United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
MUFTI ABDUL EL-MALIK BEY ALI a/k/a FRANCIS LEE SMITH-BEY, Plaintiff,
MATT PETERSON, DREW LIEBEL, ANDREW COLE, Defendants.
A. ARTHUR INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
JONATHAN PAUL NAGY INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
ENTRY GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
WILLIAM T. LAWRENCE, SENIOR JUDGE
Mufti Abdul El-Malik Bey Ali is a prisoner confined at the
Pendleton Correctional Facility (PCF). Mr. Abdul filed this
lawsuit on May 15, 2017, pursuing claims alleging
restrictions on his religious practices.
defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mr.
Abdul failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies
as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a), before filing this lawsuit. For the
reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion for
summary judgment is granted in part and
denied in part.
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Material facts are those that
might affect the outcome of the suit under applicable
substantive law.” Dawson v. Brown, 803 F.3d
829, 833 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
genuine dispute as to any material fact exists ‘if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Daugherty v.
Page, 906 F.3d 606, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)). The Court views the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in the non-movant's favor. See
Barbera v. Pearson Education, Inc., 906 F.3d 621, 628
(7th Cir. 2018).
substantive law applicable to the motion for summary judgment
is the PLRA, which requires that a prisoner exhaust his
available administrative remedies before bringing a suit
concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);
see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002).
“[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” Id. at
532 (citation omitted).
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines
and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly
structure on the course of its proceedings.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote
omitted); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804,
809 (7th Cir. 2006) (“‘To exhaust remedies, a
prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and
at the time, the prison's administrative rules
require.'”) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry,
286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). “State law
establishes the administrative remedies that a state prisoner
must exhaust for purposes of the PLRA.” Lanaghan v.
Koch, 902 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2018). “[A]n
inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those,
grievance procedures that are capable of use to obtain some
relief for the action complained of.” Ross v.
Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1859 (2016) (internal quotation
party does not respond to a motion for summary judgment, the
opposing party's facts are accepted as true. See
S.D. Ind. L. R. 56-1(f)(1)(A) (“In deciding a summary
judgment motion, the court will assume that[ ] the facts as
claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the movant
are admitted without controversy except to the extent that
the non-movant specifically controverts the facts . . .
.”); see also Dade v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
128 F.3d 1135, 1137 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming district
court's grant of summary judgment where it accepted
moving party's facts as true when non-moving party failed
to respond under local rule). This does not alter the summary
judgment standard, so the movant's facts are still viewed
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, but it does
“reduce the pool” from which facts and inferences
relative to the motion may be drawn. Smith v.
Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
“Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, the
defendants must establish that an administrative remedy was
available and that [the plaintiff] failed to pursue
it.” Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th
complaint alleges that the defendants are responsible for
conditions that have prevented Mr. Abdul from exercising his