Community Foundation of Northwest Indiana, Inc., St. Mary Medical Center, Inc., and Rebecca Iwanus, Appellants-Defendants,
v.
Elizabeth A. Miranda, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Appeal
from the Lake Superior Court The Honorable Calvin D. Hawkins,
Judge. Trial Court Cause No. 45D02-1511-PL-83
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS Michael D. Sears Jacquelyn S. Pillar
Crown Point, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE D. Eric Neff Crown Point, Indiana
Tavitas, Judge.
Case
Summary
[¶1]
Community Foundation of Northwest Indiana, Inc.
("Community"), St. Mary Medical Center, Inc.
("St. Mary's"), and Rebecca Iwanus
(collectively, "Defendants") appeal the trial
court's denial of their motion for summary judgment in
proceedings brought by Elizabeth Miranda. We reverse and
remand.
Issue
[¶2]
Defendants raise one issue, which we restate as whether the
trial court properly denied Defendants' motion for
summary judgment.
Facts
[¶3]
Miranda began working at St. Mary's in 2014 as a nurse on
the oncology floor. Miranda was unemployed prior to beginning
her job at St. Mary's. After approximately six months of
employment at St. Mary's, Miranda requested and was
granted a transfer within St. Mary's to a new position as
a nurse liaison in the emergency department. According to
Defendants, the nurse liaison's role was:
At the time of "arriving" a patient [which occurs
when a patient arrives at the emergency department and
registration employees input the patient into the
hospital's system], if a nurse liaison was present, her
job was to instruct the registration employee as to the
patient's chief complaint after discussion with the
patient. If the nurse liaison was not present, the
registration employee would input the chief complaint based
on the patient's description, and the liaison would later
amend the complaint, as necessary.
Appellants' App. Vol. II p. 41 (internal citations
omitted). Miranda claims, because the position was relatively
new to St. Mary's, the assigned duties of the nurse
liaison evolved as the position became more developed.
"Arriving" a patient essentially means noting their
arrival time to the emergency department. See
Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 104 (Iwanus states that,
"When a patient came up to the desk, we were to take
their ID, arrive the patient"); see also
Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 8 (Miranda explains that her
role as a nurse liaison changed, and "[d]uties were
added. At first we were supposed to be strictly at the
registration, or the desk, to arrive the patient and get the
chief complaint"). Arriving a patient is important
because certain procedures would need to be followed for
certain patients within a pre-determined time period
depending on the patient's symptoms. For example,
patients who came in complaining of chest pain would need to
be given an EKG within a certain time period after the
patient's arrival. Thus, noting a patient's arrival
time is important for purposes of rendering adequate and
timely care.
[¶4]
Greg Sampson is the Director of Emergency Services at St.
Mary's and was Miranda's direct supervisor. Iwanus
was the supervisor of the registration employees in the
emergency department, and she supervised the registration
employees with whom Miranda, as nurse liaison, would work in
the emergency department.[1] In April 2015 (the "April
meeting"), Sampson notified Miranda that he received an
email in March, complaining that Miranda was asking the
registration employees to delay recording the time of
"arriving" patients, which was
"un[]ethical." Appellants' App. Vol. III p.
189.
[¶5]
Miranda claims that Sampson showed her the email complaint in
the April meeting authored by Iwanus. Iwanus, however, denies
ever complaining about Miranda. Until this point, Miranda
stated that she and Iwanus never had any issues with one
another. Miranda admitted that she recalled asking a
registration employee to delay an "arriving"
patient time in March 2015. At the April meeting, Sampson
instructed Miranda not to ask registration employees to delay
"arriving" patient times again.
[¶6]
In July 2015, Miranda received her positive review for her
performance during the time period from March 10, 2014, until
March 10, 2015, which was prior to the date of the complaint
Sampson received regarding Miranda's request to delay
"arriving" patient times. Later that month, on July
23, 2015 (the "July meeting"), Miranda was summoned
to a meeting with Sampson and a human resources
representative. Sampson presented Miranda with a notice of
corrective action for again asking employees to delay
"arriving" patients. Sampson received complaints
that Miranda again made the request to registration employees
on two separate occasions on July 20, 2015. Miranda denies
that she asked the registration employees to delay
"arriving" patient times again. Miranda informed
Sampson that she would be submitting a rebuttal to challenge
the accusations made against her.
