United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, CHIEF JUDGE
Terry Tripp filed this civil rights action on January 30,
2017. At the time of filing, he was incarcerated at the
Putnamville Correctional Facility
(“Putnamville”). He filed an amended complaint on
May 5, 2017. Dkt. 25. The Court screened the amended
complaint and allowed the following claims to proceed against
three medical defendants:
1) Dr. Vikki Burdine prescribed medications in powder form
which is contrary to the manufacturers' instructions, and
refused to prescribe Mr. Tripp Welbutrin, in violation of the
2) Dr. Courtney Deloney refused to provide mental health
treatment and refused to prescribe or allow other physicians
to prescribe necessary mental health medications in violation
of the Eighth Amendment and in retaliation for Mr. Tripp
filing grievances, in violation of the First Amendment; and
3) Dr. Spanenberg prescribed medications in powder form which
is contrary to the manufacturers' instructions and
discontinued necessary medications without reason in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and in retaliation for
filing grievances in violation of the First Amendment.
Tripp seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief. He is
no longer incarcerated at Putnamville, so his claim for
injunctive relief is dismissed as moot.
See also dkt. 76 (denying plaintiff's motions
for preliminary injunctive relief).
defendants have moved for summary judgment and Mr. Tripp has
not opposed the motion. For the reasons explained in this
Entry, the defendants' unopposed motion for summary
judgment, dkt. , must be granted.
purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings
and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a
genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A “material fact” is one that
“might affect the outcome of the suit.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the
non-moving party must set forth specific, admissible evidence
showing that there is a material issue for trial. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Court
views the record in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that
party's favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp.,
512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). The Court cannot weigh
evidence or make credibility determinations on summary
judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder.
O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625,
630 (7th Cir. 2011).
dispute about a material fact is genuine only “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If no
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, then
there is no “genuine” dispute. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
defendants' motion for summary judgment, brief in
support, and Local Rule 56-1 notice were served on Mr. Tripp
on or about March 26, 2018. Dkt. nos. 88, 89, 90, 91. As
noted, no response has been filed, and the deadline for doing
so has long passed.
consequence of Mr. Tripp's failure to respond is that he
has conceded the defendants' version of the facts.
Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by
the local rules results in an admission.”);
see S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1 (“A party
opposing a summary judgment motion must . . . file and serve
a response brief and any evidence . . . that the party relies
on to oppose the motion. The response must . . . identif[y]
the potentially determinative facts and factual disputes that
the party contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding
summary judgment.”). This does not alter the standard
for assessing a Rule 56(a) motion, but does “reduc[e]
the pool” from which the facts and inferences relative
to such a motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129
F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
following facts, unopposed by Mr. Tripp and supported by
admissible evidence, are accepted as true:
Vikki Burdine has been a licensed medical doctor in Indiana
since 1990 and specializes in General Psychiatry. Dr. Burdine
worked as a psychiatrist for Corizon LLC
(“Corizon”) from April 2010 until March 31, 2017,
when Wexford of Indiana (“Wexford”) became the
contracted health care provider. As of the date the motion
for summary judgment was filed, she was employed by Wexford
as a psychiatrist.
Mr. Tripp was incarcerated in the Indiana Department of
Correction (“IDOC”) in August 2016, he reported a
history of mental health treatment for PTSD, anxiety, bipolar
disorder, and depression. He also reported that he was taking
Buspirone, Wellbutrin, and Gabapentin.
is a highly abused and trafficked drug within the IDOC and
prisons across the country. Buspirone (Buspar) is commonly
prescribed to treat anxiety and is used to augment
antidepressants. Buspar generally has a low risk of
dependence and does not cause feelings of euphoria. However,
it has sedative effects that can cause some patients to abuse
it. Gabapentin (Neurontin) is a nerve pain medication and
anticonvulsant prescribed to treat seizures. ...