United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
PHILIP
P. SIMON, JUDGE.
Ramona
Palmer appeals the Social Security Administration's
decision to deny her protective application for Supplemental
Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
Palmer alleges a disability due to, generally speaking, back
issues, hip, knee, left shoulder, arthritis in shoulder,
anxiety, sciatica, chronic lower back pain, Ehlers-Danlos,
and dyslexia. [Tr. 102-03.][1] An administrative law judge ruled
Palmer was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act and that she had the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to perform the full range of sedentary work.
Palmer
challenges the ALJ's decision on three grounds. First,
she argues the ALJ erred by not properly evaluating her pain.
Second, Palmer takes issue with the ALJ's evaluation at
Step 5 that she is capable of performing the full range of
sedentary jobs. Third, she argues that the ALJ improperly
found her alleged mental impairments were non-severe. These
arguments are unavailing and none are grounds for reversal.
The ALJ
found that Palmer had the severe impairments of Ehlers-Danlos
syndrome which manifests itself in overly flexible joints.
The ALJ further found that Palmer had mild degenerative
changes in various joints. [Tr. 18.] Aside from this severe
impairment, Palmer had a number of other medical challenges
which are fully recounted in the ALJ's opinion and which
need not be repeated here. [See Tr. at 18-23.]
Let's
start with a description of the role I play in reviewing the
work of an ALJ. I am not supposed to determine from scratch
whether or not Palmer is disabled. Rather, I only need to
determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards
and whether the decision is supported by substantial
evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Shideler
v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012);
Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir.
2010); Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 462 (7th
Cir. 2008). My review of the ALJ's decision is
deferential. This is because the “substantial
evidence” standard is not a particularly rigorous one.
In fact, the Supreme Court announced long ago that the
standard is even less than a preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). Of course, there certainly has to be more than a
“scintilla” of evidence. Id. So in
conducting my review, I cannot “simply rubber-stamp the
Commissioner's decision without a critical review of the
evidence.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863,
869 (7th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the review is a light one
and the substantial evidence standard is met “if a
reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support the
conclusion.” Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995,
1001 (7th Cir. 2004).
Evaluation
of Pain
Palmer
first maintains that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her
pain. This argument seems to have a few prongs, including her
belief that the ALJ failed to consider the aggregate effect
of her ailments, the RFC is improper, and the ALJ discounted
her subjective complaints of pain. [DE 19 at 14-16.]
Palmer's
argument that the ALJ failed to consider the aggregate effect
of her ailments and pain is completely lacking in detail. She
lists a number of diagnoses, and then drops a footnote which
refers me to the “notable large footnotes” in the
statement of fact which again merely list references to her
illnesses or pain in the record. [DE 19 at 9-10.] This is
entirely unhelpful. Each party bears the burden of pointing
out specific portions of evidence in the court's
possession to support her case. Hermann v. Astrue,
No. 07 C 6914, 2010 WL 356233, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1,
2010). Palmer's brief does not do this - it fails to
connect citations to the record with any meaningful legal
analysis.
On the
other hand, the ALJ did account for the evidence of
pain in the record - he analyzed Palmer's pain for 6
pages in his opinion. [Tr. 24-30.] The ALJ considered
Palmer's daily activities, the type of treatment she
received for pain or other symptoms, and the type and dosage
of medication. [Tr. 24.] The ALJ specifically acknowledged
Palmer's hearing testimony that she could not work
because she hurts, her accounts with struggles of daily
living activities (like having to use both hands to lift a
gallon of milk), her reports that her Ehlers' Danlos
symptoms were worsening, and the testimony from Palmer's
future daughter-in-law and friend. [Tr. 24-25.] The ALJ
addressed her complaints of pain head-on, but found
“despite a record with many alleged symptoms and
subjective complaints, her allegations for disabling symptoms
are not supported by the objective medical findings and
diagnostic testing. The medical evidence reflects that the
claimant has complaints, but her allegations are unsupported
[by] the few objective findings and x-rays.” [Tr. 25.]
The ALJ
then laboriously went through the medical evidence in the
record related to pain, noting things like “it is true
that Dr. Bader diagnosed Ehler's Danlos hyperextensible
type but aside from a loose elbow, thumb and finger joints,
she was not reported with other significant
abnormalities” [Tr. 26]; December 2016 x-rays of the
back which were considered negative, or revealed normal or
minimal findings of the lumbar spine [Tr. 27]; despite knee
complaints, x-rays revealed well maintained joint spaces,
patellar tilt and no fracture [Tr. 27]; Oaklawn psychiatric
center diagnosed Palmer with no restrictions on her activity
level, and stated she could participate in 20-30 minutes of
aerobic activities [Tr. 690]; the treatment notes failed to
establish a severe respiratory condition [Tr. 28]; in late
2015, Palmer reported she rode a bike 5 times per week for 2
miles [Tr. 691]; and the consultative examination by Dr.
Gupta on August 15, 2015 revealed:
no anatomical deformities, no spinous or paraspinal
tenderness, full ranges of motion in all spines, negative
straight leg raises, normal curvature in all spines, no
stiffness of effusion in the upper extremities, no edema,
only mild pain in the left shoulder with normal motion,
“5/5" strength in the upper extremities, full
ranges of motion in all lower extremities with 5/5 strengths,
normal gait, the ability to arise without difficulties,
normal grip strength, normal coordination, preserved memory,
2/4 deep tendon reflexes and good fine finger manipulative
abilities.
[Tr. 28, Ex. 7F.] In sum, the ALJ found that “[t]hese
findings do not support allegations for greater limitation of
function.” [Tr. 28.]
Additionally,
the ALJ concluded that Palmer “failed her burden to
establish greater limitations of function, than those
reflected in the residual functional capacity, and lasting
twelve months in duration. The claimant failed her burden of
documenting a logical bridge between allegations, the record
and greater limitations of function.” [Tr. 29.] I agree
with the conclusion - and in this appeal, Palmer still has
not pointed me to anything specifically in the record, or
articulated any specific legal argument in support of her
bald claim that the ALJ did not properly evaluate
Palmer's pain. Just saying it does not make it so, and in
light of the ALJ's detailed pain analysis supported by
substantial evidence in the record, Palmer's claim fails.
To the
extent Palmer asserts the RFC is incorrect, this argument
also does not point me to anything in the medical record
supporting the contention that she is limited in
concentration, persistence and pace beyond what the ALJ
assessed. “[I]t is not the Court's obligation to
scour the record in search of such evidence.” Crump
v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-cv-557, 2018 WL 4627217, at *2
(N.D. Ind. Sept. 27, 2018). Palmer claims that “she
cannot last even five minutes while [sic] hurting before then
at her prior hobby of crochet.” [DE 19 at 15]. She
further says that the ALJ should have limited her sedentary
position because she cannot sit through church service.
Id. But these are similar to the other subjective
complaints ...