[¶7]
After the July meeting, Miranda was suspended and escorted
out. Immediately after Miranda was escorted out, she
contacted Lori Alicea, one of the registration employees, and
informed Alicea that Miranda had been suspended, with the
possibility of termination, due to allegations that Miranda
was delaying patient treatment. According to Miranda, Alicea
"became emotional" and apologized because Alicea
had raised the issue in July to supervisors, because she was
looking for direction on the proper course of action, and her
intent was not to get Miranda fired. Appellant's App.
Vol. II p. 202. Miranda also contacted Gwen Perfetti, another
nurse liaison and also told Perfetti that she was suspended
with a possibility of termination. Miranda claims she
received several phone calls from coworkers once they became
aware of her suspension.
[¶8]
After Miranda's suspension, Miranda submitted a rebuttal
on July 27, 2015, and attempted to begin the problem solving
procedure outlined in the employee handbook. Sampson
terminated Miranda on July 29. After her termination,
Miranda's nursing license was due for renewal, and
Miranda was required to list her termination on her renewal
application. Miranda was required to participate in a hearing
before the Board of Nursing ("the Board") to renew
her license. While Miranda's hearing was pending, her
license was put on temporary status, but ultimately,
Miranda's license was renewed by the Board.
[¶9]
On November 17, 2015, Miranda filed her "Complaint for
Damages and Injunctive Relief" (the
"Complaint") against Defendants. Miranda's
Complaint alleges Count I, "Breach of Contract/Wrongful
Termination"; Count II, "Defamation, Libel &
Slander Against Community and/or St. Mary's"; Count
III, "Defamation, Libel & Slander Against
Iwanus"; Count IV, "Negligence Against Iwanus,
Community, and/or St Mary's"; Count V,
"Promissory Estoppel"; and Count VI, "Tortious
Interference with Contractual Relationship/Business
Relations." Id. at 14-22. We address the basis
for each claim further below.
[¶10]
Miranda's complaint also sought injunctive relief, asking
the trial court to issue an injunction (1) prohibiting
Defendants from sharing any information regarding
Miranda's employment with Community and St. Mary's;
(2) requiring St. Mary's and Community to remove all
"negative and false notations" in Miranda's
employment records; (3) prohibiting St. Mary's and
Community from refusing Miranda entrance to the premises
where Miranda's "current employment requires her
attendance"; (4) requiring St. Mary's and Community
to turn over any and all employment records related to
Miranda; (5) requiring St. Mary's and Community to
"remove any and all negative notations, comments, and/or
findings . . . . associated with [Miranda's] nursing
license"; and (6) requiring St. Mary's and Community
to immediately stop all communications with the Board related
to Miranda's nursing license until the resolution of
Miranda's lawsuit. Id. at 23.
[¶11]
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on January 31,
2018. After a hearing on May 16, 2018, the trial court
concluded that it would take the motion under
advisement.[2] The trial court ultimately entered an
order on May 23, 2018, denying Defendants' motion for
summary judgment and certifying the order for interlocutory
appeal sua sponte.
Analysis
[¶12]
Defendants appeal the trial court's denial of their
motion for summary judgment on all counts of Miranda's
complaint. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the
moving party shows there are no genuine issues of material
fact for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Erie Indem. Co. for Subscribers at
Erie Ins. Exch. v. Estate of Harris by Harris, 99 N.E.3d
625, 629 (Ind. 2018), reh'g denied; see
also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Once that showing is made,
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to designate
appropriate evidence to demonstrate the actual existence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Schoettmer v.
Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 705-06 (Ind. 2013). When ruling
on the motion, the trial court construes all evidence and
resolves all doubts in favor of the non-moving party.
Id. at 706. We review the trial court's ruling
on a motion for summary judgment de novo, and we take
"care to ensure that no party is denied his day in
court." Id. "We limit our review to the
materials designated at the trial level." Gunderson
v. State, Indiana Dep't of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d
1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018).
A.
Breach of Contract, Promissory Estoppel, Wrongful
Termination
[¶13]
Defendants argue that the trial court erred by denying their
motion for summary judgment on Miranda's breach of
contract claim. Miranda's basis for her breach of
contract claim is that she signed an employment offer letter
and on-boarding schedule (the "offer letter") and
an employee handbook (the "handbook"), which
applies to all St. Mary's employees, when she began her
employment with St. Mary's in 2014. Miranda contends that
the offer letter and the handbook constitute her employment
contract. In response, Defendants claim that Miranda was an
at-will employee, who was terminated due to performance
issues. Importantly, Defendants note that the handbook
squarely states it is not a contract of employment.
i.
