proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Massey v.
Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006).
In the
case at hand, defendants did not file a response to the
motion for summary judgment, despite being given proper
notice of the motion. (See DE # 19-5.) Pursuant to
N.D. Ind. Local Rule 7-1(d)(4), a party's failure to file
a response within the time prescribed may subject the motion
to summary ruling. Nevertheless, “a nonmovant's
failure to respond to a summary judgment motion, or failure
to comply with [the local rules], does not, of course,
automatically result in judgment for the movant.”
Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 884 (7th
Cir. 2012). BMO “must still demonstrate that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
Although defendants have not provided their own versions of
the facts, we still view all facts asserted by BMO in the
light most favorable to defendants and draw all reasonable
inferences in their favor. Id.
II.
BACKGROUND
J-Lin
entered into four Master Lease Agreements and one Loan and
Security Agreement with General Electric Capital Corporation
(collectively, the “Agreements”). (DE # 19-3 at
2.) General Electric Capital Corporation later assigned the
Agreements to BMO. (Id. at 10-11.)
On
December 28, 2012, the parties entered into the first Master
Lease Agreement (“Agreement 1”). (DE # 19-3 at
13.) J-Lin agreed to make monthly payments for a term of 60
months in exchange for financing for the use of a 2012
Kenworth Model T660-Series vehicle. (Id. at 2.) On
February 5, 2013, the parties entered into a second Master
Lease Agreement (“Agreement 2”), whereby J-Lin
agreed to make monthly payments for a term of 60 months in
exchange for financing for the use of a 2012 Kenworth Model
T700 vehicle. (Id. at 2, 26.) On November 21, 2013,
the parties entered into a third Master Lease Agreement
(“Agreement 3”), whereby J-Lin agreed to make
monthly payments for a term of 60 months in exchange for
financing for the use of a 2014 Kenworth Model T680 vehicle.
(Id. at 2-3, 29.) On January 15, 2014, the parties
entered into a fourth Master Lease Agreement
(“Agreement 4”), whereby J-Lin agreed to make
monthly payments for a term of 60 months in exchange for
financing for the use of another 2014 Kenworth Model T680
vehicle. (Id. at 3, 32.) Lastly, on June 24, 2015,
the parties entered into a loan and security agreement
(“Agreement 5”), whereby J-Lin agreed to make
monthly payments for a term of 60 months in exchange for
financing for the use of a 2012 Kenworth Model T660-Series
vehicle. (Id. at 3, 35.) Pursuant to those
agreements, General Electric Capital Corporation provided
J-Lin with financing for the equipment described in the
Agreements. (Id. at 47.)
On
December 28, 2012, February 5, 2013, November 21, 2013,
January 15, 2014, and June 24, 2015, contemporaneously with
the execution of the Agreements, defendant Jones executed
five Continuing Guaranties (collectively, the
“Guaranties”). (DE # 19-3 at 4, 41-44.) Each
Guaranty states that Jones will “unconditionally
guarantee” all of J-Lin's “present and future
liabilities, obligations, and indebtedness to GE
Capital.” (Id.) More specifically, Jones
agreed “to pay on demand the entire [i]ndebtedness and
all losses, costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which may
be suffered by GE Capital by reason of [J-Lin]'s
default” under the Agreements.[1] (Id.) These
Guaranties were later assigned to BMO. (Id. at
10-11.)
On
January 1, 2017, J-Lin trucking defaulted under the terms of
the Agreements by failing to make the minimum monthly
payments. (DE # 19-3 at 4.) All of the Agreements define
default as the failure to pay any amount owed.[2] (Id.
19-3 at 3, 16, 37.) All say that upon default, BMO may
declare any indebtedness “immediately due and
payable.” (Id. at 3, 16-17, 37.)
In two
letters dated April 28, 2017, BMO notified J-Lin and Jones,
respectively, that J-Lin was in default and that the balance
due was $369, 142.91. (DE # 19-3 at 4, 47, 49.) Defendants
owed $72, 055.40 on Agreement 1 (id. at 51), $57,
344.73 on Agreement 2 (id. at 52), $85, 591.14 on
Agreement 3 (id. at 53), $91, 542.72 on Agreement 4
(id. at 54), and $62, 608.92 on Agreement 5
(id. at 55). After certain equipment was retrieved
and sold, the balance due was reduced to $281, 173.30,
according to plaintiff. (Id. at 4.) Neither J-Lin
nor Jones have paid this amount. (Id. at 5.)
On May
25, 2017, BMO filed a complaint containing two claims: (1) a
breach of contract claim against J-Lin for breach of the
Agreements (“Count I”), and (2) a breach of
contract claim against Jones for breach of the Guaranties
(“Count II”). (DE # 1 at 8-9.)
On
April 10, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment
in its favor on Counts I and II of the complaint. (DE # 19.)
Neither defendant responded to the motion in any manner. The
motion is now ripe for ruling.
III.
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