United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
BARRY W. MATLOCK, Plaintiff,
v.
FRANKLIN, et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
JON E.
DEGUILIO JUDGE
Barry
W. Matlock, a prisoner without a lawyer, was granted leave to
proceed against Mr. Sonnenberg, Warden Sevier, Sgt. Collier,
Sgt. Flakes, Sgt. Yancy, Sgt. Mottshagen, and Sgt. Franklin
in their official capacities for injunctive relief to cease
retaliating against him for exercising his First Amendment
rights, and in their individual capacities for monetary
damages for retaliating against him for exercising those
rights. Matlock was also granted leave to proceed against
Warden Sevier in his official capacity for injunctive relief
to provide adequate protection from members of the prison
staff and Vice Lords that have threatened him, as required by
the Eighth Amendment. Matlock has now filed a number of
motions with the court, each of which is addressed below.
Motions
Seeking Injunctive Relief
Matlock
seeks a temporary restraining order (ECF 26) and preliminary
injunction (ECF 27) against Sgt. Porter, Mr. Sonnenberg,
Warden Sevier, Sgt. Collier, Sgt. Flakes, Sgt. Yancy, Sgt.
Mottshagen, Sgt. Franklin, and Larry Crittenden. More
specifically, he asks that he be separated from the staff
that are retaliating against him by either moving him to a
different location or moving the staff members.
“[A]
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by
a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). To
obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show
(1) he will suffer irreparable harm before the final
resolution of his claims; (2) available remedies at law are
inadequate; and (3) he has a likelihood of success on the
merits. See BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d
317, 323-24 (7th Cir. 2015). The court then “weighs the
competing harms to the parties if an injunction is granted or
denied and also considers the public interest.”
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir.
2013). Furthermore, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
injunctive relief must be “narrowly drawn, extend no
further than necessary to remedy the constitutional
violation, and must use the least intrusive means to correct
the violation of the federal right.” Westefer v.
Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2012).
The PLRA circumscribes the scope of the court's authority
to enter an injunction in the corrections context. Where
prison conditions are found to violate federal rights,
remedial injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no
further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right, and use the least intrusive means necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right. This section of
the PLRA enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme
Court in cases challenging prison conditions: Prison
officials have broad administrative and discretionary
authority over the institutions they manage.
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012)
(quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
As
explained in this court's screening order (ECF 24 n. 2),
Matlock's amended complaint does not allege facts that
provide a basis for granting a preliminary injunction because
it does not detail specific threats demonstrating he would
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.
Matlock's current requests for injunctive relief do
detail some specific threats made by Sgt. Porter after his
amended complaint was filed. Specifically, Matlock asserts
that, on February 25, 2019, Sgt. Porter directed another
officer to search Matlock's cell and the following day
Sgt. Porter asked Matlock how he liked his shake down and
then laughed and said, “it wasn't over whiteboy and
Matlock could expect more to come.” (ECF 26 at 1; ECF
27 at 2.) Then, on March 3, 2019, Sgt, Porter told Matlock
that “he should watch his cell location because it
would be a shame if drugs or a weapon were found in his
possession.” (ECF 26 at 2; ECF 27 at 2.) On March 7,
2019, Sgt. Porter told Matlock “he had better watch his
back and his bed area was fair game.” (ECF 26-1 at
1-2.) She also indicated that Matlock “was lucky he
didn't make commissary that day” as “it
would've been a terrible thing had Matlock been robbed as
bad things happen in prison where the bad people are.”
(ECF 26-1 at 2.)
While
Matlock has attempted to obtain injunctive relief against
numerous defendants, he also seeks injunctive relief against
Sgt. Porter and Larry Crittenden, neither of whom are
defendants. Matlock may also be seeking injunctive relief
against Jody Kufferber, who is also not a defendant. (ECF
26-1 at 1.)
[a]n injunction, like any “enforcement action, ”
may be entered only against a litigant, that is, a party that
has been served and is under the jurisdiction of the district
court. Lake Shore Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 511 F.3d 762, 767 (7th
Cir. 2007); see also Audio Enters., Inc. v. B & W
Loudspeakers, 957 F.2d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 1992)
(vacating preliminary injunction because defendant had not
been served).
Maddox v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 528
Fed.Appx. 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus, injunctive relief
cannot be granted against Sgt. Porter, Larry Crittenden, or
Jody Kufferber.
To the
extent Matlock seeks injunctive relief against the defendants
named in this action, Matlock's allegations do not
support the granting of the extraordinary relief of a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
Matlock has not demonstrated that he will suffer irreparable
harm before this case can be resolved on the merits. The
additional allegations regarding Sgt. Porter's recent
threats do not alter this courts previous conclusion that a
preliminary injunction is not warranted. Unwarranted
shake-downs, unsubstantiated and vague threats of a set-up
that could result in a future conduct violation, and being
robbed of commissary goods are not the kind of harms that
preliminary injunctive relief is intended to remedy.
Therefore, Matlock's requests for a temporary restraining
order (ECF 26) and preliminary injunction (ECF 27) will be
denied.
Matlock
also seeks an order compelling two law library employees,
Elizabeth Kennerk and Mr. Hicks, to allow Matlock to access
the law library three to five times per week for the duration
of this lawsuit. While Matlock has phrased his request as a
motion to compel, it is more appropriately construed as
another request for preliminary injunctive relief. But it too
must be denied because neither Kennerk nor Hicks are
defendants in this action. Maddox, 528 Fed.Appx. at
672. Accordingly, the motion to compel (ECF 28 at 2-4) must
be denied.[1]
Motion
for ...