United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge
se Plaintiff Cameron Hawkins filed this Title VII
employment action on December 14, 2017. [Filing No.
1.] Following the filing of various pleading amendments,
[Filing No. 23; Filing No. 32],
and a period of discovery, Defendant Allegion,
(“Allegion”) filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 54], which is
currently pending before the Court. Mr. Hawkins failed to
respond in the allotted time, and to date has not responded.
The Motion is therefore ripe, and the Court, being duly
advised, GRANTS the Motion for the reasons
set forth below.
motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a
trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and, instead, that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. SeeFed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). As the current version of Rule 56 makes clear,
whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or
genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact
by citing to particular parts of the record, including
depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing that
the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence
of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or declarations must be made on
personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in
evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify
on matters stated. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly
support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual
assertion can result in the movant's fact being
considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of
summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only
consider disputed facts that are material to the decision. A
disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Hampton v. Ford Motor
Co., 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). In other words,
while there may be facts that are in dispute, summary
judgment is appropriate if those facts are not outcome
determinative. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d
521, 525 (7th Cir. 2005). Fact disputes that are irrelevant
to the legal question will not suffice to defeat summary
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence
it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its
version of the events. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus.,
325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). The moving party is
entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable factfinder
could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson
v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court
views the record in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that
party's favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp.,
512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). It cannot weigh evidence
or make credibility determinations on summary judgment
because those tasks are left to the fact-finder.
O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657
F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court need only consider
the cited materials, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh
Circuit has “repeatedly assured the district courts
that they are not required to scour every inch of the record
for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary
judgment motion before them, ” Johnson, 325
F.3d at 898. Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue
for trial is resolved against the moving party. Ponsetti
v. GE Pension Plan, 614 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2010).
failing to respond to Allegion's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Mr. Hawkins has conceded Allegion's version of
the facts. Brasic v. Heinemann's Inc., 121 F.3d
281, 286 (7th Cir. 1997). This does not alter the standard
for assessing a Rule 56 motion, but it does “reduc[e]
the pool” from which the facts and inferences relevant
to such a motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129
F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
forth above, while the following facts are presented in the
light most favorable to Mr. Hawkins as the nonmoving party,
they are limited to those presented in Allegion's version
of the facts due to Mr. Hawkins' failure to respond to
Allegion's Motion. Furthermore, the recitation of the
facts is limited to those necessary for resolving the issues
presented by Allegion's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Mr. Hawkins' Employment at Allegion
Hawkins began his employment with Allegion in March 2013.
[Filing No. 55-2 at 1.] The plant at which Mr.
Hawkins worked manufactured locks and related devices for
doors. [Filing No. 55-2 at 7.] From June 2016 until
his eventual discharge in June 2017, Mr. Hawkins worked as a
“receiving clerk.” [Filing No. 55-2 at
8.] Up until his termination, Mr. Hawkins had a
satisfactory performance record and was awarded a raise based
upon his performance. [Filing No. 55-4 at 2.]
September 2015 EEOC Charge
September 2015, Mr. Hawkins filed an EEOC charge, alleging
that he had suffered harassment and race discrimination.
[Filing No. 55-2 at 50-51; Filing No. 32-1 at
4.] Allegion and the EEOC investigated Mr. Hawkins'
complaints, which based upon his deposition testimony
involved someone printing a Confederate flag on the company
computer. [Filing No. 55-2 at 63-64.] Mr. Hawkins
elected not to sue after he received his right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC. [Filing No. 55-2 at 17.] The
September 2015 EEOC charge was the only charge Mr. Hawkins
filed during his employment with Allegion. [Filing No.
55-2 at 10.] Neither Ernest Maul nor Dimo Vckov, the two
supervisors responsible for terminating Mr. Hawkins in 2017,
were supervising Mr. Hawkins at the time of his September
2015 EEOC charge, and neither were aware of the September
2015 EEOC charge until after Mr. Hawkins' termination.
[Filing No. 55-2 at 51; Filing No. 55-3 at
3-4; Filing No. 55-4 at 3-4.]
Events Leading to Mr. ...