United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
NED P. RULE, Plaintiff,
MAINSTREET CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC, MAINSTREET INVESTMENT COMPANY LLC, MAINSTREET DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LLC, MAINSTREET HEALTH LLC, MAINSTREET HEALTH MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, MAINSTREET ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., PAUL EZEKIEL TURNER, JASEN COLDIRON, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS COLDIRON AND TURNER'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge
Jasen Coldiron and Paul Ezekiel Turner have filed a motion to
dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's amended complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. . For the
reasons that follow, that motion is GRANTED. Defendant Scott
Fankhauser also moved to dismiss Count II, incorporating
Defendants Coldiron and Turner's arguments. Dkt. .
Because Defendant Fankhauser has since been dismissed from
this case, dkt. 90, dkt. 93, that motion is DENIED as moot.
and Procedural History
Defendants Coldiron and Turner have moved for dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accept[s] the well-pleaded
facts in the complaint as true.” McCauley v. City
of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
collection of corporate entities specializing in real estate
development, value investments, and health care-hired
Plaintiff Ned P. Rule in September 2015 as its
“Managing Director - Investment.” Dkt. 7 at 5
¶ 30. Plaintiff's employment contract with
Mainstreet included various guarantees, including a
compensation package “guaranteed for three years,
” except in the case of his termination “for
cause.” Dkt. 7-1. Plaintiff was terminated around
November 15, 2017-a little over two years after his
employment began. Dkt. 7 at 10 ¶ 72. No.
“cause” was given. Dkt. 7 at 11 ¶¶
now alleges three causes of action against several Mainstreet
defendants. Dkt. 7 at 1-3 ¶¶ 2-14, 11-16
¶¶ 81-135. Defendants Coldiron and Turner move
solely for dismissal of Count II. Dkt. 25 at 1. They are the
only defendants remaining in Count II; a third
defendant-Scott Fankhauser- has been dismissed by joint
stipulation of the parties, dkt. 90, dkt. 93.
Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Coldiron and
Turner tortiously interfered with his employment contract
when they “purposely sought out a way to avoid
[Mainstreet's] contractual obligation” to
Plaintiff. Dkt. 7 at 13 ¶ 107. Specifically, Defendants
attempted to “induce [Mainstreet] to terminate
Plaintiff's employment in accordance with their own
desires, ” dkt. 7 at 14 ¶ 109; “sought to
find or invent a ‘cause' to terminate Plaintiff
even though no such ‘cause' existed, ” dkt. 7
at 13 ¶ 108; and, when they could not find or invent a
“cause, ” fired him without one, dkt. 7 at 14
¶ 109. By doing so, Plaintiff claims, Defendants
Coldiron and Turner tortiously interfered with his employment
contract. Dkt. 7 at 14 ¶ 114.
Colidiron and Turner filed this motion to dismiss Count II
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 25.
Defendants may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) to dismiss claims for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially
plausible claim is one that allows “the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id.
ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will “accept the
well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, ” but will
not defer to “legal conclusions and conclusory
allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim.”
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th
II is governed by Indiana law. See Land v. Yamaha Motor
Corp., 272 F.3d 514, 516-17 (7th Cir. 2001). To state a
claim for tortious interference with a contract, plaintiffs
ordinarily must allege: “(1) the existence of a valid
and enforceable contract; (2) defendant's knowledge of
the existence of the contract; (3) defendant's
intentional inducement of breach of the contract; (4) the
absence of justification; and (5) damages resulting ...