United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
IN THE MATTER OF JOHN H. DAVIS
JANE MAGNUS-STINSON JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Respondent John H. Davis's
Motion to Reconsider Order Imposing Discipline
(“Motion to Reconsider”) [Filing No.
10]. Respondent contends this Court improperly imposed
reciprocal attorney discipline against him. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court denies Respondent's Motion.
Court examines a motion to reconsider as one to alter or
amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Kiswani v.
Phoenix Sec. Agency, Inc., 584 F.3d 741, 742 (7th Cir.
2009). Relief under Rule 59(e) is an
“extraordinary remed[y] reserved for the exceptional
case.” Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 442
(7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d
582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008)). “A Rule 59(e) motion will be
successful only where the movant clearly establishes:
‘(1) that the court committed a manifest error of law
or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded
entry of judgment.'” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co.
v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698
F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012)). It is not an opportunity to
relitigate motions or present arguments, issues, or facts
that could and should have been presented earlier.
See Foster, 545 F.3d at 584.
29, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit removed Respondent from its roll of attorneys. In
re Davis, No. 17-1732, Dkt. No. 76 (7th Cir. May 29,
2018) (unpublished order imposing discipline). The
disciplinary action arose from Respondent's conduct in a
district court case, Davis v. Alabama Department of Human
Resources, No. 2:16-cv-00120-PPS-PRC, 2017 WL 930649
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 9, 2017) (dismissing complaint for failure to
comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10), and
from Respondent's conduct in his appeal of that decision,
Davis v. Anderson, 718 Fed.Appx. 420 (7th Cir. 2017)
(unpublished order affirming district court's dismissal
and ordering Respondent to show cause why he should not be
removed from the roll of attorneys), reh'g and
reh'g en banc denied, motion to file untimely cert.
order imposing discipline, the Seventh Circuit pointed to
Respondent's excessively voluminous filings in the
district court (including a 165-page amended
complaint with 429 pages of exhibits), his questionable
representation of his ex-wife and estranged adult son in the
case, and his frivolous appellate arguments. The court
declared, “Our main concern was that the quality of
Davis's work fell far below the standards expected of
members of this court's bar.” In re Davis,
No. 17-1732, Dkt. No. 76 at 2. Finding that Respondent failed
to comply with court rules and that he cannot adequately
represent his own or his clients' interests, the Seventh
Circuit concluded Respondent's conduct warranted
discipline pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
46(b) and (c) (providing in relevant part that a “court
of appeals may discipline an attorney who practices before it
for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to
comply with any court rule”). Accordingly, the court
ordered that Respondent be removed from the roll of attorneys
admitted to practice before it.
11, 2018, in response to the discipline imposed by the
Seventh Circuit and after affording Respondent notice and an
opportunity to be heard, this Court issued an Order Imposing
Discipline against Respondent, reciprocally removing
Respondent from this Court's roll of attorneys. [Filing
No. 7.] Rule II of the Local Rules of Disciplinary
Enforcement for the Southern District of Indiana provides
that, upon receipt of an order by another court publicly
disciplining an attorney and after providing the attorney
notice and an opportunity to be heard,
this Court shall impose the identical discipline
unless the respondent-attorney demonstrates, or this Court
finds, that upon the face of the record upon which the
discipline in another jurisdiction is predicated it clearly
1. that the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity
to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
2. that there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the
misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that this
Court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as ...