The Documents
[¶14]
First, we analyze the contents of the documents Miranda
contends are contracts. The offer letter includes directions
at the top, which state:
Please review the following form and provide your electronic
signature at the far bottom to indicate your acceptance of
the terms of employment. If you do not accept these terms,
have any changes or if you have any questions, please contact
your HR representative promptly.
Appellants'
App. Vol. II p. 93. The offer letter contains personal
information about Miranda, including her name, address, phone
number, date of birth; date of hire; job title; manager;
starting rate; shift; pay group; benefit program; job code;
department; and hours worked per pay period. The offer letter
also states:
This offer of employment and your continued employment with
[sic] is contingent upon your successful completion of an
employee health and background screening. Please indicate you
accept this agreement by providing your electronic signature
below.
Id. Miranda signed and dated the offer letter on
February 25, 2014. Once Miranda transferred to the emergency
department, she received an email titled, "Employee
Transfer Information," which included most of the same
information that was included in the offer letter. Notably,
there is a start date listed, but no term of employment on
either document.
[¶15]
The handbook, a separate document, states that it "is
not a contract guaranteeing employment for any specific
duration. Although we hope that your employment relationship
with us will be long-term, either you or Management may
terminate this relationship at any time, for any reason, with
or without cause or notice." Appellants' App. Vol.
III p. 53. The handbook states that employment at St.
Mary's is "at will." Id. at 63. The
handbook also states that the policies contained in the
handbook are "subject to change at the sole discretion
of Management." Id. at 53. Finally, with regard
to Miranda's specific allegations in this lawsuit, the
handbook advises that "problem solving is not available
to the following corrective action status: suspension which
could result in termination." Appellants' App. Vol.
II p. 96.
ii.
Types of Employment
[¶16]
In Orr v. Westminster
Village North, Inc., our Supreme
Court set forth the distinctions in the type of employment in
Indiana. 689 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ind. 1997).
Historically, Indiana has recognized two basic forms of
employment: (1) employment for a definite or ascertainable
term; and (2) employment at-will. If there is an employment
contract for a definite term, and the employer has not
reserved the right to terminate the employment before the
conclusion of the contract, the employer generally may not
terminate the employment relationship before the end of the
specified term except for cause or by mutual agreement. If
there is no definite or ascertainable term of employment,
then the employment is at-will, and is presumptively
terminable at any time, with or without cause, by either
party. Wior v. Anchor Industries, Inc., 669 N.E.2d
[172, ] 175 (Ind. 1996); Speckman v. Indianapolis,
540 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Ind. 1989) . . . .
The employment-at-will doctrine is a rule of contract
construction, not a rule imposing substantive limitations on
the parties' freedom to contract. Streckfus v.
Gardenside Terrace Co-Op., Inc., 504 N.E.2d 273, 275
(Ind. 1987). If the parties choose to include a clear job
security provision in an employment contract, the presumption
that the employment is at-will may be rebutted. See
Speckman, 540 N.E.2d at 1192; Streckfus, 504
N.E.2d at 275. Nevertheless, in Indiana, the presumption of
at-will employment is strong, and this Court is disinclined
to adopt broad and ill-defined exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine. []
Orr, 689 N.E.2d at 717-18.
[¶17]
Even though the presumption of at-will employment in Indiana
is strong, our Supreme Court has acknowledged certain
exceptions to the at-will employment presumption.
First, if an employee establishes that "adequate
independent consideration" supports the employment
contract, the Court generally will conclude that the parties
intended to establish a relationship in which the employer
may terminate the employee only for good cause. Generally,
simply surrendering another job or moving to another location
to accept a new position which the employee sought, standing
alone, does not constitute adequate independent
consideration.
** * * *
Second, we have recognized a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine if a clear statutory expression
of a right or duty is contravened. For example, we have
invoked the public policy exception when an employee was
discharged for filing a workmen's compensation claim, or
when an employee was discharged for refusing to commit an
illegal act[.]
** * * *
Third, this Court has recognized that, in certain instances,
an employee may invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
To do so effectively, the employee must plead or assert the
doctrine with particularity. The employee must assert and
demonstrate that the employer made a promise to the employee;
that the employee relied on the promise to his detriment; and
that the promise otherwise fits within the Restatement test
for promissory estoppel.
Id. at 718 (citations omitted).
[¶18]
The Orr court also stated that it was going to
"decline plaintiffs' invitation" to use that
case to determine whether an employee handbook "can ever
constitute a unilateral contract serving to modify the
otherwise at-will employment ...