United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, CHIEF JUDGE
matter is before the Court on a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside
or Correct a Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed
by Petitioner Michael Coleman (“Coleman”). For
the reasons explained in this Order, the motion is
denied and dismissed with prejudice. In
addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability
should not issue.
Section 2255 Motion Standards
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the presumptive
means by which a federal prisoner can challenge his
conviction or sentence. See Davis v. United States,
417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). A court may grant relief from a
federal conviction or sentence pursuant to § 2255
“upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “Relief under
this statute is available only in extraordinary situations,
such as an error of constitutional or jurisdictional
magnitude or where a fundamental defect has occurred which
results in a complete miscarriage of justice.”
Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878-79 (7th
Cir. 2013) (citing Prewitt v. United States, 83 F.3d
812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996); Barnickel v. United
States, 113 F.3d 704, 705 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Factual and Procedural Background
February 23, 2015, a police officer stopped Coleman for
walking in the middle of a residential street in
Indianapolis. See United States v. Coleman, 676 Fed.
App'x. 590 (7th Cir. 2017). Coleman gave the officer a
phony name, and after this lie was discovered, another
officer searched him and found a handgun in his pocket.
Id. Coleman was arrested under an Indiana statute
criminalizing the refusal to provide identification, Ind.
Code § 34-28-5-3.5.
was charged in this Court in a three-count Superseding
Indictment with one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count
1); one count of possession with the intent to distribute
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count
2); and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)
(Count 3). United States v. Coleman, No.
1:15-cr-00064-JMS-DML-1 (S.D. Ind.) (hereinafter “Crim.
Dkt.”), Dkt. 21.
26, 2015, Coleman filed a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained during his arrest. Crim. Dkt. 17. On September 24,
2015, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on Coleman's
motion to suppress. Crim. Dkt. 42. The two officers present
during the arrest and Coleman testified. Id. The
Seventh Circuit summarized the testimony at the evidentiary
hearing as follows:
At the evidentiary hearing on that motion, Coleman and the
two police officers testified. The first officer saw the
41-year-old Coleman in a residential area walking in the
street instead of using one of the sidewalks running along
either side. The officer asked for identification, prompting
Coleman to say that he possessed an Indiana identification
card but did not have it with him. He gave a name,
“DeWayne Coleman, ” and, in quick succession,
three dates of birth: September 34, 1973; September 31, 1930;
and, finally, September 30, 1973. The last of these was at
least plausible, but the officer's mobile, online search
of Bureau of Motor Vehicles records turned up neither a
driver's license nor an identification card. After first
confirming with Coleman the spelling of the name and date of
birth he had given, the officer placed him in handcuffs. The
second police officer then asked Coleman if he had a weapon,
and when he said yes, the officer found and removed a handgun
from his pants pocket. At this point only five to ten minutes
had elapsed since the encounter began. For his part, Coleman
testified that he had been walking in the street to avoid
snow on the sidewalks. But the district court, relying on the
first officer's testimony and street photos taken the
next day, found that the sidewalks had been clear of snow. In
his Rule 51(b) response, Coleman does not dispute this
Coleman, 676 Fed. App'x. at 591-92.
Court took Coleman's motion under advisement and then on
October 9, 2015, the Court denied Coleman's motion to
suppress. Crim. Dkt. 43. Coleman filed a motion for
reconsideration that was denied. Crim. Dkt. 46 and 51.
October 28, 2015, Coleman's attorney filed a motion to
withdraw and new counsel was assigned to represent Coleman.
Crim. Dkt. 44 and 49.
December 8, 2015, Coleman entered into a petition to enter a
plea of guilty and plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B). Crim. Dkt. 60 and 61.
Coleman agreed to plead guilty to Count 1 of the Superseding
Indictment and the government agreed to dismiss Counts 2 and
3. Crim. Dkt. 61. The parties agreed that the Court would use
its discretion to fashion a sentence. Id. at 2-3.
Coleman waived the right to appeal the conviction and
sentence imposed except for the right to appeal the order
denying his motion to suppress. Id. at 4. Coleman
further waived the right to any collateral attacks on his
conviction or sentence except for claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. The parties also agreed
to the factual basis for the plea. Id. at 5.
December 9, 2015, Coleman appeared before the Court and
pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment. Crim. Dkt. 66.
The Court accepted his plea. On May 23, 2016, the Court
sentenced Coleman to 100 months' imprisonment to be