United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
RAYMOND A. BRILEY, Plaintiff,
v.
MR MCPHERSON, et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
JON E.
DEGUILIO JUDGE
Raymond
A. Briley, a prisoner without a lawyer, currently proceeds on
claims against Deputy Myers, Deputy Merrill, Deputy Rayl, and
Lieutenant McPherson for denying him medical treatment after
a slip-and-fall at the St. Joseph County Jail in violation of
the Eighth Amendment ECF 14. He also proceeds on a claim that
these defendants placed him on suicide watch and issued
disciplinary reports against him for informing them of his
slip-and-fall in violation of the First Amendment.
Briley
now moves for summary judgment, arguing that the defendants
have offered no facts to support their defense and ignored
the deadlines in the scheduling order. He further argues
that, based on the evidence he has filed, the defendants
cannot dispute that they violated his rights under the First
and Eighth Amendments. The defendants respond that the burden
of proof rests with Briley and that they complied with the
scheduling deadlines. Briley replies that the incident
reports prepared by the defendants demonstrate that he is
entitled to summary judgment.
According
to the incident reports (ECF 47 at 9-12), a nurse saw Briley
fall in the dayroom in a small puddle of water that had
formed because of a leaky ceiling. Lieutenant McPherson told
Deputy Myers, Deputy Rayl, and Deputy Merrill that he had
reviewed the video surveillance footage and that Briley had
fallen intentionally. Lieutenant McPherson observed that
Briley had jogged toward the puddle of water, immediately
fell on his back, cushioned his fall with his right arm and
shoulder, and remained on the floor until staff arrived.
Lieutenant McPherson asked Briley if he was suicidal or had
any intention of harming himself, and Briley said no.
Nevertheless, Lieutenant McPherson believed that the fall was
intentional and placed on Briley suicide watch due to
concerns for his safety. Lieutenant McPherson also charged
Briley with disruptive conduct, malingering, and lying to
staff.
Summary
judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A
genuine dispute of material fact exists when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the
deciding court must construe all facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. Ogden v.
Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
Briley
alleges that the defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to his medical needs by preventing him from
receiving medical attention after the slip-and-fall. To
prevail on this claim, Briley must show: (1) his medical need
was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to that medical need. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A medical need is
“serious” if it is one that a physician has
diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor's attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Deliberate indifference means
that the defendant “acted in an intentional or
criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have
known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed
and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from
occurring even though he could have easily done so.”
Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005).
Notably, the record does not demonstrate nor has Briley
identified a serious medical need. While a slip-and-fall may
result in injury, it is not, by itself, a serious medical
need. As a result, he is not entitled to summary judgment on
this claim.
Briley
also alleges that the defendants retaliated against him for
informing them about the slip-and-fall by placing him on
suicide watch and by issuing disciplinary reports. To prevail
on this claim, Briley must show that (1) he engaged in
activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a
deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity
in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at
least a motivating factor in the Defendants' decision to
take the retaliatory action.” Gomez v. Randle,
680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012). “[A] prison inmate
retains those First Amendment rights that are not
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974). “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on
inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987) Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th
Cir. 2005).
Though
Briley contends that he was placed on suicide watch in
retaliation for reporting the slip-and-fall, the incident
report suggests that Lieutenant McPherson decided to place
Briley on suicide watch based on what he saw on video
surveillance rather than any speech or expression from
Briley.[1] Moreover, though Lieutenant McPherson
initiated disciplinary charges against Briley for reporting
the slip-and-fall, the incident reports suggest that the
report may not have been protected First Amendment activity;
based on the incident reports, a reasonable jury could
conclude that Briley had staged the slip-and-fell, and the
State has a legitimate penological interest in preventing
inmates from misleading correctional staff. Because issues of
material fact remain disputed, Briley is not entitled to
summary judgment on his First Amendment claim, and the motion
for summary judgment is denied.
As a
final matter, on December 12, 2018, following a status
conference, the court reopened discovery with a deadline of
February 11, 2019, and indicated that a dispositive motion
deadline would be set thereafter. ECF 42. Because the
discovery deadline has passed and there are no pending
discovery motions, the court sets the dispositive motion
deadline for April 1, 2019.
For
these reasons, the court:
(1)
DENIES the motion for summary judgment (ECF 40); and
(2)
ORDERS the parties to file dispositive motions by April
1, 2019.
SO
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