United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
JAMES F. GRIFFITH, Plaintiff,
v.
F. BRANNICK, D. HASKINS, YARBAR, DEVINE, E. DRADA, N. LYDAY, PHILLIPS, Defendants.
DAVID
A. ARTHUR INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOSHUA
ROBERT LOWRY INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S VERFIED MOTION TO RECONSIDER
PARTS OF ORDER AT DOCKET NO. 104
MARK
J. DINSMORE UNITED STATE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Verified
Motion to Reconsider Parts of “Order on
Plaintiff's Verified Fourth and Fifth Motions to Compel
Discovery.” [Dkt. 112.] On January 17,
2019, the Court issued its Order [Dkt. 104] on two
motions: 1) Plaintiff's Verified Fourth Motion to
Compel Discovery [Dkt. 87] and 2)
Plaintiff's Verified Fifth Motion to Compel
Discovery [Dkt. 93], granting in part and
denying in part Plaintiff's motions. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court now DENIES
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider.
I.
Background
In this
action, Plaintiff, a prisoner incarcerated at New Castle
Correctional Facility, brings excessive use of force claims
against correctional officer Defendants that he asserts
occurred while he was housed at Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility [Dkt. 5 at 1.] Plaintiff alleges that on
June 2, 2016 Defendants dragged him to F cell house and
carried him down the stairs out of the view of cameras.
[Dkt. 5 at 2.] While Plaintiff was handcuffed, he
contends Defendants body slammed, jumped on, and began
beating him. [Dkt. 5 at 2.] In relevant part of
Plaintiff's Verified Fourth and Fifth Motions to
Compel, the Court granted the following discovery
requests in its January 17, 2019 Order:
1). Plaintiff's Verified Fourth Motion is
GRANTED IN PART as to
Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 11 to the
limited extent that the Court directs
Defendants to identify what inmate grievances, if any, were
filed against them complaining of the use of physical force
and detailing the alleged nature of that force between June
2, 2014 and June 2, 2017. Confidential or sensitive security
information may be redacted. Contemporaneous with the
production of these responses to Plaintiff, Defendants are
ordered to provide copies of both the redacted and the
unredacted grievance records in an ex-parte filing
for in camera review.
2). The Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff's
Request for Production No. 2 to the limited
extent that the Court directs Defendants to
produce any use of force reports they participated in
creating in response to an inmate grievance or where medical
care was provided to an inmate as a result of the interaction
between June 2, 2014 and June 2, 2017. Confidential or
sensitive security information may be redacted.
Contemporaneous with the production of these redacted
documents to Plaintiff, Defendants are ordered to provide
copies of both the redacted and unredacted use of force
reports in an ex-parte filing for in camera
review.
[See Dkt. 104.]
Plaintiff
timely filed his Verified Motion to Reconsider on
February 7, 2019, urging the Court to reconsider the
limitations placed upon 1). Plaintiff's Interrogatory No.
11 involving inmate grievances filed for use of physical
force between June 2, 2014 and June 2, 2017 and 2).
Plaintiff's
Request for Production No. 2 involving use of force reports
Defendants developed in response to the aforementioned inmate
grievances or inmates provided medical care as a result of
physical force incidents within the same three-year period.
[Dkt. 112 at 1.]
II.
Legal Standard
Motions
to reconsider serve a limited function, to be used,
“where ‘the Court has patently misunderstood a
party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues
presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error
not of reasoning but of apprehension.'” Bank of
Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185,
1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel
Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va.
1983)). The parties may not introduce evidence previously
available but unused in the prior proceeding or tender new
legal theories. See In re Prince, 85 F.3d
314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996); Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar
Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1986). A court may
grant a motion to reconsider where a movant demonstrates a
manifest error of law or fact. In re Prince, 85 F.3d
at 324. A motion to reconsider is not an occasion to make new
arguments. Granite State Ins. Co. v. Degerlia, 925
F.2d 189, 192 n.7 (7th Cir. 1991).
This is
a difficult standard to meet: “Motions to reconsider
are granted for ‘compelling reasons,' such as a
change in the law which reveals that an earlier ruling was
erroneous, not for addressing arguments that a party should
have raised earlier.” Solis v. Current Dev.
Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). It is accordingly “inappropriate to argue
matters that could have been raised in prior motions”
or to “rehash previously rejected arguments[.]”
United States v. Zabka, No. 1:10-CV-1078, 2013 WL
9564253, at *2 (C.D.Ill. Aug. 19, 2013); accord,
e.g.,Caisse Nationale De Credit Agricole v. CBI
Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1267, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“Again we emphasize, apart from manifest errors of
law, reconsideration is not for rehashing previously rejected
arguments.”); id. (“[A] motion to
reconsider is not the appropriate vehicle to introduce new
legal theories[.]”). ...