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Grinstead v. Warden

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division

November 7, 2018

JERRY RAY GRINSTEAD, Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, Respondent.

          ENTRY DISCUSSING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

          Hon. William T. Lawrence, Senior Judge

          Petitioner Jerry Ray Grinstead brings the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Indiana convictions for murder, theft, and other related crimes. For the reasons explained below, his habeas petition must be denied as untimely. In addition, the Court concludes that a certificate of appealability should not issue.

         The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

         I.

         Background

         Mr. Grinstead was convicted of murder, theft, and other related crimes, and he was sentenced to a total term of 108 years. His convictions were ultimately affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court on July 22, 1997. See Grinstead v. State, 684 N.E.2d 482, 483 (Ind. 1997) (''Grinstead I").

         Mr. Grinstead filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on February 4, 2000. His post-conviction petition was denied, but the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed on September 23, 2004. It concluded that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and ordered a new trial. The Indiana Supreme Court granted the State's petition to transfer. It held that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance, but that appellate counsel did by failing to raise an available Double Jeopardy claim regarding Mr. Grinstead's theft conviction. See Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1038 (Ind. 2006) (''Grinstead II''). Mr. Grinstead's theft conviction was vacated, but his murder-related convictions remained.

         On October 13, 2017, Mr. Grinstead filed in state court a motion for authorization to file a successive post-conviction petition. His request for authorization was denied on December 17, 2017.

         Mr. Grinstead filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court on January 18, 2018.

         II.

         Discussion

         Mr. Grinstead raises several challenges to his remaining convictions in his habeas petition. The respondent argues that Mr. Grinstead's habeas petition must be denied as untimely. The Court concludes that Mr. Grinstead's habeas petition is untimely and must be dismissed with prejudice.

         Habeas petitions brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year period "runs from the latest of four specified dates" in § 2244(d). Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 148 (2012) (citation and alterations omitted). Applicable here is § 2244(d)(1)(A), which states that the one-year limitations period runs from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see Gladney v. Pollard, 799 F.3d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 2015). This leaves two options for when a judgment becomes final. "For petitioners who pursue direct review all the way to th[e] [United States Supreme] Court, the judgment becomes final. . . when th[e] [United States Supreme] Court affirms a conviction on the merits or denies a petition for certiorari." Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 150 (quotation marks omitted). "For all other petitioners, the judgment becomes final. . . when the time for pursuing direct review in th[e] [United States Supreme] Court, or in state court, expires." Id. (quotation marks omitted). "The one-year clock is stopped, however, during the time the petitioner's 'properly filed' application for state postconviction relief 'is pending.'" Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 201 (2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

         As noted above, on July 22, 1997, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Grinstead's direct appeal. See Grinstead I, 684 N.E.2d at 483. He did not file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, so his conviction became final when the time for doing so expired. See Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 150. Rule 13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States provides ninety days after the entry of judgment to petition ...


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