United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING FURTHER
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE
William Cox filed this civil action. He is currently
incarcerated at the Plainfield Correctional Facility. Mr. Cox
alleges that the defendants are liable to him because he was
falsely imprisoned between March 6, 2015 and May 15, 2016. He
seeks an apology and money damages.
the plaintiff is a “prisoner” as defined by 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(c), this Court has an obligation under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) to screen his complaint before service
on the defendants. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the
Court must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. In determining whether the complaint states a claim,
the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th
Cir. 2017). To survive dismissal,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se
complaints such as that filed by the plaintiff are construed
liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792
F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
Dismissal of Action
complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state law.
L.P. v. Marian Catholic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690, 696
(7th Cir. 2017) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988)). Suits under § 1983 use the statute of
limitations and tolling rules that states employ for
personal-injury claims. In Indiana, the applicable statute of
limitations period is two years. See Richards v.
Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code
action was filed on February 13, 2019, nearly nine months
after the expiration of Indiana's 2-year statute of
limitations, with Mr. Cox's claims having accrued by no
later than May 15, 2016, when he was released from custody.
“It is, of course, ‘irregular' to dismiss a
claim as untimely under Rule 12(b)(6). . . . However, . . .
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of a limitations
defense may be appropriate when the plaintiff effectively
pleads [himself] out of court by alleging facts that are
sufficient to establish the defense.” Hollander v.
Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 691 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal
citations omitted); see also Koch v. Gregory, 536
Fed.Appx. 659 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that when the language
of the complaint plainly shows that the statute of
limitations bars the suit, dismissal under § 1915A is
appropriate); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy
Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012). Mr. Cox
alleges that he was prohibited from filing this action
earlier based on community corrections standards. But, Mr.
Cox's suggestion that he was not able to timely file his
claims must be rejected because he filed these same claims in
Cox v. State of Indiana, 1:17-cv-226-LJM-TAB (S.D.
Ind. 2017) (dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A on
February 27, 2017).
shall have through March 13, 2019, in which
to show cause why this action should not be dismissed because
each of the claims alleged is barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“Without at least an opportunity to amend or to
respond to an order to show cause, an IFP applicant's
case could be tossed out of court without giving the
applicant any timely notice or opportunity to be heard to
clarify, contest, or simply request leave to amend.”);
Jennings v. City of Indianapolis, 637 Fed.Appx. 954,
954-955 (7th Cir. 2016) (“In keeping with this
court's advice in cases such as Luevano . . .,
the court gave Jennings 14 days in which to show cause why
the case should not be dismissed on that basis.”).