United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division
OPINION AND ORDER
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN CHIEF JUDGE
The
Defendant, Brandon Buchanan, has been ordered detained
pending trial on charges that he aided maintenance of a
residence for distributing controlled substances, a violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count
1), profited by managing a building to manufacture, store, or
distribute a controlled substance, a violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(a)(2) (Count 2), and unlawfully possessed a
firearm and ammunition in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 4). The
Defendant faces potential penalties of imprisonment of not
more than 20 years on Counts 1 and 2, and a range of between
five years and life imprisonment on Count 4. This matter is
before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Revocation
or Amendment of Detention Order [ECF No. 50] filed pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), which provides for district
court review, upon motion by a defendant, of a Magistrate
Judge's detention order.[1]
The
Government requested the detention of the Defendant pending
trial on grounds that the Defendant was a danger to the
community and a risk of flight. (See Mot. for
Detention, ECF No. 4.) On March 19, 2018, Magistrate Judge
Paul R. Cherry conducted a detention hearing. He found that
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) created a rebuttable presumption
that no condition or combination of conditions of release
would reasonably assure the Defendant's appearance or the
safety of the community. The Magistrate Judge concluded that
the Defendant had not introduced sufficient evidence to rebut
the presumption and, further, that the presumption was
strengthened by the Defendant's failure to appear in
court in another criminal case against him, the
Defendant's lack of regular, established employment, the
Defendant's substance abuse, that the Defendant committed
the offenses charged while on bond for two other active
criminal cases, because drugs, including fentanyl, and a
weapon were found at the Defendant's residence, because
the Defendant sold fentanyl to an undercover informant, and
finally because the Defendant made a call to a friend asking
that the friend wipe clean or delete data from the
Defendant's cell phone while detained pending these
charges. Thus, the Defendant was ordered to be detained
pending trial.
A
defendant may file a motion seeking review or revocation of a
detention order when the defendant has been “ordered
detained by a magistrate judge, or by a person other than a
judge of a court having original jurisdiction over the
offense and other than a Federal appellate court.” 18
U.S.C. § 3145(b). A district court may review a
magistrate's detention order without holding a new
hearing. See United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064,
1071 (7th Cir. 1990) (“An evidentiary hearing is
necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a
significant disputed factual issue.”).
The
argument for revocation set forth in the Defendant's
Motion consists of the following assertions:
• The Defendant's pending cases in Michigan have
been resolved.
• The Defendant would reside in Fort Wayne and would be
able to find employment.
• The Defendant is not a flight risk or a danger to the
community, and that charges alone do not justify detention.
(Mot. 2-3, ECF No. 50.) The Defendant also states that he
would not object to any conditions of pretrial release and
offers several example conditions.
The
Bail Reform Act requires a judicial officer to order pretrial
release on personal recognizance or upon the execution of an
unsecured appearance bond “unless the judicial officer
determines that such release will not reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required or will endanger the
safety of any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(b). Detention can be based on a showing of either
dangerousness or risk of flight; only one is required.
United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 765 (7th Cir.
1985). If such unconditional release will not reasonably
assure appearance or will endanger safety, then the judicial
officer must consider a number of conditions to accompany the
release order. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c). However, if, after a
hearing pursuant to § 3142(f), the judicial officer
finds that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required
and the safety of any other person and the community, the
judicial officer shall order detention pending trial.
Id. § 3142(e).
Section
3142(e) provides for two rebuttable presumptions in favor of
detention. Because the Defendant's drugs and firearms
offenses meet the requirements of § 3142(e)(3)(A) and
(B), the Magistrate Judge was correct to find that his
offense triggered a rebuttable presumption in favor of
detention. A defendant can rebut the presumption by
“coming forward with some evidence that he will not
flee or endanger the community if released.” United
States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986).
The rebutted presumption, however, is not erased.
Id. “Instead it remains in the case as an
evidentiary finding militating against release, to be weighed
along with other evidence relevant to factors listed in
§ 3142(g).” Id.
The
factors to be considered in determining whether there are
conditions of release that will reasonably assure the
appearance of the defendant and the safety of any other
person and the community fit into four general categories.
They take into account the available information
concerning-(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence
or involves a narcotic drug; (2) the weight of the evidence
against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of
the person, including-(A) the person's character,
physical and mental condition, family ties, employment,
financial resources, length of residence in the community,
community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or
alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings; and (B) whether, at the time
of the current offense or arrest, the person was on
probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial,
sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense
under federal, state, or local law; and (4) the nature and
seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person's release. 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g).
The
Court considers first the Defendant's argument that the
resolution of the matters in Michigan affect the
Defendant's detention. The Defendant's submissions
indicate that he pled guilty to the relevant charges in state
court, including possession of narcotics. The Defendant
states that, “[b]ased on this change in background
information, ” and because “Magistrate Judge
Cherry denied Defendant's release based in part on a
concern about matters pending in the state of Michigan,
” the Defendant “believes that the Court can now
find there are conditions of release that would satisfy the
two-prong test of Defendant being a flight risk and a danger
to the community.” (Mot. ¶¶ 6-8.)
First,
the Defendant's guilty pleas in state court in Michigan
do not alter the analysis regarding detention. Magistrate
Judge Cherry found that the Defendant was a flight risk and a
danger to the community in part because: “[t]he
defendant committed the offenses charged in this case while
on court supervisions (bond conditions) in two other criminal
cases against him both of which are pending active
cases.” While the Defendant is correct that the cases
are no longer pending and active, the more important part of
the finding is that the Defendant committed additional
offenses while on previous court supervisions, and nothing
about that part of the ...