United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
JESSICA A. GIBSON, Plaintiff,
INDIANA STATE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT, JON DARROW a/k/a DENNY, JOHN F. BAYSE, MATTHEW A. BROWN, BRUCE BAXTER, BRUCE LEMMON, Defendants.
C. DICKMEYER INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
ELIZABETH MARIE LITTLEJOHN INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
REBECCA L. LOEFFLER INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
PATRICK HANLON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jessica Gibson brought this lawsuit alleging interference
with her FMLA rights and wrongful termination of her
employment. Defendants have filed a motion for partial
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Dkt. . For the reasons that follow, that motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in
Factual and Procedural History
Because Defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court “accept[s] the well-pleaded facts
in the complaint as true.” McCauley v. City of
Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
began working as a human resources director for the Indiana
State Personnel Department (“ISPD”) in February
2015. Dkt. 47 at 3 ¶ 18. Later that year, she
became a foster parent to three children and her parents
moved into her home because of her stepfather's serious
health condition. Dkt. 47 at 3 ¶¶ 19-21.
Those family developments became a source of frustration and
affected Plaintiff's mental and physical health. Dkt.
47 at 3-4 ¶¶ 23-24.
began to talk to her supervisors and coworkers about these
frustrations and their effects on her health-and she told her
supervisor, Defendant John Bayse, that she needed time off.
Dkt. 47 at 3-5, 7 ¶¶ 23, 28- 29, 34-35.
Finally, in April 2016, she informed Defendant Bayse that she
would be taking FMLA leave. Dkt. 47 at 9 ¶ 42.
FMLA leave began on April 18, 2016 and ran through May 23,
2016. Dkt. 47 at 9 ¶ 43. When Plaintiff
returned to work on May 23, her employment was terminated.
Dkt. 47 at 10 ¶ 46. Initially, Plaintiff was
told only that the termination was due to broken trust.
Dkt. 47 at 10 ¶ 46. Later, as she worked
through an unemployment claim, ISPD told her that she had
“been racist toward one of her subordinate
employees” and had violated policy. Dkt. 47 at
11-12 ¶ 50.
that she had been discriminated against, Plaintiff obtained a
right to sue letter from the EEOC in February 2017. Dkt.
47 at 2 ¶ 10. She then filed her first complaint
pro se in this Court in April 2017, alleging that Defendants
discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of The
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), The
Rehabilitation Act, The Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Dkt. 1. Defendants
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, dkt.
10, and Plaintiff responded with an amended complaint,
dkt. 18. Defendants again moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. Dkt. 19. The Court granted
that motion in part and denied it in part. Dkt. 31.
that partial dismissal, Plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint, dkt. 47, alleging: (1) FMLA interference
and retaliation claims, dkt. 47 at 15-16; (2) an ADA
claim, dkt. 47 at 16-17; (3) a 42 U.S.C. section
1983 claim, dkt. 47 at 24-25; (4) a Title VII claim,
dkt. 47 at 24-25; and (5) an Indiana Code Title 22
claim, dkt. 47 at 25-26. That complaint names six
defendants-ISPD and five individuals-and seeks multiple forms
of relief. Dkt. 47 at 26.
have filed a motion for partial dismissal of the second
amended complaint for failure to state a claim, dkt.
53, which the Court now grants in part and denies in
may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to
dismiss claims for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially plausible claim is one that
allows “the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court will “accept the
well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, ” but will
not defer to “legal conclusions and conclusory
allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim.”
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th
motion to dismiss raises four arguments: (1) Plaintiff's
FMLA interference and retaliation claims should be dismissed
as to all defendants; (2) Plaintiff's Title VII and ADA
claims should be dismissed as to the individual defendants;
(3) Plaintiff's Indiana-law claim under Indiana Code
Title 22 should be dismissed in its entirety; and (4) certain
claims for ...