United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
William T. Lawrence, Senior Judge
Petitioner Jerry Ray Grinstead brings the instant petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
challenging his Indiana convictions for murder, theft, and
other related crimes. For the reasons explained below, his
habeas petition must be denied as untimely. In addition, the
Court concludes that a certificate of appealability should
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Grinstead was convicted of murder, theft, and other related
crimes, and he was sentenced to a total term of 108 years.
His convictions were ultimately affirmed by the Indiana
Supreme Court on July 22, 1997. See Grinstead v.
State, 684 N.E.2d 482, 483 (Ind. 1997)
Grinstead filed a pro se petition for
post-conviction relief on February 4, 2000. His
post-conviction petition was denied, but the Indiana Court of
Appeals reversed on September 23, 2004. It concluded that
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and ordered a
new trial. The Indiana Supreme Court granted the State's
petition to transfer. It held that trial counsel did not
provide ineffective assistance, but that appellate counsel
did by failing to raise an available Double Jeopardy claim
regarding Mr. Grinstead's theft conviction. See
Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1038 (Ind. 2006)
(''Grinstead II''). Mr.
Grinstead's theft conviction was vacated, but his
murder-related convictions remained.
October 13, 2017, Mr. Grinstead filed in state court a motion
for authorization to file a successive post-conviction
petition. His request for authorization was denied on
December 17, 2017.
Grinstead filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas
corpus with this Court on January 18, 2018.
Grinstead raises several challenges to his remaining
convictions in his habeas petition. The respondent argues
that Mr. Grinstead's habeas petition must be denied as
untimely. The Court concludes that Mr. Grinstead's habeas
petition is untimely and must be dismissed with prejudice.
petitions brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are
subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year period "runs from
the latest of four specified dates" in § 2244(d).
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 148 (2012)
(citation and alterations omitted). Applicable here is §
2244(d)(1)(A), which states that the one-year limitations
period runs from "the date on which the judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of
the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(A); see Gladney v. Pollard, 799 F.3d 889,
894 (7th Cir. 2015). This leaves two options for when a
judgment becomes final. "For petitioners who pursue
direct review all the way to th[e] [United States Supreme]
Court, the judgment becomes final. . . when th[e] [United
States Supreme] Court affirms a conviction on the merits or
denies a petition for certiorari." Gonzalez,
565 U.S. at 150 (quotation marks omitted). "For all
other petitioners, the judgment becomes final. . . when the
time for pursuing direct review in th[e] [United States
Supreme] Court, or in state court, expires."
Id. (quotation marks omitted). "The one-year
clock is stopped, however, during the time the
petitioner's 'properly filed' application for
state postconviction relief 'is pending.'"
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 201 (2006) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).
noted above, on July 22, 1997, the Indiana Supreme Court
affirmed Mr. Grinstead's direct appeal. See Grinstead
I, 684 N.E.2d at 483. He did not file a petition for
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, so his
conviction became final when the time for doing so expired.
See Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 150. Rule 13 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
provides ninety days after the entry of judgment to petition