United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS, SCREENING AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT, AND DIRECTING
PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE
Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Jonathan Psi Young's motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, dkt. , is granted.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A), an initial
partial filing fee of twenty-one dollars and nine-seven cents
($21.97) is assessed and shall be paid to the clerk of the
district court no later than March 12, 2019.
Mr. Young is excused from pre-paying the full filing
fee, he still must pay the three hundred and fifty dollar
($350.00) filing fee pursuant to the statutory formula set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) when able. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (“the prisoner shall be
required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.”).
Screening Legal Standard
Psi Young is a prisoner currently incarcerated at
Indiana's Plainfield Correctional Facility. Because Mr.
Young is a prisoner as that term is defined by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(c), this Court has an obligation under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b) to screen the complaint before service on
defendants. Pursuant to Section 1915A(b), the Court must
dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining
whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the
same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v.
Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). To survive
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se
complaints such as that filed by Mr. Young are construed
liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792
F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
Young asserts Eighth Amendment claims for “deliberate
indifference to medical needs, unsafe conditions, and
discrimination.” Dkt. 1, p. 2. His assertions are:
I placed a heathcare request . . . stating a notice of
appointment to Dr. Thayer to provide services as a co-trustee
for the purposes of executing a statement of competency to
determine me to be of sound mind and body to authenticate my
ability to execute legal documents related to Will and Trusts
and capacity at suit. Dr. M. Links trespassed and broke
confidentiality by opening a private letter addressed to Dr.
Thayer. Further, Dr. M. Links took it upon himself to
schedule an interview to attempt to gain implied consent to
abuse his discretion by intentionally slandering me stating
that I made statements that were bizarre and non-sensical and
that I needed to be placed . . . on psychiatric evaluation. .
. . Dr. M. Links fraudulently coerced an on the spot
evaluation in an attempt to acquiesce a commitment to
psychological hospitalization to which I immediately denied
consent and was then returned by threats over and beyond Dr.
M. Links ability to perform solely, stating that he would
forcibly detain me and drastically depreciate the status of
my accustomed [sic] of living to which I became in fear for
my life. I have since filed notice of default of previous
appointment and accompanied a notice of rescission of any
agreement Dr. M. Links assumes he may have acquired by his
threats of duress and coercion. . . . Dr. M.
Links has placed me under psychological observation . . .
based on a pure prejudice in retaliation of a notice to
determine competency and not of any sound
judgment. . . .
I have reason to suspect that [defendants] are involved in a
conspiracy to render me incompetent to cover up a claim of
fraudulent joinder that ...