United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
P. SIMON, JUDGE
Ryan Holl, who is representing himself in this matter, filed
this action after he was psychologically evaluated and then
detained at the Otis R. Bowen Center for Human Services, Inc.
(“Bowen Center”), in Plymouth, Indiana. In his
initial complaint, he alleged that the Bowen Center violated
his rights under the federal constitution, Indiana state
constitution, Indiana state law, and international human
rights laws. The Bowen Center moved to dismiss, and I
dismissed Holl's claims, but gave him an opportunity to
amend his complaint.
filed an amended complaint [DE 27] in which he added two
defendants -Gina Haspial and Randolph Alles. However, he soon
thereafter requested to withdraw his claims against Haspial
and Alles, and I dismissed those claims without prejudice
against those defendants. [DE 33 at 1.] Therefore, what
remains in this lawsuit are the claims in the amended
complaint against the Bowen Center.
matter is before me on the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint, filed by Defendant, the Bowen Center. [DE
29.] The Bowen Center once again moves to dismiss Holl's
amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the
reasons set forth below, I will grant the Bowen Center's
motion to dismiss Holl's amended complaint.
amended complaint is brief (only three pages). It alleges as
follows: during his stay at the Bowen Center, from September
1 - September 8, 2017, Holl was assaulted by three staff
members, and he was denied access to the banking system,
legal system, his business data, his legal counsel, and his
doctors. [DE 27 at 1.] Holl states claims for fraud, libel,
slander, destruction of legal property, withholding access to
the court system, violating contracts, and violating HIPPA.
[Id. at 1-2.]
that Holl's initial complaint contained much more detail
about the events. These are set forth in my opinion and order
dated July 12, 2018 (and need not be repeated here), in which
I granted the Bowen Center's motion to dismiss, but
afforded Holl a chance to amend his complaint. [Op. at 1-5.]
Additionally, I have reviewed the sealed documents Holl
submitted at docket entry 39.
Bowen Center moves to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant
to both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides
for a dismissal of an action for “lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). On a Rule
12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading
the court that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Kontos
v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 826 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir.
1987). When a party moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)
challenging the factual basis for jurisdiction, the nonmoving
party must support its allegations with competent proof of
jurisdictional facts. Id.
reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), I “‘must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint' that are not legal conclusions.”
Toulon v. Continental Casualty Co., 877 F.3d 725,
734 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The complaint must be construed in the
light most favorable to Holl, and all possible inferences
must be drawn in his favor. Fields v. Wharrie, 672
F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a plaintiff must allege ‘enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d
362, 365-66 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Plausibility”
does not require “probability, ” but “more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully” is required to survive a challenge under
Rule 12(b)(6). Id.
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,
and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). While I should give the pleadings of a
pro se plaintiff a liberal construction, a pro se plaintiff
is nevertheless bound to comply with the rules governing the
filing of a claim and to comply with court rules.
Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir.
2001); Members v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.
1998) (“[R]ules apply to uncounseled litigants and must
of following the rules, I have warned Holl in a separate
lawsuit that was in front of me against three other
defendants but appearing to bring similar claims, Holl v.
Indiana, et al., No. 3:18-cv-1 (N.D. Ind. filed Jan. 3,
2018), that his abusive and offensive language in his filings
have come “dangerously close to constituting an abuse
of the judicial process.” [Case No. 3:18-cv-1 DE 42 at
5-6 (citing DE 20, 21, 22, 25, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37,
39, 40, 41).] Yet the amended complaint in this case is
entitled “Holl Amended Complaint - SUMMARY OF EVENTS
for JUDGE PHIL.” [DE 27 at 1] While I appreciate the
casual nature of Mr. Holl's filings, responding to my
earlier dismissal order with a ”WTF” - as Holl
has done in his most recent filing, see DE 35 at 2 -
isn't particularly illuminating and, in all events, flies
in the face of my earlier admonitions to him.
noted earlier, Holl's amended complaint is very brief.
“[W]hen a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the new
complaint supersedes all previous complaints and controls the
case from that point forward . . . a plaintiff's new
complaint wipes away prior pleadings.” Massey v.
Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the
first complaint is rendered void. Flannery v. Recording
Indus. Ass'n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir.
2004). Nevertheless, I have done my best to interpret, as
liberally as possible, what claims Holl appears to be
asserting against the Bowen Center. Even applying this most
liberal construction, the amended complaint fails to fix the
deficiencies of the initial complaint, and fails to state a
amended complaint sets forth a list of alleged wrongdoings
(“fraud, libel, slander, destruction of legal property,
withholding access to the court system, violating contracts,
” and violation of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPPA”), without supporting
any such claims with facts. [DE 27 at 1.] This violates Rule
8 which requires that a complaint provides “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief” so the defendant is given
“fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” AGM v. Mental Health
Center, No. 2:16-cv-25, 2016 WL ...