United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division
OPINION AND ORDER
COLLINS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is a motion to compel filed by Plaintiff Birchrea
Partners, Inc. (“Birchrea”), on January 9, 2019,
asking that the Court compel Defendant Regent Bank
(“Regent”) to submit to a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition noticed for January 25, 2019. (DE 62). Regent
filed a response the next day (DE 64); Birchrea has not
yet filed a reply, and the time to do so has now run. N.D.
Ind. L.R. 7-1(d)(2)(B).
motion to compel is obviously deficient. Birchrea failed to
file a separate Local Rule 37-1 certification representing
that its counsel has conferred in good faith or attempted to
confer in good faith with Regent's counsel in an effort
to resolve the matter without Court action. N.D. Ind. L.R.
37-1(a). The certification must state the date, time, and
place of the conference or attempted conference and the names
of all persons participating therein. N.D. Ind. L.R. 37-1(a).
The Court may deny the motion on this basis alone.
See N.D. Ind. L.R. 37-1(b).
it is quite obvious from Birchrea's motion that the
parties have not yet conferred in good faith or attempted to
meet and confer in good faith in an effort to resolve the
matter without Court action. In the motion, Birchrea explains
that on January 3, 2019, it unilaterally noticed the
deposition after Regent failed to respond within four days to
Birchrea's December 20th correspondence advising Regent
of Birchrea's intention to schedule a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition. Regent did respond to Birchrea's
correspondence on January 8, 2019, stating that its corporate
representative was not available on January 25, 2019, but
proposed alternative dates of February 12, 20, or 22. Later
that day, Birchrea's counsel replied via email to
Regent's counsel that the deposition must take place on
or before January 25, 2018, the discovery deadline in this
case. (DE 52). Rather than confer further with Regent's
counsel, Birchrea instead filed the instant motion to compel
the following day.
correspondences may fail to meet Rule 37's standard if
the court determines that the correspondences were not
genuine two-way communications involving a meaningful
dialogue.” Lewis v. Saint Margaret Mercy, No.
2:11 CV 313, 2013 WL 214239, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2013)
(citation omitted). “The communication specifically
must address the conflict and appear to involve meaningful
negotiations.” Id.; see Romary Assocs.,
Inc. v. Kibbi LLC, No. 1:10-cv-00376-JD-RBC, 2011 WL
4005346, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 8, 2011) (“Such a
dialogue occurs when the parties engage in bartering or
negotiations rather than merely reciting their general
stances on the issues.” (citation omitted)); Imbody
v. C & R Plating Corp., No. 1:08-CV-218, 2010 WL
3184392, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2010) (concluding that
several letters exchanged between counsel was not a good
faith conference); Shoppell v. Schrader, No.
1:08-CV-284, 2009 WL 2515817, at *1-2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 13,
2009) (finding that a telephone call and a letter was not a
good faith conference); Forest River Hous., Inc. v.
Patriot Homes, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-841 AS, 2007 WL
1376289, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 7, 2007) (“[T]wo emails .
. . do not constitute meaningful discussion or serious
negotiations to resolve the disputed discovery issue.”
correspondence between Birchrea's counsel and
Regent's counsel shows that the parties exchanged only
three emails regarding the dates for the Rule 30(b)(6)
examination, and that the parties never conducted a
telephonic meet and confer on the issue. (See DE
62-2 through DE 62-4). “The parties are reminded that
discovery is supposed to be a cooperative endeavor, requiring
minimal judicial intervention.” C.A. v. Amli at
Riverbend LP, No. 1:06-cv-1736-SEB-JMS, 2008 WL 1995451,
at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 7, 2008) (citing Airtex Corp. v.
Shelley Radiant Ceiling Co., 536 F.2d 145, 155 (7th Cir.
1976)). “The requirement to meet-and-confer must be
taken seriously, because [b]efore the court can rule on a
motion, the parties must demonstrate they acted in good faith
to resolve the issue among themselves.” Garcia v.
Aartman Transp. Corp., No. 4:08-cv-77, 2010 WL 2427571,
at *4 (N.D. Ind. June 4, 2010) (alteration in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
because there is no evidence that the parties met and
conferred in good faith or attempted to meet and confer in
good faith prior to filing the motion to compel,
Birchrea's motion to compel (DE 62) is DENIED without
prejudice. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to term Regent's
motion in opposition (DE 64), as it is actually a response
 While Regent entitled its response as
a “motion in opposition, ” it actually is a