United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S
DECISION
JAMES
R. SWEENEY II, JUDGE
Plaintiff
Londa T. (“Ms. T.”) applied for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) from the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) on October 10,
2014, alleging an onset date of June 27, 2014. [ECF No.
10-2 at 63.] Her application was initially denied on
November 25, 2014, [ECF No. 10-5 at 2], and upon
reconsideration on February 17, 2015 [ECF No. 10-2 at
63]. Administrative Law Judge Kevin R. Martin (the
“ALJ”) held a hearing on September 27, 2016.
[ECF No. 10-3 at 4-33.] The ALJ issued a decision on
December 14, 2016, concluding that Ms. T. was not entitled to
receive DIB. [ECF No. 10-2 at 60.] The Appeals
Council denied review on May 5, 2017. [ECF No. 10-2 at
2.] On July 5, 2017, Ms. T. timely filed this civil
action asking the Court to review the denial of benefits
according to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. §
1383(c). [ECF No. 1.]
I.
Standard
of Review
“The Social Security Act authorizes payment of
disability insurance benefits … to individuals with
disabilities.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S.
212, 214 (2002). “The statutory definition of
‘disability' has two parts. First, it requires a
certain kind of inability, namely, an inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity. Second, it requires an
impairment, namely, a physical or mental impairment, which
provides reason for the inability. The statute adds that the
impairment must be one that has lasted or can be expected to
last … not less than 12 months.” Id. at
217.
When an
applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this
Court's role is limited to ensuring that the ALJ applied
the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence
exists for the ALJ's decision. Barnett v.
Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). For the purpose of judicial review,
“[s]ubstan-tial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). Because
the ALJ “is in the best position to determine the
credibility of witnesses, ” Craft v. Astrue,
539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008), this Court must accord the
ALJ's credibility determination “considerable
deference, ” overturning it only if it is
“patently wrong.” Prochaska v. Barnhart,
454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
The ALJ
must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), evaluating the following, in
sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the
claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the
impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the
claimant can perform her past work; and (5) whether the
claimant is capable of performing work in the national
economy.
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted) (alterations in original). “If a
claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, she will
automatically be found disabled. If a claimant satisfies
steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step
four. Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the
SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.” Knight v.
Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
After
Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a
claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) by evaluating “all limitations that
arise from medically determinable impairments, even those
that are not severe.” Villano v. Astrue, 556
F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ
“may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the
ruling.” Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four
to determine whether the claimant can perform her own past
relevant work and if not, at Step Five to determine whether
the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(iv), (v). The burden of proof is on the
claimant for Steps One through Four; only at Step Five does
the burden shift to the Commissioner. See Clifford,
227 F.3d at 868.
If the
ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists
to support the ALJ's decision, the Court must affirm the
denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When
an ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial
evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the
appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v.
Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An award of
benefits “is appropriate only where all factual issues
have been resolved and the record can yield but one
supportable conclusion.” Id. (citation
omitted).
II.
Background
Ms. T.
was 57 years of age at the time she applied for DIB. [ECF
No. 10-6 at 2.] She has completed at least four years of
college and previously worked as a nurse supervisor. [ECF
No. 10-7 at 17-18.][2]
The ALJ
followed the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the
SSA in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and ultimately
concluded that Ms. T. was not disabled. [ECF No. 10-2 at
75.] Specifically, the ALJ found as follows:
• At Step One, Ms. T. had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity[3] since June 27, 2014, the alleged onset
date. [ECF No. 10-2 at 65.]
• At Step Two, she had the following severe impairments:
“migraine headaches, major depressive disorder with
panic attacks, generalized anxiety disorder, and
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) ...