United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ANTONIO M. BROWN, Petitioner,
JEFFREY E. KRUEGER, Respondent.
ORDER DENYING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28
U.S.C. § 2241 AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL
William T. Lawrence, Senior Judge
Antonio M. Brown is currently incarcerated at the United
States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana. He seeks a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Brown
challenges his sentence arguing that Hobbs Act Robbery, 18
U.S.C. § 1951, is not a “crime of violence”
under Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). For
the reasons explained below, the petition for writ of habeas
corpus is dismissed.
was indicted on September 17, 2015 in the Eastern District of
Missouri. On April 20, 2016, Brown pled guilty to one count
of interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 1); and one count of possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 2). United States v.
Brown, 1:15-cr-108-SNLJ (E.D. Mo. 2017) (hereinafter
24, 2017, the district court sentenced Brown to a combined
sentence of 240 months' imprisonment (120 months'
imprisonment as to Count 1, to be followed by a consecutive
sentence of 120 months' imprisonment for Count 2). Crim.
Dkt. 70. Brown did not appeal.
September 28, 2017, Brown filed a motion pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
and a supplemental motion claiming that his Hobbs Act Robbery
was improperly classified as a crime of violence. See
Brown v. United States, No. 1:17-cv-174 (E.D. Mo. 2017).
His motion was dismissed, and the Court found that Hobbs Act
robbery was a crime of violence. Brown appealed to the Eighth
Circuit and his certificate of appealability was denied on
August 7, 2018.
22, 2018, Brown filed a petition for permission to file a
successive habeas petition with the Eighth Circuit arguing
that his Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence in
light of Dimaya. See Brown v. United
States, No. 18-2103 (8th Cir. 2018). On October 5, 2018,
the Eighth Circuit denied Brown permission to file a
successive petition. Id.
now files a petition under § 2241 again arguing that his
Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence in light of
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the presumptive
means by which a federal prisoner can challenge his
conviction or sentence. See Shepherd v. Krueger, 911
F.3d 861, 862 (7th Cir. 2018); Webster v. Daniels,
784 F.3d 1123, 1124 (7th Cir. 2015). Under very limited
circumstances, however, a prisoner may employ Section 2241 to
challenge his federal conviction or sentence.
Webster, 784 F.3d at 1124. This is because
“[§] 2241 authorizes federal courts to issue writs
of habeas corpus, but § 2255(e) makes § 2241
unavailable to a federal prisoner unless it ‘appears
that the remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of [the]
detention.'” Roundtree v. Krueger, 910
F.3d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 2018). Section 2255(e) is known as
the “savings clause.” The Seventh Circuit has
held that § 2255 is “'inadequate or
ineffective' when it cannot be used to address novel
developments in either statutory or constitutional law,
whether those developments concern the conviction or the
sentence.” Roundtree, 910 F.3d at 313
(citing e.g., In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th
Cir. 1998); Brown v.Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir.
2013); Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir.
2015) (en banc)).
Seventh Circuit construed the savings clause in In re
A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed
inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted
defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so
fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been
imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998).
Seventh Circuit has explained that, to fit within the savings
clause following Davenport, a petitioner must meet
three conditions: “(1) the petitioner must rely on a
case of statutory interpretation (because invoking such a
case cannot secure authorization for a second § 2255
motion); (2) the new rule must be previously unavailable and
apply retroactively; and (3) the error asserted must be grave
enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice, such as the
conviction of an innocent defendant.” Davis v.
Cross, 863 F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 2017); Brown v.
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013); see also
Roundtree, 910 F.3d at 313 (acknowledging circuit split
regarding Davenport conditions ...